

# Extreme Penetration Testing



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# About Me



**Yaniv Simsolo**

**CISSP**


**CTO, Palantir Security**

- Over 12 years in Information Security
- Information Systems security expert of:
  - Compound and Hybrid systems
  - Cloud solutions
  - Applications
  - Database Security
  - Back-End systems and components
  - Middleware

# Agenda

- Intro**
- PT – normal**
- PT – Advanced**
- PT - Extreme**
- Summary**

# Extreme Penetration Testing



## Intro

# Be Cool

- Hacking is cool
- Hacking highly secure systems is COOOOOOLER



# Be Cool

- Take a system.
  - The customer will supply you with at least one!
- Break it to kingdom come.
- Enjoy yourself, have fun.
- Learn something new.
- Experience.
- Exercise your greatest muscle!



EVOLUTION : COMPUTER & HUMAN



# Penetration Testing

- The art of...
  - Hacking?
  - Reviewing?
  - Using tools & technologies?
  - Observing?
  - Analyzing?
- Penetration Testing is cool!



# Extreme Penetration Testing



PT - Normal

# Normal PT

- Get some access to a system
- Connect
- Get a feel for the system
- Attack!
- Use some tools. Attack!
- Analyze, Revise and recuperate. Attack even harder!
- Get the Bonanza! Attack, attack, attack until you get it!
- Attack some more!
- Report.


**Is that the correct process?**

# PT Process

- Get the OWASP Testing Guide
- It is the Best Practice
- Follow it
  - Meticulously
  - All 224 pages

Is that process feasible?





# What is the described test?

browser environments simply displaying an email message containing the image would result in the execution of the request to the web application with the associated browser cookie.

Things may be obfuscated further, by referencing seemingly valid image URLs such as

```

```

where [attacker] is a site controlled by the attacker, and by utilizing a redirect mechanism on

```
http://[attacker]/picture.gif to http://[thirdparty]/action.
```

Cookies are not the only example involved in this kind of vulnerability. Web applications whose session information is entirely supplied by the browser are vulnerable too. This includes applications relying on HTTP authentication mechanisms alone, since the authentication information is known by the browser and is sent automatically upon each request. This DOES NOT include form-based authentication, which occurs just once and generates some form of session-related information (of course, in this case, such information is expressed simply as a cookie and can we fall back to one of the previous cases).

## Sample scenario

Let's suppose that the victim is logged on to a firewall web management application. To log in, a user has to authenticate himself and session information is stored in a cookie.

Let's suppose the firewall web management application has a function that allows an authenticated user to delete a rule specified by its positional number, or all the rules of the configuration if the user enters '\*' (quite a dangerous feature, but it will make the example more interesting). The delete page is shown next. Let's suppose that the form – for the sake of simplicity – issues a GET

Therefore, if we enter the value '\*' and press the Delete button, the following GET request is submitted.

```
https://www.company.example/fwmgt/delete?rule=*
```

with the effect of deleting all firewall rules (and ending up in a possibly inconvenient situation).



Now, this is not the only possible scenario. The user might have accomplished the same results by manually submitting the URL or by following a link pointing, directly or via a redirection, to the above URL. Or, again, by accessing an HTML page with an embedded img tag pointing to the same URL.

```
https://[target]/fwmgt/delete?rule=*
```

In all of these cases, if the user is currently logged in the firewall management application, the request will succeed and will modify the configuration of the firewall. One can imagine attacks targeting sensitive applications and making automatic auction bids, money transfers, orders, changing the configuration of critical software components, etc.


An interesting thing is that these vulnerabilities may be exercised behind a firewall; i.e., it is sufficient that the link being attacked be reachable by the victim (not directly by the attacker). In par-

# Normal PT

- At least – test for OWASP Top 10.
- How do you test A5?



# Extreme Penetration Testing



PT - Advanced

# Advanced Penetration Testing


- Following some Best Practices is:
  - Not always feasible
  - Not always practical
  - Resource consuming
- So, use some shortcuts:
  - Scan tools
  - Hack tools



# That Which is Common



**NMAP**




# That Which is Common

- Tools progress with technology



# That Which is Common





```
bt ~ # hcidump -i hci0 -X -t
HCI sniffer - Bluetooth packet analyzer ver 1.37
device: hci0 snap_len: 1028 filter: 0xffffffff
1240692321.957111 < ACL data: handle 12 flags 0x02 dlen 52
    L2CAP(s): Echo req: dlen 44
        0000: 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 4a 4b 4c 4d 4e 4f 50 ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOP
        0010: 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 5a 5b 5c 5d 5e 5f 60 QRSTUVWXYZ[\]^_`_
        0020: 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 41 42 43 44 abcdefghABCD
1240692321.991241 > ACL data: handle 12 flags 0x02 dlen 52
    L2CAP(s): Echo rsp: dlen 44
        0000: 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 4a 4b 4c 4d 4e 4f 50 ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOP
        0010: 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 5a 5b 5c 5d 5e 5f 60 QRSTUVWXYZ[\]^_`_
        0020: 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 41 42 43 44 abcdefghABCD
1240692322.184240 > HCI Event: Number of Completed Packets (0x13) plen 5
    0000: 01 0c 00 01 00 ****
1240692322.993200 < ACL data: handle 12 flags 0x02 dlen 52
    L2CAP(s): Echo req: dlen 44
        0000: 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 4a 4b 4c 4d 4e 4f 50 ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOP
        0010: 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 5a 5b 5c 5d 5e 5f 60 QRSTUVWXYZ[\]^_`_
        0020: 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 41 42 43 44 abcdefghABCD
1240692323.012326 > ACL data: handle 12 flags 0x02 dlen 52
    L2CAP(s): Echo rsp: dlen 44
        0000: 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 4a 4b 4c 4d 4e 4f 50 ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOP
        0010: 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 5a 5b 5c 5d 5e 5f 60 QRSTUVWXYZ[\]^_`_
        0020: 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 41 42 43 44 abcdefghABCD
1240692323.185332 > HCI Event: Number of Completed Packets (0x13) plen 5
    0000: 01 0c 00 01 00 ****
1240692324.013175 < ACL data: handle 12 flags 0x02 dlen 52
    L2CAP(s): Echo req: dlen 44
        0000: 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 4a 4b 4c 4d 4e 4f 50 ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOP
        0010: 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 5a 5b 5c 5d 5e 5f 60 QRSTUVWXYZ[\]^_`_
        0020: 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 41 42 43 44 abcdefghABCD
```

# That Which is Common



# Fiddler



# Cold Hard Facts

## Misconceptions:

- We CAN test THE security
- Our tools CAN scan the ENTIRE scope
- Our protection tools CAN PROTECT us

# Cold Hard Facts

InfoSec Natural Selection, Shay Chen, OWASP IL 09\_2014

# WAVSEP

# Advanced Penetration Testing

- Code analysis
  - Will not cover newest technologies
  - Limited strength
  - Static Vs. Dynamic

```
<Variable name="textColor" description="Text Color" type="color" default="#204063" value="#204063">
<Variable name="blogTitleColor" description="Blog Title Color" type="color" default="#eef6fe" value="#eef6fe">
<Variable name="blogDescriptionColor" description="Blog Description Color" type="color" default="#eef6fe" value="#eef6fe">
<Variable name="postTitleColor" description="Post Title Color" type="color" default="#477fba" value="#477fba">
<Variable name="dateHeaderColor" description="Date Header Color" type="color" default="#8facc8" value="#8facc8">
<Variable name="sidebarTitleColor" description="Sidebar Title Color" type="color" default="#809fbd" value="#809fbd">
<Variable name="linkColor" description="Link Color" type="color" default="#4386ce" value="#4386ce">
<Variable name="visitedLinkColor" description="Visited Link Color" type="color" default="#2462a5" value="#2462a5">
<Variable name="sidebarLinkColor" description="Sidebar Link Color" type="color" default="#599be2" value="#599be2">
<Variable name="redLinkColor" description="Red Link Color" type="color" default="#3372b6" value="#3372b6">
```

# Advanced Penetration Testing



- Memory analysis, disk analysis
  - Resource intensive
  - Pinpointed approach only

## Software Security Analysis without Code Schematics

**Software Security Analysis without a control and data flow diagram of logic and design, is like home security analysis without schematics, such as a flooring plan or circuitry diagram.**

Simply scanning for known exploits without verifying control flow integrity is comparable to the same security expert explaining the obvious, such as windows are open and doors are unlocked, and being completely oblivious to the fact that there is a trap door in your basement.

**Those known exploits, just like the insecure doors and windows, are only the low hanging fruit.**

- McCabe Software



(CVE-2010-0188 Adobe PDF)

# A 256 AES strong key implementation

- $16*8 = 256?$

```
/**  
 * this function generates random string for given length  
 * @param length  
 *          Desired length  
 * @return  
 */  
public static String generateRandomIV(int length)  
{  
    SecureRandom ranGen = new SecureRandom();  
    byte[] aesKey = new byte[16];  
    ranGen.nextBytes(aesKey);  
    StringBuffer result = new StringBuffer();  
    for (byte b : aesKey) {  
        result.append(String.format("%02x", b)); //convert to hex  
    }  
    if(length> result.toString().length())  
    {  
        return result.toString();  
    }  
    else  
    {  
        return result.toString().substring(0, length);  
    }  
}
```

# Yes. It can get worse.

```

import com.      .im.utils. Log;
import com.      .im.utils.ValidationUtil;
/**
 * This is a singleton class which handles all the encryption-decryption along with key-randomIV generation.
 * @author
 *
 */
public class AESEncryptionUtil {

    private final String TAG = AESEncryptionUtil.class.getSimpleName();

    private static AESEncryptionUtil mInstance = new AESEncryptionUtil();

    // private HashMap<String, String[]> mKeyMapping = new HashMap<String, String[]>();

    private final String TAG_GENERATE_KEY = "      key";

    ////////////// removed code for clear image //////////////////

    }

    /**
     * Handles the generation and caching of key and randomIV.
     * @return
     */
    public String[] getEncryptionKeyRandomIV(){
        BzLog.dumpLog(Log.INFO, TAG, "getEncryptionKeyRandomIV called.");
        String[] keyRandom = new String[2];
        try {
            keyRandom[0] = CryptLib.SHA256(TAG GENERATE KEY, 32);
            keyRandom[1] = CryptLib.generateRandomIV(16);
        } catch (NoSuchAlgorithmException e) {
            // TODO Auto-generated catch block
            BzLog.dumpLog(Log.INFO, TAG, e.getMessage());
            return null;
        } catch (UnsupportedEncodingException e) {
            BzLog.dumpLog(Log.INFO, TAG, e.getMessage());
            return null;
        }

        return keyRandom;
    }
}

```

The company name

↑


image

# More Advanced Methods

- Reversing
  - Resource intensive
  - Highly advanced inter-disciplinary skills mandatory

blackhat USA 2014

Protocol Reverse Engineering



The table illustrates a protocol structure with various fields and their corresponding hex and ASCII values. Annotations with arrows point to specific parts of the table:

- Header**: Points to the first row of the table, which contains the bytes 00 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 10 00 14 5E 87 74 CA.
- Text strings**: Points to a row where the bytes 64 0A 11 0A 00 0A are highlighted in red, and the ASCII value 'b' is shown in the adjacent column.
- Data**: Points to a row where the bytes 00 00 00 08 00 00 00 18 00 00 00 00 53 77 69 74 are highlighted in red.
- IP address**: Points to the last row of the table, which contains the bytes 00 00 00 0D 00 00 00 00 06.

Importance

Length

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	A	B	C	D	E	F	0123456789ABCDEF
00	02	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	10	00	14	5E	87	74	CA	.....^#tÈ
62	68	70	AC	C9	59	54	58	0B	42	E4	53	FA	4A	49	96	bhp-ÉYTX.BäSÚJI-
00	5C	CB	F0	57	53	2D	43	32	39	36	30	53	2D	32	34	.\ÈðWS-C2960S-24
54	53	2D	53	00	00	54	30	33	46	4F	43	37	36	34	37	TS-S..V03FOC1647
5A	33	53	39	01	00	64	0A	11	0A	00	0A	00	89	00	08	Z3S9..d.....%...
00	00	00	08	00	00	00	18	00	00	00	00	53	77	69	74	.....Swit
63	68	44	6F	6D	61	69	6E	00	00	00	17	00	00	00	1C	chDomain.....
00	00	00	00	00	02	A9	B0	C0	A8	02	14	00	00	00	00	.....©ºÀ".....
00	00	00	00	00	00	00	31	00	00	00	0E	00	00	00	00	.....1.....
00	10	00	00	00	00	21	00	00	00	10	00	00	00	00	D1 3D	.....!.....Ñ=
27	C5	00	00	00	00	09	00	00	00	0D	00	00	00	01	2A 00	'À.....*
00	00	0E	00	00	00	0D	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	21	.....!
00	00	00	10	00	00	00	00	D1	3D	27	C5	00	00	00	29	.....Ñ='À...)
00	00	00	0D	00	00	00	00	06								.....


IP address

# More Advanced Methods



## • Debugging

- Can that be considered a PT technique?
- Limited



# Extreme Penetration Testing



Extreme  
Penetration Testing



# The Problem

A system must be penetration tested

- Imagine a system or a component that has no GUI whatsoever.
- This is no obstacle for professionals, since proven techniques like Reversing, Memory Analysis, Code Review and Debug will be implemented.


# The Problem

- About The system:
  - Passed a full Security Design Review
  - A high complexity, multi layer solution
  - Employs Best Cryptography Practices
  - Employs Best Coding Practices
  - Internal code process, no “normal” interfaces

# The Problem

- So, what's left?
  - Code analysis tests – completed, bugs fixed.
  - Not yet PT'ed
- Is PT even required?
  - ???

**If all previously identified bugs are fixed?**



# Penetration Testing

- Some penetration tests are not about coolness
- Modus operandi:
  - Do not work hard unless absolutely necessary
  - When necessary: work the HARDEST
  - Be very fast! ALWAYS!



# PT it is! But...

- No “normal” interfaces
  - No attack entry points
  - Hack tools irrelevant
  - Scan tools irrelevant

# PT it is! But...

OK.

The challenge is on!


The  
Challenge is  
ON!

- Bring in the heavy artillery
  - Memory analysis – not relevant due to cryptography multi layers
  - Disk analysis – not relevant due to no save to disk functionality




# PT it is! But...

- So we are left with reversing and debugging.
- Reversing is viable but the scope of testing is wide.
- Debugging is the only acceptable PT approach.
- Eureka!



# PT it is! But...

- Ever tried an entire PT from the development environment Debugging?



The screenshot shows a Microsoft Visual Studio interface for a driver project named 'Driver1'. The Solution Explorer on the right shows a single project with files: stdafx.h, VisualDDKHelper.h, stdafx.cpp, and Driver1.cpp. The Disassembly window in the center shows assembly code for the DriverEntry function, including calls to IoCreateDevice and NT\_SUCCESS. The Watch window on the left displays the state of a float matrix variable 'm4x4' at memory address 0x0042fc88. The Call Stack window at the bottom shows the call chain starting from Driver 1's DriverEntry function, leading through nt!IoLoadDriver, nt!IoLoadUnloadDriver, nt!ExpWorkerThread, nt!PspSystemThreadStartup, and nt!KiThreadStartup.

Name	Value	Type
m4x4[16]	0x0042fc88 {1.00000000, 0.00000000, 0.00000000, 0.00000000, 0.00000000, 0.00000000, 0.00000000, 0.00000000, 0.00000000, 0.00000000, 0.00000000, 0.00000000, 0.00000000, 0.00000000, 0.00000000, 0.00000000, 0.00000000}	float[16]
[0]	1.00000000	float
[1]	0.00000000	float
[2]	0.00000000	float
[3]	0.00000000	float
[4]	0.00000000	float
[5]	2.00000000	float
[6]	0.00000000	float
[7]	0.00000000	float
[8]	0.00000000	float
[9]	0.00000000	float
[10]	3.00000000	float
[11]	0.00000000	float
[12]	0.00000000	float
[13]	0.00000000	float
[14]	0.00000000	float
[15]	4.00000000	float

# PT it is! But...

- If I know where to look for:
  - Easy to use Debugging or runtime manipulation
- What if I don't know where to look?

# One More Joker Up My Sleeve

- ## Unit Testing

- unit testing is a software testing method by which individual units of source code, sets of one or more computer program modules together with associated control data, usage procedures, and operating procedures, are tested to determine whether they are fit for use



# PT it is! But...

- Unit Testing practicality
  - Whatever unit tests were created – is now legacy to the product/system
  - Can be retested automatically upon any release/version/sprint etc.
  - Each payload requires a unit test to be created individually
  - Coding as a means of hacking is slower by scales

# PT it is! But...

- Consider that under modern methods (DevOps, Fast IT) there is never enough time for implementing these techniques.
- Hence, Reversing, Memory Analysis or Debugging are not feasible or practical.

# Extreme Penetration Testing

- We need a testing method that is:
  - Simple
  - Comprehensive
  - Accurate, deep and pin pointed
  - FAST!
  - Controllable



# Extreme Penetration Testing

- The method:
  - Create a “basic flow” unit test code
  - Sanity test the unit test on testing environment. Verify that the unit test can be run from within a development environment (e.g. Studio)
  - Identify key points of the flow that are to be tested



# Extreme Penetration Testing

## The method (cont.)

- In the key points:
  - Modify the “basic flow” unit test:
    - Save all parameters, even binary, encrypted, signed, etc. parameters to one single file, serialized.
    - After save – toggle a breaking point.
    - After breakpoint – Read the file and reseed all parameters back from the accepted values.



Familiar concept?

A “file-based” runtime proxy

# Extreme Penetration Testing



## The method (cont.)

- When the test is stopped –
  - Read the serialized file, using whatever text editor
  - Modify the parameters, web-proxy-style
  - Save

Familiar concept?

A “file-based” runtime proxy

# Extreme Penetration Testing

- Demo (by Team Incomplete)
- Disclaimer, scale, shortcuts & others



# Extreme Penetration Testing

- Management
  - Having a custom testing method is nice
  - PT is nothing without control



# Extreme Penetration Testing

- PT management is an issue

B28	Attack type	Payload sent	Reviewed response	Expected response	Acceptable?	Comments
<b>PT is nothing without control</b>						
1						
2						
3	Fuzz					
4						
5	AAAAAA%c					
6	AAAAAA%d					
7	AAAAAA%e					
8	AAAAAA%f					
9	AAAAAA%I					
10	AAAAAA%o					
11	AAAAAA%p					
12	AAAAAA%s					
13	AAAAAA%x					
14	AAAAAA%n					
15	AAAAAA%c					
16	AAAAAA%d					
17	AAAAAA%e					
18	AAAAAA%f					
19	AAAAAA%I					
20	AAAAAA%o					
21	AAAAAA%p					
22	AAAAAA%s					
23	AAAAAA%x					
24	AAAAAA%n					
25	';alert(String.fromCharCode(88,83,83))//';alert(String.fromCharCode(88,83,83))//';alert(String.fromCharCode(88,83,83))//';alert(String.fromCharCode(88,83,83))//';					
26	CRLF					
27	NULL					
28	0x0D, 0x0A	0x0D 0x0A	Faild signing	successful signing	No	
29	0x00					
30	\";alert('XSS');//					
31	<TITLE><SCRIPT>alert("XSS");</SCRIPT>					
32	<DIV STYLE="background-image: url(javascript:alert('XSS'))>					
33	<DIV STYLE="background-image: url(0075\0072\006C\0028\006a\0061\0076\0061\0073\0063\0072\0069\0070\0074\003a\0061\006c\0065\0072\0074\0028.1053\0053\0027\0029\0029)">					
34						
35						

# Extreme Penetration Testing



## Summary

# Summary

- One cannot rely on a single security testing approach
  - Design Review
  - Code Analysis
  - Penetration Testing
- Some system testing require innovation
  - Known tools irrelevant
  - Known payloads irrelevant
- Know thy limitations
  - Relying on standard approaches is not enough

# Summary

- Innovate
  - Consider each technique advantages and disadvantages
  - Consider PT scope and limitations
  - Create your own technique
- Manage
  - Control the PT process using custom technique
- Success
  - Get that Bonanza!



# Questions?