

BSIMM: Building Security In Maturity Model

Carl W. Schwarcz Managing Consultant, Cigital

Presented to Bay Area
OWASP
June 2012



Software Confidence. Achieved.



Maturity in Secure Development Processes

- We all have ideas about a secure SDLC but ..
 - What works?
 - What is worthwhile (ROI)?
 - What's in vogue this year?
- But, do we have any <u>data</u> to back up adoption?
 - We rely on friends, stories, PR
 - My opinion against yours



New Product!



Carl tm Security In A Can




Process Model Choice:


Prescriptive vs Descriptive




A Brief History of AppSec Best Practices

- NIST SP 800-64
- BS7799/ISO17799/27001-2
- OCTAVE
- Microsoft's SDL
- Cigital's touchpoints
- OWASP CLASP











What if you could collect real data?



Bank of America







The Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation







Intel





Empowering Healthcare





































© 2011 Cigital Inc.

BSIMM: Software Security Measurement



McGraw, Migues, Chess







- Idea: Build a maturity model from actual data gathered from realworld software security initiatives
- Interview firms inperson
- Discover common activities through observation
- Build scorecard

The Evolution of BSIMM

- We now have over 42 firms with 81 distinct measurements
 - 2009: BSIMM (9 firms)
 - 2009: BSIMM Europe (9 in EU)
 - 2010: BSIMM2 (30)
 - 2011: BSIMM3 (42), Creative Commons license
- Since we have data from > 30 firms we can perform statistical analysis
 - How good is the model?
 - What activities correlate with what other activities?
 - Do high-maturity firms look the same?



Monkeys eat bananas



- BSIMM is not about good or bad ways to eat bananas or banana best practices
- BSIMM is about observations
- BSIMM is descriptive, not prescriptive

bsimm.com/facts



A Software Security Framework

The Software Security Framework (SSF)										
Governance	Intelligence	SSDL Touchpoints	Deployment							
Strategy and Metrics	Attack Models	Architecture Analysis	Penetration Testing							
Compliance and Policy	Security Features and Design	Code Review	Software Environment							
Training	Standards and Requirements	Security Testing	Configuration Management and Vulnerability Manage- ment							

- Four domains, twelve practices, 109 activities
- Derived from observation of the first 9 firms, updated since
- A common vocabulary, NOT a methodology



Architecture Analysis practice skeleton

	Capturing software architecture diagrams	RCHITECTURE ANALYSIS applying lists of risks and threats, adopting a assessment and remediation plan.	
	Objective	Activity	Level
[AA1.1]	get started with AA	perform security feature review	1
[AA1.2]	demonstrate value of AA with real data	perform design review for high-risk applications	
[AA1.3]	build internal capability on security architecture	have SSG lead review efforts	
[AA1.4]	have a lightweight approach to risk classification and prioritization	use risk questionnaire to rank apps	
[AA2.1]	model objects	define/use AA process	2
[AA2.2]	promote a common language for describing architecture	standardize architectural descriptions (include data flow)	
[AA2.3]	build capability organization-wide	make SSG available as AA resource/mentor	1
[AA3.1]	build capabilities organization-wide	have software architects lead review efforts	3
[AA3.2]	build proactive security architecture	drive analysis results into standard architectural patterns (T: sec features/design)	



Example activity

[AA1.2] **Perform design review for high-risk applications.** The organization learns about the benefits of architecture analysis by seeing real results for a few high-risk, high-profile applications. If the SSG is not yet equipped to perform an in-depth architecture analysis, it uses consultants to do this work. Ad hoc review paradigms that rely heavily on expertise may be used here, though in the long run they do not scale.



Real-world data (42 firms)

- Initiative age
 - Average: 5.5 years
 - Newest: 1
 - Oldest: 16
 - Median: 4
- SSG size
 - Average: 19.2
 - Smallest: 0.5
 - Largest: 100
 - Median: 8

- Satellite size
 - Average: 42.7
 - Smallest: 0
 - Largest: 350
 - Median: 15
- Dev size
 - Average: 5,183
 - Smallest: 11
 - Largest: 30,000
 - Median: 1675

SSG ratio to dev averages ~1-2%



BSIMM3 Scorecard

Govern	ance	Intelliger	ıce	SSDL Tou	ıchpoints	Deployment			
Activity	Observed	Activity	Observed	Activity	Observed	Activity	Observed		
[SM1.1]	30	[AM1.1]	13	[AA1.1]	34	[PT1.1]	38		
[SM1.2]	26	[AM1.2]	29	[AA1.2]	[AA1.2] 29		32		
[SM1.3]	28	[AM1.3]	24	[AA1.3]	24	[PT1.3]	30		
[SM1.4]	38	[AM1.4]	13	[AA1.4]	28	[PT2.2]	15		
[SM1.6]	30	[AM1.5]	25	[AA2.1]	9	[PT2.3]	20		
[SM2.1]	18	[AM2.1]	12	[AA2.2]	6	[PT3.1]	10		
[SM2.2]	22	[AM2.2]	12	[AA2.3]	12	[PT3.2]	6		
[SM2.3]	22	[AM2.4]	15	[AA3.1]	8		7		
[SM2.5]	20	[AM3.1]	3	[AA3.2]	4	-	-0.		
[SM3.1]	13	[AM3.2]	5				6		
[SM3.2]	5	1 1			12				
[CP1.1]	35	[SFD1.1]	37	[CR1.1]	19	[SE1.1]	19		
[CP1.2]	38	[SFD1.2]	29	[CR1.2]	20	[SE1.2]	38		
[CP1.3]	34	[SFD2.1]	23	[CR1.4]	29	[SE2.2]	19		
[CP2.1]	19	[SFD2.2]	15	[CR2.2]	14	[SE2.3]	7		
[CP2.2]	27	[SFD2.3]	14	[CR2.3]	19	[SE2.4]	22		
[CP2.3]	20	[SFD3.1]	8	[CR2.4]	17	[SE3.2]	11		
[CP2.4]	18	[SFD3.2]	9	[CR2.5]	13	35	5		
[CP2.5]	26	1 (1)		[CR3.1]	12				
[CP3.1]	7			[CR3.2]	3				
[CP3.2]	11			[CR3.3] 5		(A)	4		
[CP3.3]	8	1 8			les no	S.	0		
[T1.1]	33	[SR1.1]	31	[ST1.1]	32	[CMVM1.1]	33		
[T1.2]	11	[SR1.2]	22	[ST1.2]	12	[CMVM1.2]	35		
[T1.3]	5	[SR1.3]	25	[ST1.3]	28	[CMVM2.1]	29		
[T1.4]	11	[SR1.4]	17	[ST2.1]	20	[CMVM2.2]	27		
[T2.1]	16	[SR2.1]	10	[ST2.3]	7	[CMVM2.3]	22		
[T2.2]	18	[SR2.2]	17	[ST3.1]	9	[CMVM3.1]	5		
[T2.4]	20	[SR2.3]	18	[ST3.2]	9	[CMVM3.2]	6		
[T2.5]	9	[SR2.4]	17	[ST3.3]	4		8		
[T3.1]	6	[SR2.5]	19	[ST3.4]	4	9	ž.		
[T3.2]	4	[SR3.1]	9						
[T3.3]	7						7		
[T3.4]	6					7			

- 109 Activities
- 3 levels
- Top 12 activities
 - 69% cutoff
 - 29 of 42 firms
- Comparing scorecards between releases is interesting




Twelve things "everybody" does (well, 66%)

Core activities

- identify gates
- know PII obligations
- awareness training
- data classification
- identify features
- security standards
- review security features
- static analysis tool
- QA boundary testing
- external pen testers
- good network security
- close ops bugs loop









BSIMM3 as a measuring stick

- Compare a
 (fake) firm with
 peers using the
 high water mark
 view
- Descriptive (not prescriptive)
- Incredible insight for planning






BSIMM3 scorecard with firm data



- Top 12 activities
 - green = good?
 - red = bad?
- "Blue shift" practices to emphasize
 - activities you should maybe think about in blue




We are a special snowflake (NOT)



- ISV (15) results
 are similar to
 financial services
 (17)
- You do the same things
- You can demand the same results
- Measurement works for all



BSIMM Longitudinal: Improvement over time



- 11 firmsmeasured twice(19 months apart)
- BSIMM
 measurements
 show how firms
 improve
 - 32% increase



© 2011 Cigital Inc. 6/15/2012

BSIMM Over Time (3 studies)

Governance	C	6		Intelligence	e .			SSDL Touch	points		10	Deploymen	t		8
Activity	BSIMM3 Observed (of 42)	BSIMM2 Observed (of 30)	BSIMM Observed (of 9)	Activity	BSIMM3 Observed (of 42)	BSIMM2 Observed (of 30)	BSIMM Observed (of 9)	Activity	BSIMM3 Observed (of 42)	Observed (of 30)	BSIMM Observed (of 9)	Activity	BSIMM3 Observed (of 42)	BSIMM2 Observed (of 30)	BSIMM Observed (of 9)
[SM1.1]	30	18	4	[AM1.1]	13	12	5	[AA1.1]	34	22	5	[PT1.1]	38	28	9
[SM1.2]	26	18	8	[AM1.2]	29	20	6	[AA1.2]	29	18	4	[PT1.2]	32	17	2
[SM1.3]	28	16	6	[AM1.3]	24	14	2	[AA1.3]	24	19	8	[PT1.3]	30	17	3
[SM1.4]	38	24	. 7	[AM1.4]	13	10	7	[AA1.4]	28	15	3	[PT2.2]	15	10	2
[SM1.6]	30	13	7	[AM1.5]	25	7	3	[AA2.1]	9	9	4	[PT2.3]	20	11	1
[SM2.1]	18	12	7	[AM2.1]	12	9	6	[AA2.2]	6	6	2	[PT3.1]	10	9	2
[SM2.2]	22	13	4	[AM2.2]	12	13	5	[AA2.3]	12	11	5	[PT3.2]	6	5	2
[SM2.3]	22	16	7	[AM2.4]	15	9	5	[AA3.1]	8	5	2				
[SM2.5]	20	19	4	[AM3.1]	3	2	1	[AA3.2]	4	3	1				
[SM3.1]	13	7	3	[AM3.2]	5	2	1								
[SM3.2]	5	4	1												
[CP1.1]	35	24	6	[SFD1.1]	37	29	9	[CR1.1]	19	10	3	[SE1.1]	19	11	2
[CP1.2]	38	24	6	(SFD1.2)	29	16	6	(CR1.2)	20	19	7	(SE1.2)	38	30	9
(CP1.3)	34	26	9	[SFD2.1]	23	18	6	[CR1.4]	29	20	8	(SE2.2)	19	16	4
[CP2.1]	19	13	3	[SFD2.2]	15	11	5	[CR2.2]	14	11	5	[SE2.3]	7	7	2
[CP2.2]	27	18	4	[SFD2.3]	14	10	4	[CR2.3]	19	8	4	[SE2.4]	22	13	3
[CP2.3]	20	13	5	[SFD3.1]	8	5	1	[CR2.4]	17	12	5	[SE3.2]	11	6	1
[CP2.4]	18	9	3	(SFD3.2)	9	10	5	[CR2.5]	13	11	5				
[CP2.5]	26	17	5					[CR3.1]	12	7	2				
[CP3.1]	7	4	1					[CR3.2]	3	1	1				
[CP3.2]	11	7	2					[CR3.3]	5	2	1				
[CP3.3]	8	5	2						7.00						
[T1.1]	33	24	9	[SR1.1]	31	22	S	[ST1.1]	32	21	5	[CMVM1.1]	33	21	4
[T1.2]	11	6	5	[SR1.2]	22	13	3	[ST1.2]	12	9	5	[CMVM1.2]	35	22	6
[T1.3]	5	5	5	[SR1.3]	25	12	3	[ST1.3]	28	18	9	[CMVM2.1]	29	18	6
[T1.4]	11	11	7	[SR1.4]	17	11	4	[ST2.1]	20	16	2	[CMVM2.2]	27	11	4
[T2.1]	16	14	6	[SR2.1]	10	10	3	[ST2.3]	7	5	3	[CMVM2.3]	22	11	2
[T2.2]	18	13	8	[SR2.2]	17	8	1	[ST3.1]	9	7	5	[CMVM3.1]	5	2	1
[T2.4]	20	14	6	[SR2.3]	18	13	4	[ST3.2]	9	10	7	[CMVM3.2]	6	4	2
[T2.5]	9	7	4	[SR2.4]	17	13	5	[ST3.3]	4	3	2	(CHITTIESE)	Ť		_
[T3.1]	6	4	2	[SR2.5]	19	11	4	[ST3.4]	4	4	2				
[T3.2]	4	3	1	[SR3.1]	9	10	3	[01014]		1	-				
[T3.3]	7	4	1	(Shark)	,	40	,								
[T3.4]	6	2	1												
15.4	9	-													



How will you use it?

- Gap assessment
 - Building a new program
 - Evolving an existing program



- How are we doing relative to the "market"? Peers?
- How are we doing over time?
- Business justification
 - Spend more here, less there
 - Data-driven, management approved ©
- Internal alignment
 - Business unit A vs. B vs. central policy etc.
- Assess 3rd parties





Get Involved


- http://bsimm.com
- WE NEED MORE FIRMS TO MEASURE

"So now, when we face a choice between adding features and resolving security issues, we need to choose security."

-Bill Gates

cschwarcz at Cigital.com

More info from CTO, Gary McGraw and other Cigital-ites:



www.informIT.com www.cigital.com/justiceleague www.cigital.com/silverbullet www.computer.org/security/bsisub/ www.swsec.com



Membership Has Its Benefits

- The 42 firms participating in the BSIMM Project make up the BSIMM Community.
- BSIMM Community resources include:
 - A moderated private mailing list
 - An annual BSIMM Conference (invitation only)
 - A members only section of the BSIMM web site.



References

- bsimm.com/facts
- bsimm.com/resources
- "Cargo Cult Computer Security" (January 28, 2010); http://www.informit.com/articles/article.aspx?p=1562220
- A Software Security Framework: Working Towards a Realistic Maturity Model (October 15, 2008);
 http://www.informit.com/articles/article.aspx?p=1271382
- "You Really Need a Software Security Group" (December 21, 2009); http://www.informit.com/articles/article.aspx?p=1434903
- vBSIMM; http://bsimm.com/vbsimm/
- vBSIMM article on InformIT; http://www.informit.com/articles/article.aspx?p=1832574

