

# Application Firewalling in the Age of Mobile: New Considerations

 OWASP Orlando Chapter Meeting May 15, 2012
 Stephen Mak, Product Manager smak@layer7tech.com

## Agenda

- Introduction
  - Layer 7 Technologies
- Background
  - Hacking's Gilded Age: How APIs Will Increase Risk and Chaos
- The New API Threat
  - API Parameterization
  - Identity
  - Cryptography



#### Layer 7 Technologies – Introduction

- Founded in 2002
- Based in Vancouver, BC, Canada
- Provide Integration Governance solutions for SOA, Cloud and API Management
- Customers include large commercial enterprises, public sector organizations, and service providers across a number of vertical markets worldwide



#### Layer 7 Technologies Provides Secure Integration Technology That **Enable The Hybrid Enterprise: Divisions, Partners, Mobile & Cloud**



٠

Over the Top TV and Media (Xbox Live and Smart TV)

#### **Emerging Hybrid Enterprise Connectivity Use Cases**

#### X-Departments & Agencies

- Application Reuse
- Private Cloud Integration
- Data Federation
- Federated ESB



#### Partners

- Real-time Supply Chain
- Media Syndication
- Trading Platform Integration
- Web Ecosystems

#### <u>Mobile</u>

- BYOD Employee Enablement
- iPad Field Enablement
- API Developer Communities
- Smart Grid



#### <u>Cloud</u>

- SaaS Access
- IaaS Integration & Governance
- Big Data Connectors
- Social Integration



#### L7 Product Suite Designed For New API-Driven Cloud and Mobile Connectivity Requirements

#### Virtual & Cloud Deployable API Gateway



**API Developer Portal** 

**Enterprise Service Manager** 

ECHNOLOGIE

Integrated HSM Card

#### Layer 7 Is The Market Leader For Securing And Governing SOA, API And Cloud Based Interactions Across The New Hybrid Enterprise



#### **Examples of Layer 7 Technologies Customers**



#### **Background / Context**

- The Gilded Age?
- A time of impressive economic growth (output, 1865-1898):
  - Wheat: 256%
  - Corn: +222%
  - Coal: +800%
  - Railway: +567% (miles of track)
- Rise of the great "robber-barons"
  - Rockefeller
  - Mellon
  - Carnegie
  - Morgan
  - Vanderbilt
  - Astor



Hacking's Gilded Age: How APIs Will Increase Risk And Chaos

K. Scott Morrison CTO & Chief Architect Laver 7 Technologies

Luyer r reennoiogies

Session IDASEC-402 Session Classification:Intermediate

RSACONFERENCE2012

Who will be the robber-barons of the 21<sup>st</sup> century?
 APIs could be a rich resource for exploitation

Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gilded Age

#### Here Is What This Talk Is About:

- The new API threat
  - ...and the potential rise of the hacker-robber-baron
- Are APIs just like the Web? Or are they different?
  - Look at three important areas:
    - 1. Parameterization
    - 2. Identity
    - 3. Cryptography
- How to apply the lessons of this talk



#### What is an API?





#### GET http://services.layer7.com/staff?name=Scott



000		_	Google					
Google Google	+			_				-
(Image: Image: I		/er7.com/staf	r7.com/staff?name=Scott			Goog	۹ 🍙	
🥡 Sarek 🏾 🍿 Bugzilla	OAuth2 Client T	🔝 beatstreet 🔻	CBC Radio   Idea	🚞 Blog 🔻	bit.ly	🔵 L7 Webex	OWA »	Bookmarks 🔻
<pre>{     "firstName": '     "lastName": '     "title": "CTO",     "address":     {         "streetAdd         "city": "Var         "prov": "BC         "postalCod     },     "phoneNumb [         {         "type": "o         "number"         },         {         "type": "h         "number"         }     ] }</pre>	'Scott ", "Morrison", ress": "405-1100 couver", 2", de": "V6E 4A6" er": ffice", : "605 681-9377' ome", : "604 555-4567'	Melville",						



#### This is a Technological Sea Change

	Old	New
Transport	HTTP	HTTP
Data	XML	JSON
Authentication	Basic, X.509, Kerberos, SAML	OAuth
Confidentiality & Integrity	WS-Security	SSL



#### **Where Simple Won**

# SOAP + WS-\*

- Complex
- Highly standardized
- Vendor-driven
- Barriers

# **RESTful APIs**

- Simple
- Informal
- Grassroots
- Frictionless



# "Sounds great. So what's the problem?"



**The Real Problem Is This:** 

# API Development != Web Development



#### **In Particular:**

We need to be wary of bad web development practices migrating to APIs...



#### **Problem Area #1:** API Parameterization

- In the web world, parameterization was limited and indirect
  - Subject to the capabilities of URLs and forms
- APIs in contrast and offer much more explicit parameterization
  - The full power of RESTful design: GET, POST, PUT, DELETE
    - (And don't stop there... what about effects of HEAD, etc)?
- This is a greater potential attack surface
  - Injection, bounds, correlation, and so on











#### **Script Insertion is Just One Potential Exploit**



#### **Exploits of a Mom**



Source: https://xkcd.com/327/



## **Mitigation Strategy**

- Rigorous validation of user supplied input
  - Stronger typing
  - Sets and ranges
  - Avoid auto-generated schemas that make everything a string
- Use schema validation
  - XML Schema, RELAX-NG, Schematron
    - Please no DTDs!
  - JSON schema validation
  - WADL's second coming



## Mitigation Strategy (cont.)

- Regex scanning for signatures
- Tune scanning for the API
  - Sometimes SELECT is OK
- Virus scanning of attachments
  - Don't forget B64'd message content
- Library, service, or gateway solutions
  - Decoupled security
  - What are the tradeoffs?



### **Mitigation Strategy**

- Whitelist tags if you can (i.e. where the validation space is small and concise)
  - Not always practical
  - (Note that I'm referring to whitelisting tags not IPs.)
- Blacklist dangerous tags like <SCRIPT>
- <u>Always</u> perform FIEO (Filter Input, Escape Output)
- Learn more: <u>http://xssed.com</u>



#### **Problem Area #2:** *Identity*

- We had it surprisingly good in the Web world
  - Browser session usually tied to human
  - Dealing with one identity is not so tough
    - Security tokens abound, but solutions are mature
      - Username/pass, x.509 certs, multi-factor, Kerberos, SAML, etc
  - APIs rapidly becoming more difficult
    - Non-human entities
    - Multiple layers of relevant identities
      - Me, my attributes, my phone, my developer, my provider...



#### **API Keys**

"An application programing interface key (API key) is a code generated by websites that allow users to access their application programming interface. API keys are used to track how the API is being used in order to prevent malicious use or abuse of the terms of service.

API keys are based on the <u>UUID</u> system to ensure they will be unique to each user."

Source: wikipedia http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Application programming interface key



# GET http://example.layer7.com/services/staff ?APIKey=15458617-7813-4a37-94ac-a8e6da6f6405



Seriously? WTF.

#### How Does An API Key Map To Identity?



#### 15458617-7813-4a37-94ac-a8e6da6f6405



It is entirely inconsistent.

#### **The Identity Profile**

- As applications become more complex, increasingly, there is need to support a greater number of claims (multiple identity profiles)
  - Application ID
  - User ID
  - Device ID
- User attributes may include to …
  - Roles
  - Geo location
  - IP
  - User agent
  - Time of day
  - etc.



#### Where Did API Keys Come From?

- API keys came from Google APIs like maps, early Yahoo APIs, early Twitter APIs etc.
  - Originally meant for loose, non-authoritative tracking
  - Rate limits, approximate usage profiling
- Google geocoding v3.0 API deprecates API keys
  - Uses IP instead to track and throttle
  - This has its own set of problems
    - IP address spoofing
    - Problems with legitimate clients like cloud servers
- Google Premier uses a public client\_id and requires signed URLs
  - (Strips domain leaving only path and query parameters)



#### The Real Issue Is That This Is Ad-hoc Sessioning

- This is a web developer cultural issue
  - On the web, session tokens are rarely secured
    - Step 1: Sign in with SSL
    - Steps 2 to n: Track session using cookie without SSL
- There are two bad things going on here:
  - 1. No protection of security token
  - 2. No binding of token to message content



In 2012, this is a huge problem...



#### **One Word:** *Firesheep*



Source: http://codebutler.com/firesheep



In the post-Firesheep world, unprotected session tracking should never be tolerated ...

# Bottom Line: The API Key Was Never Meant To Be Authoritative

- Strange hybrid of HTTP's USER-AGENT and sessioning
- OK only for general tracking
- Anything that matters should use real security tokens
- Anything that matters == anywhere where identity is important:
  - APIs that provide access to sensitive data
  - APIs that change things that matter
  - APIs that charge for use
  - etc.



#### **Twitter Gets It**

## API Keys, Basic Authentication







#### Will OAuth survive adolescence?

- Complexity and confusion
- Interop is a nightmare right now
- Enterprise token management
  - Beyond the timeout
  - Lifecycle, revocation, distribution, etc.
  - Talk, but not a lot of action
- SSL everywhere
  - Protect bearer tokens
- Phishing vulnerabilities
  - Server authentication and loss of trust in the CA infrastructure



## **Mitigation**

- Protect the tokens!
- HTTPS everywhere
  - This is another web design cultural issue
  - It's just not that expensive any more
- Need HTTP Strict Transport Security (HSTS) for APIs
  - http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTTP\_Strict\_Transport\_Security



#### **Problem Area #3:** Cryptography and PKI

- Cryptography is reasonably mature on the web
  - Surprisingly limited use patterns
  - SSL/TLS
  - Very little tough PKI (like client-side)
- So what's wrong with APIs?



#### It's Like We Forgot Everything We Knew

- Emailing keys
  - API keys, shared secrets, etc.
- Bad storage schemes
  - Security through obscurity
  - Toy ciphers
- No life cycle management
  - Limits on use
  - Time limits
  - Revocation
  - Audit



#### **The Issues**

- Key management
  - Especially across farms
- Nobody takes web PKI seriously
  - CRLs and OCSP aren't much good in the browser world
    - Fail open seriously
- CA trust breakdown
  - Comodo fraud in March 2011



### The Issues (cont.)

- Cipher suite restrictions
  - Avoiding downgrades
- Client-side certificate authentication is hard
- The alternatives for parameter confidentiality and/or integrity are hard:
  - XML encryption is still there
    - Not for the faint of heart
  - OAuth 1.0 gave you parameter signing
    - Only optional in 2.0



### **Mitigations**

- Use real PKI
  - I know it's painful
- Use HSMs to protect keys that really matter
- Otherwise use real key material protection schemes
  - PKCS #12, etc.
  - Libraries abound



#### **Mitigations**

- You must do CRLs and OCSP for APIs
- Google maintains a certificate registry: <u>http://googleonlinesecurity.blogspot.com/2011/04/improving-ssl-certificate-security.html</u>
- Google safe browsing API: <u>http://code.google.com/apis/safebrowsing/developers\_guide\_v2.html</u>
  - Blacklist of phishing and malware sites
- DANE and DNSSEC



#### Where Does This All Leave Us?

- SOAP, the WS-\* stack dealt with much of this very rigorously
  - But it was just too hard.
- We need to learn from this, but make it easier to implement
- Here's how...



## How Do I Apply This Today?

- Use SSL for all API transactions
  - Hides many sins
    - Confidentiality, integrity, replay, binding token+message, server authentication, etc.
- Use real PKI
  - Yes, it's hard
  - But you can't skimp here
- Use OAuth for distributed authentication
- Use real frameworks, don't reinvent
  - They exist for most languages
- Consider gateways to encapsulate security





# Thank You!

#### Layer 7 Technologies

Stephen Mak Email: <u>smak@layer7tech.com</u> Website: <u>www.layer7tech.com</u>

