



Secure SDLC: The Good, The Bad, and The Ugly

*Joey Peloquin, Director, Application Security
FishNet Security*

INFORMATION SECURITY PRACTICES

- Secure Development Programs
 - The Good, The Bad, and The Ugly
- QSA Perspectives
 - Application Security in a *PCI World*
- Secure SDLC
 - The Essential Elements & Where to Start
- Post-Mortem
 - A Flawed “AppSec” Program Made Right
- Q & A



THE GOOD



- Top -> Down Support
- Clearly Defined Processes
- Focus on Training and Education
- Security is a Function of Quality Management
- Properly Leveraging Technology
- Third-party Partnerships
- Go – No-Go Authority
- Working **Smarter, Not Harder**



THE BAD



- Insufficient Support from Management
- Reactive Security Posture
- Check-in-the-box Mentality
- Insufficient Vulnerability Management
- No Developer Training
- Lack of Application Security Awareness
- Insufficient Standardization
- Development Silos



THE UGLY



- Complete Lack of Management Support
- Devoid of Security Awareness
- “Wow, there’s organizations devoted to Application Security that offer free information, tools, and standards?”
- Complete Lack of Vulnerability Management
- Little Standardization
- No Quality Management
- Pattern of Denial





“I’m concerned that as long as the payment card industry is writing the standards, we’ll never see a more secure system. We in Congress must consider whether we can continue to rely on industry-created standards, particularly if they’re inadequate to address the ongoing threat.”

- Rep. Bennie Thompson


- Security Throughout the Lifecycle
 - Requirements, checkpoints, accreditation, testing
 - No concept of OWASP, inability to examine code for common defects, no peer reviews, etc.
- Well-documented and Maintained SDLC
 - I'm from Missouri...
- Knowledgeable Developers
 - Coding examples, processes
- Peer Reviews
 - Someone other than the dev; examine comments

- Homegrown Encryption
 - Publically available, commercial/open source
- Code Reviews
 - No, you can't review your own...
- Look at the Pretty WAF!
 - Yes, it has to actually be configured to block, /sigh
- “We have a WAF, so we don’t need to fix our code.”
- “Our IPS can totally block SQLi and XSS!”


- WAF
 - Network diagrams
 - Configuration
 - Logging
- Code Reviews
 - Documented policy, process, methodologies
 - Reports
 - Internal or third-party?
 - Tester's role
 - Tester's credentials



- Executive Champion
- Mid-level Support
- Support of *The Business*
- People
- Process
- Technology
- *...and unfortunately;*
 - *Time & Money help a great deal*




The ONLY VALID MEASUREMENT OF CODE QUALITY: WTFs/minute




(c) 2008 Focus Shift

- Assess your current maturity level
- Identify Business and Security Objectives
- Plan your work and work your plan!
- Document your approach
 - Who, what, when, where, how?
- Dr. McGraw's Touchpoints:
 - Code Reviews (Static Analysis)
 - Risk Analysis
 - *Skills Assessment and Training*
 - Penetration Testing (Dynamic Analysis)







- Lost executive champion
- Lack of mid-level support
- Staff Reorganization
- No business support
- No defined processes
- Not enough expertise
- Development silos
- Shelfware



- Educate *The Business*
- Security Requirements
- Define Standards
- Define Processes
- Development Mentors
- HP AMP – SaaS
- Offensive Security
 - License to Pen-test



Joey Peloquin, CSSLP, GCIH
Director, Application Security
972.788.7206 (O)
214.909.0763 (M)
joey@fishnetsecurity.com