



Photo Source – flickr.com

Top 10 Cloud Risks That Will Keep You Awake at Night

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.. **Amazon EC2**
(Cloud) to host
Eng. Lab
testing....

We want to use
SalesForce.com to
host our next Cisco
customer application



**Cisco
Business
User**

.. **Facebook/MySpace**
to collaborate with
company's customer....


.. **Google docs** to share
Cisco documents within
team....

400+ ASPs (aka Cloud Providers) in use within Cisco

Outline

- Cloud – Industry Adoption Trend
- Cloud Taxonomy
- OWASP Cloud Top 10
- Cloud Security Risks
- Risk Mitigations
- Q & A

Cloud – Industry Adoption Trend



(Source Gartner)

Cloud Taxonomy

Service Models

Software as a Service (SaaS)

Platform as a Service (PaaS)

Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS)

Deployment Models

Public

Private

Hybrid

Community

Broad Network
Access

Rapid
Elasticity


Measured
Service

On-Demand
Self-Service

Resource
Pooling

(Adapted from CSA Guide, originally from NIST)

Cloud Top 10 - Motivation



Develop and maintain top 10 risks with cloud



Serve as a quick list of top risks with cloud adoption




Provide guidelines on mitigating the risks

Cloud Top 10 - Approach



- ✓ Easily Executable
- ✓ Most Damaging
- ✓ Incidence Frequency



Category:OWASP Cloud - 10 Project

Cloud Top 10 Security Risks

Goal

According to Gartner, by 2012, 20% of businesses will adopt cloud services and own no IT assets. Goal of the project is to maintain a list of top 10 security risks faced with the Cloud* Computing and SaaS Models. List will be maintained by input from community, security experts and security incidences at cloud/SaaS providers.

- Most of the risks are based on the assumption that Cloud is a public or a hybrid cloud

Audience

Audience for the project will be organizations planning on leveraging external cloud environment to host their applications or rent application in a SaaS model (Software as a Service). Aim of the "OWASP Cloud-10" list is to help balance security risks with the cost advantage that the Cloud and SaaS model provides. We expect the Cloud and SaaS providers to be indirect audience for "OWASP Cloud-10", when they try to showcase their security controls to potential customers against this list.

Initial pre-alpha list of OWASP Cloud Top 10 Security Risks

R1 - Accountability and Data Ownership	A traditional data center of an organization is under complete control of that organization. The organization logically and physically protects the data it owns. An organization that chooses to use a public cloud for hosting its business service loses control of its data. This poses critical security risks that the organization needs to carefully consider and mitigate. (Pankaj, Vinay)
R2 - User Identity Federation	It is very important for the enterprises to keep control over user identities as they move services and applications to the different cloud providers. Rather than letting cloud providers create multiple islands of identities that become too complex to manage down the line. Users should be uniquely identifiable with a federated authentication (e.g. SAML) that works across the cloud providers. User experience is enhanced when he/she does not manage multiple userids and credentials. This allows easier back-end data integrations between cloud provides. (Vinay, Pankaj)

OWASP
Cloud Top 10

Cloud Top 10 Risks


-  **R1: Accountability & Data Risk**
-  **R2: User Identity Federation**
-  **R3: Regulatory Compliance**
-  **R4: Business Continuity & Resiliency**
-  **R5: User Privacy & Secondary Usage of Data**
-  **R6: Service & Data Integration**
-  **R7: Multi-tenancy & Physical Security**
-  **R8: Incident Analysis & Forensics**
-  **R9: Infrastructure Security**
-  **R10: Non-production Environment Exposure**

R1: Accountability

In traditional data center, the owning organization is accountable for security at all layers




Organization fully accountable for security at all layers



You can outsource hosted services but you cannot outsource accountability

In a cloud, who is accountable for security at these layers?

R1: Accountability (cont.)



R1: Data Risk

How sensitive is the data?



Who owns the data?



Data stored anywhere !!



Data encrypted? Single vs. multiple keys

R1: Accountability & Data Risk Mitigation



Provider fully destroys deleted data




Logical isolation of the data of multiple consumers



Multiple encryption keys


R2: Risks: Islands of User Identities



Security Risks

1. Managing Identities across multiple providers
2. Less control over user lifecycle (off-boarding)
3. User experience

R2: Mitigation: User Identity Federation




Mitigations

1. Federated Identity
2. OAuth for backend integrations
3. Tighter user provisioning controls

R3: Regulatory Compliance

Data that is perceived to be secure in one country may not be perceived secure in another country/region



Lack of transparency in the underlying implementations makes it difficult for data owners to demonstrate compliance (SOX/HIPAA etc.)

Lack of consistent standards and requirements for global regulatory compliance – data governance can no longer be viewed from a point-to-point data flow perspective but rather a multi-point to multi-point.

European Union (EU) has very strict privacy laws and hence data stored in US may not comply with those EU laws (*US Patriot Act allows federal agencies limitless powers to access any corporate data etc*)

R3: Regulatory Compliance – Mitigation Strategy



Apply risk management framework, case-by-case basis



Define data protection requirements and SLAs



Provider / Consumer agreement to a pre-defined RACI model

R4: Business Continuity & Resiliency



Lack of know-how and capabilities needed to ensure continuity & resiliency




Cloud provider may be acquired by a consumer's competitor



Monetary losses due to an outage

R4: Business Continuity & Resiliency Mitigation




Contract defines Recovery Time Objectives, and monetary penalty for downtime



Cloud provider's Business Continuity program certified to standard such as BS 25999

R5: User Privacy & Secondary Usage of Data

Users vs. Providers (Priorities)



■ Privacy of my data

- Address, Email,.. (Personally Identifiable Information)
- Health, personal financial info
- Personal Details (email, IMs,....)

End Users


■ Keep Revenue Up/ Cost Down

- Push out the liabilities to user via Privacy and Acceptable Use Policy
- Build Additional Services on users behavior (targeted advertisements) e.g. Google Email, banner adv.
- Do minimal to achieve compliance
- Keep their social applications more open (increased adoption)

Providers

R5: Risks: User Privacy & Secondary Usage of Data

- User personal data mined or used (sold) without consent
 - Targeted Advertisements, third parties
- User Privacy data transferred across jurisdictional borders
- No opt out features for user (user can not delete data)
- Lack of individual control on ensuring appropriate usage, sharing and protection of their personal information.
- Law Obligation for providers
 - Key escrows to law agencies
 - Subpoena




R5: Mitigations: User Privacy & Secondary Usage of Data



Policy Enactment

- Privacy and Acceptable Usage
- Consent (Opt In / Opt Out)
- Policy on Secondary Usage



De-identification of personal Information




Encrypted storage



Terms of Service with providers

- Responsibility on compliance
- Geographical affinity

R6: Service & Data Integration



R6: Service & Data Integration – Mitigation Strategy



Data in Transit




Data at Rest



Encryption (keys, protocols etc)

R7: Risks: Multi-tenancy and Physical Security



- ### Security Risks
1. Inadequate Logical Separations
 2. Co-mingled Tenant Data
 3. Malicious or Ignorant Tenants
 4. Shared Service-single point of failures
 5. Uncoordinated Change Controls and Misconfigs
 6. Performance Risks

R7: Attacks and Incidences

- MIT demonstrating cross-tenant attacks (Amazon EC2)*
 - Side channel Attacks
 - Scanning other tenants
 - DoS
- Wordpress Outage June 2010**
 - 100s of tenants (CNN,..) down in multi-tenant environment.
 - Uncoordinated Change in database




* <http://chenxiwang.wordpress.com/2009/11/02/mit's-attack-on-amazon-ec2-an-academic-exercise/>

** <http://smoothspan.wordpress.com/2010/06/11/wordpress-and-the-dark-side-of-multitenancy/>

R7: Mitigations: Multi-tenancy and Physical Security

Architecting for Multi-Tenancy




Data Encryption (per tenant key management)

Controlled and coordinated Change Management



Transparency/Auditability of Administrative Access



Virtual Private Cloud (VPC)


Regular Third Party Assessments



R8: Incident Analysis & Forensic Support

Complex integration and dynamics in cloud computing present significant challenges to timely diagnosis and resolution of incidents such as:

- **Malware detection and**
- **Immediate intrusion response to mitigate the impact**



R8: Incidence Analysis & Forensic Support – Mitigation Strategy



Dedicated Forensic VM Images




Comprehensive logging

Without compromising Performance



R9: Infrastructure Security

Malicious parties are actively scanning the internet for ...



R9: Infrastructure Security - Mitigations



Segregation of duties and role based administrative privs



Third party audits and app vulnerability assessments



Tiered architecture with appropriate security controls between them



Hardening – Networks, OS, Apps


R10: Non-Production Environment Exposure

Non-Production Environments are ...


used for design, development, and test activities internally within an organization




Typical non-prod environment use **generic** authentication credentials



Security flaws



Data copied to non-prod from its production equivalent



High risk of an unauthorized user getting access to the non production environment


R10: Non-Production Environment Exposure Mitigation



Use multi layers of authentication



Don't use cloud for developing a highly sensitive app in the cloud



Non-prod data is not identical to production

Summary: Peaceful Sleep





R5: Incidence: User Privacy & Secondary Usage of Data

Security

Google Fired Engineer for Privacy Violations

By: Brian Prince

2010-09-15

Article Rating: ★★★★★ / 4

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Google confirmed it fired an engineer for violating its privacy policies following a media report the employee had been let go for spying on the Google accounts of teenagers.

Google confirmed today one of its engineers has been fired for violating the company's privacy rules.

The acknowledgment followed a media report that Google employee David Barksdale accessed the accounts of several teenagers in violation of Google policies. [According to Gawker](#), Barksdale was let go in July for abusing his position as a site reliability engineer in Google's Kirkland, Wash., office by spying on the minors' Google accounts, including accessing Google Voice call logs records and Google Chat transcripts.

Barksdale was fired after Google received complaints about the situation, Gawker reported.

"Site reliability engineers [SREs] are responsible for a variety of tasks, including responding to technical problems across Google's product portfolio, and as such have unfettered access to users' accounts for the services they oversee," Gawker quoted a former Google SRE as saying.

In a statement, Bill Coughran, senior vice president of engineering at Google, said Barksdale had been fired for "breaking Google's [strict internal privacy policies](#)."

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Consumer groups hammer Facebook privacy violations in federal complaint

FTC urged to overturn recent Facebook privacy changes

By [Jon Brodtkin](#), Network World

May 06, 2010 03:35 PM ET

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Facebook users were shocked to learn this week that private chats could have been viewed by their friends because of a [security hole](#) that was only recently closed, and also that new Facebook features can secretly [add applications](#) to your profile.

[Facebook, Twitter becoming business tools, but CIOs remain wary](#)

But those weren't the only privacy complaints Facebook faced this week. On Wednesday, the Electronic Privacy Information Center filed a [38-page complaint](#) against the company with the Federal Trade Commission, demanding that Facebook cancel new features introduced in mid-April that compel users to share more information than before.

"Facebook now discloses personal information to third parties that Facebook users previously did not make available," EPIC said in its complaint. "These changes violate user expectations, diminish user privacy, and contradict Facebook's own representations. These business practices are Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices."

White Paper

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Related Content

- [Facebook security flaw makes private chats public](#)
- [Facebook Privacy Changes: 5 Can't-Miss Facts](#)
- [Facebook's \\$9.5M privacy settlement not good enough](#)

In response to the FTC complaint, a Facebook spokesman said, "Our new features are providing beneficial new social experiences to people around the world that are transparent.