



SecTheory
Internet Security

About Me

- ▣ Robert Hansen – CEO
- ▣ SecTheory Ltd
 - Bespoke Boutique Internet Security
 - Web Application/Browser Security
 - Network/OS Security
 - <http://www.sectheory.com/>
- ▣ Advisory capacity to VCs/start-ups
- ▣ Founded the web application security lab
 - ~~<http://ha.ckers.org/> - the lab~~
 - <http://sla.ckers.org/> - the forum

OWASP and Brazil

- ▣ Connections committee member
- ▣ Brazil could easily become a prototype for the right way to build security
- ▣ It starts with the right laws and infrastructure
 - Whistleblower protections
 - Q&A testing/certification
 - Easy takedown processes
 - Software lemon laws
 - Extradition

Let's Go Back To Basics

The humble cookie



Basic Problems



COOKIE MONSTER

That cookie wasn't worth it, was it?

motifake.com

- ▣ Aren't secure by default
- ▣ Are being used as a form of tokenized surrogate for passwords (which makes them important)
- ▣ Shoddy replacement for a stateful protocol!

What the f*©% are Cookies?

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: text/html
Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0
X-Powered-By: PHP/5.2.3,ASP.NET
Set-Cookie: user=bob; path/
Date: Wed, 18 Aug 2010 14:24:49 GMT
Connection: close

GET / HTTP/1.1
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0...
Cache-Control: no-cache
Host: www.example.com
Cookie: user=bob;
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Connection: Keep-Alive




Cookie Structure

- ▣ a=b;
- ▣ a=b; Path=/;
- ▣ a=b; Expires=Fri, 31-Dec-2010 23:59:59 GMT; Max-Age=10000; Path=/;
- ▣ a=b; Expires=Fri, 31-Dec-2010 23:59:59 GMT; Max-Age=10000; Path=/; domain=.example.org;
- ▣ a=b; Expires=Fri, 31-Dec-2010 23:59:59 GMT; Max-Age=10000; Path=/; domain=.example.org; HttpOnly; Secure



Cookies != SOP



URL	Outcome	Reason
http://www.yoursite.com/dir/page.html	Success	Same domain
http://www.yoursite.com/dir2/other-page.html	Success	Same domain
https://www.yoursite.com/	Failure (Except Cookies)	Different protocol
http://www.yoursite.com:8080/	Failure (Except Cookies)	Different port
http://news.yoursite.com/blog/	Failure (Except Cookies)	Different sub-domain

Old Cookie Issues

- ❑ Doesn't follow the semi-sane JS SOP
- ❑ Cross Site Cooking
- ❑ Max-age doesn't work in IE
- ❑ XHR could bypass HTTPOnly
- ❑ Client side removal doesn't actually remove the cookies



THE COOKIE MONSTER
is serious about his cookies

Olllld Cookies Issues 2

- ▣ CSRF (to create/change cookies)
- ▣ XSS (to create/change/steal cookies)
- ▣ Session fixation (known cookie variant)



More Obscure Cookie Issues

- ▣ Predictable cookie names
- ▣ DNS Rebinding
- ▣ IE8 doesn't remove cookies until reboot but IE9 beta is soooo much worse...
- ▣ Lack of Cookie Consolidation Issues
- ▣ MITM cookie clobber
- ▣ MITM XSS introduction
- ▣ MITM login detection
- ▣ NoScript Cookies



Wrath of the Cookie!




COW #170 - THE REAL COOKIE MONSTER - MFRANK

- ❑ Double DNS Rebinding
- ❑ Cookies cause DoS
- ❑ Overflowing cookie jar
- ❑ Affiliate protections
- ❑ Session prediction/brute force (Samy)



- . Vertical = 1 username & many passwords
- . Horizontal = 1 pass & many usernames
- . Diagonal = many usernames & passwords
- . 3D = Many IPs
- . 4D = Over a long period of time
- . Credential



Ultimately...



ADDICTION

When one cookie is never enough

- ❑ Makes multi sub-domain sites much less safe
- ❑ Makes browsers easy to track, & hard to defend.
- ❑ We need to kick the cookie addiction and build better forms of auth.

A close-up of Darth Vader's helmet and upper torso. He is holding a small, rectangular box with a label that reads "Cookie Monster" and "Cookie Cakes". The box is black with white and red text and a small illustration of Cookie Monster.

JOIN THE DARKSIDE

and get a free cookie...



Thank you!

- ▣ Robert Hansen
 - ▣ www.fallingrocknetworks.com/ - hosting
 - ▣ www.sectheory.com - the company
 - ▣ ~~<http://ha.ckers.org>~~ - the lab
 - ▣ <http://sla.ckers.org> - the forum
 - ▣ Detecting Malice - the book
 - ▣ www.detectmalice.com
 - ▣ XSS Exploits - the book
 - ▣ robert_aT_sectheory_d0t_org - the email

