



### Who is This Guy?



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IBM's Emergency Response Service

Senior Incident Response Analyst and CSIRP Development Lead Immersed in the forensics and incident response world since 2004

The Usual Security Certs: CISSP, CISA, CISM, EnCE, CCE, etc.

Former Ski Train conductor!





- What is a CSIRP and why have one?
- Examples of Fail and Success
- CSIRP Success Factors
  - Internal Communication
  - Regulatory Issues & Committees
  - Blame
  - Cyclical Nature
  - Tiered and Flexible CSIRP
  - Resources
- Recap



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#### What is a CSIRP?



#### Computer Security Incident Response Plan

CSIRPs come in many different names but have the same goal:

Apply a pre-approved process and methodology to address computer security incidents in order to allow an efficient and coordinated response.



My experience with CSIRPs...

#### Incident Response Experience:

- Involved in hundreds of client emergencies, large and small
- Able to view what has and has not worked during incident response
- Develop custom CSIRPs for large, international companies in various sectors

#### **Show of Hands!**



How many in the audience work for a company that has:

- A CSIRP?
- Updated their CSIRP in the last 9 months?
- Conducted a mock incident in the last 9 months?
- A specific person assigned to maintain your CSIRP?
- Pre-printed copies of your CSIRP?
- A plan consisting of someone yelling 'PANIC!' and 40 people jump on a conference line?
  - The Costanza Option



## Why Have a CSIRP?



#### Why is a CSIRP Important?

- 1. Saves time
- 2. Defensible, pre-approved methodology
- 3. Ensures the appropriate notifications
- 4. Communications structure
- 5. Easier to gather appropriate resources
- 6. Quicker resumption of operations



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## **Example of Fail**



#### Scenario:

A large bank experienced a successful SQL injection attack. Initial indicators demonstrated a high likelihood customer data was compromised.

#### The People:

Skilled, qualified to be in their positions, and seemingly excellent people to respond to the incident.

#### **Example of Fail**



#### What went wrong?

- 1) Took four hours to find where the CSIRP was located.
- 2) Practice? What practice?
- 3) No clear person in charge or an apparent chain of command.
- 4) Executives jumping into the trenches.
- 5) No one notified regulatory agencies.
- 6) Blame was assigned.
- 7) CSIRP was not flexible to accommodate the situation.

## **Example of Fail**



#### End result?

An incident that would have normally taken only a few days to address became a long, drawn out affair.

Simply put, it was a mess.

#### **Example of Success**



#### Scenario:

A medium sized, publicly traded chemical company had information posted on PasteBin about the ability to access restricted URLs with customer information.

#### The People:

Skilled, qualified to be in their positions, and seemingly excellent people to respond to the incident.

#### **Example of Success**



#### What went right?

- 1. Key decision makers were quickly. Required attendees only.
- 2. Clear authority.
- 3. Redundancy.
- 4. Regulatory team was brought into the response early.
- 5. Statements to media and investors came from one source.
- 6. Key system owners with proper credentials were able to be immediately contacted.
- 7. Proper after action review occurred.

#### **Example of Success**



#### End result?

The incident was treated with the proper level of severity.

Regulatory considerations were brought forth early on in the engagement.

Coordinated, preplanned response.

#### The Issues



Breaking down the issues with the bank and the chemical company...


- 1. Internal communication
- 2. Regulatory Issues
- 3. Blame
- 4. Flexible CSIRP
- 5. Who's in charge?
- 6. Not including the proper people
- 7. Cyclical process



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The number one issue we see during incidents is not properly managing internal communication.





#### What went wrong?


- 1. Who is in charge?
- 2. Is this a coordinate response?
- 3. Siloed information and response?
- 4. Individual effort or a team effort?













#### How does this help?

- 1. Clear, preapproved lines of communication
- 2. Key decisions makers are informed of all information
- 3. Executive management is kept in the loop
- 4. Organized, efficient response

### Incident Manager



- Technical
- Must understand incident response and security
- Comprehends threat landscape
- Calm under pressure
- Knowledge of technical layout of the organization





#### **Incident Officer**



- Moderately technical
- Able to present well
- Understand business goals and risks
- Have an intimate organizational knowledge
- Respected by C-Level executives
- Invested in the CSIRP process





# Who's In Charge?



A clear chain of command also reinforces who is in charge.

- No diffusion of responsibility
- Accountability
- Investment in the CSIRP process







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We live and work in a highly regulated environment.

- PCI
- HIPAA
- SOX
- Individual state disclosure rules (California)
- Etc.

Depending on the regulation, disclosures may need to be reported within five days of a *suspected* release.




How do we remedy this?

Create tripwires to include relevant regulatory experts.

As soon as it is *possible* information may have been accessed by an unauthorized party, the regulatory committee gets pulled in.







**Incident Manager** 



The regulatory committee is notified by the strategic team as soon as they may need to be involved.

- 'Plugged in' as needed and not a part of every incident.
- Briefed, may ask clarifying questions, convey their concerns, etc.
- They do not jump into the trenches.

#### Committees



A committee approach may be applied towards other sensitive issues (e.g., brand management, corporate security).

Creates buy in from the committee members Spreads knowledge of the CSIRP process



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### Blame



"Mary's weak password caused this event."

"Joe failed to secure the application."

#### Blame




It is not the role of the core incident response team to assign blame. Why?

- Knowledge is rapidly changing.
- Statements may hurt reputation.

Ensure this is reinforced in trainings and mock incidents.

### Blame







Incident Manager



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
# Cyclical



- Treat the CSIRP like a living document
- Not to be dusted off only during emergencies
- Preparation and after action often neglected

# Cyclical





Source: NIST

# Agenda



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## Tiered Approach



Incidents need to be classified with at least three tiers of importance.

- Avoids panic at every incident
- No 'crying wolf'
- Ensures truly bad incidents are treated as such



# Does your CSIRP address:















- Threat Based
  - Limited value
  - Process breaks down for undefined threats
- Symptom Based
  - Plan for emerging threats
  - Covers USB eating locusts





#### **Examples of Symptom Based Standards:**

- Minimal risk of the unresolved problem getting worse or spreading to other areas of the organization.
- Potential risk...
- Medium to high risk...
- High risk...





### **Examples of Symptom Based Standards:**

- Limited to very few individuals and/or systems.
- Limited to single department and/or non-critical application
- Event affects several locations and/or systems and/or applications with a direct business impact.
- Event affects worldwide operations and/or systems and applications critical to the business



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### Resources



- People
- Money and Contractors

#### Resources



- Must be able to pull employees from normal jobs
  - Authority
  - CSIRP emergencies take priorities

#### Resources



### Money and Contractors

Incident Manager must be able to be able to quickly allocated equipment and necessary contractors

- Small slush fund (~\$2,500)
- Pre-approval to include certain contractors

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# Wrapping It Up



- Control communication
- Symptom vs. threat based
- Committees can be your friends
- Cyclical process
- No blame
- Resources

# Questions?



# Thank you!

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