

OWASP APPSEC

APAC 2013

SECURITY CHALLENGES OF HYBRID MOBILE APPLICATIONS

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**THIS IS NOT YOUR UNCLE OLAF'S**  
"OWASP TOP 10 MOBILE SECURITY"  
**TALK**

# AGENDA

- Hybrid Mobile Apps - what are they?
- Hybrid environments mix HTML+JS with "Native" code
- Hybrid environments mix managed code with unmanaged code
- Some difference between a "browser" and a "webview"
- Some ways of 'leaking info by accident'
- Bunch of technical details (small but perhaps important)

# ME

- Nokia (since 2001)
- Security Manager for Sales & Marketing services
  - Nokia.com etc.
- Past:
  - Ovi Store, Maps.nokia.com
  - Nokia Account
  - N-Gage v2
- Founded OWASP Helsinki in 2006
- Motto: "the more you learn, the less you seem to know"
- More of a Defender & Breaker than a Builder



**POLL**

## "DISCLAIMER"

- Examples are mainly for Windows Phone 8
- With some Qt (v4.8.x)/QML thrown in (Qt 5 is out, but...)
- Android and iPhone guys - just be cool  
(it's probably not that different)

# TRADITIONAL AIR GAP

A PRETTY EFFECTIVE SECURITY CONTROL

# WEB HAD NO ACCESS TO DEVICE API





# SECURITY USED TO BE SIGNING APPS WITH CAPABILITIES

Permission, privilege, you name it...  
So, installation handled the "rights"

BUFFER OVERFLOWS

SMS OF DEATH

MALWARE

AND SO FORTH

AND STILL IS...

THEY DIDN'T DISAPPEAR

There is just more of everything  
+ all the legacy code

# BRIDGING THE AIR GAP

NATIVE += WEB

HYBRID

# LET'S ADD A WEBVIEW

```
import QtWebKit 1.0

WebView {
    url: "https://www.owasp.org"
    preferredWidth: 490
    preferredHeight: 400
    scale: 0.5
    smooth: false
}
```

Code: Qt/QML

# MAGIC HAPPENS

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## A HYBRID ENVIRONMENT

- Native mobile apps utilize Web technologies inside the app
  - HTML, CSS and JavaScript embedded in / utilized by native code (C#, VB, objective-C, C++, "java")
- Typically utilizing

```
/ (ui) ?Web(View|Browser)/g class
```

For the rest of us: a "WebBrowser", "uiWebView", or just plain "WebView"

- Windows Phone 8: WebBrowser control (Windows 8 is very similar)
- Rendering engine without the "chrome" (Browser UI)
- According to Microsoft, nearly all Top 50 WP7 apps used the WebBrowser Control (a.k.a. WebView)

## COMMON

- Qt/QML [Qt Quick] multiplatform
- Widgets (W3C)
- Android
- Mac OS X, iOS
- Windows OS / Phone
- Apache Cordova / PhoneGap

## HOW NATIVE AND JS TALK (WP)

### In native XAML, expose an interface to JS

```
<phone:WebBrowser  
    ScriptNotify="alert_ScriptNotify"  
    IsScriptEnabled="True"  
/>>
```

### JavaScript calls the parent native app

```
function AlertSilverlight(data)  
{  
    window.external.notify(data);  
}  
AlertSilverlight(1);
```

### Listener picks it up and executes

```
private void alert_ScriptNotify(object sender, NotifyEventArgs e)  
{  
    MessageBox.Show(e.Value);  
}
```

Code: WinPhone 8 C#/Silverlight/XAML/JavaScript

## AND IN QML

**In this case, JS can be included in QML (inline or external)**

```
WebView { // consider this as "<html>"  
    javaScriptWindowObjects: QtObject {  
        WebView.windowObjectName: "qmlJS" // expose from native to JS  
  
        function qmlFunc() {  
            // native QML or JavaScript code here  
            console.log("Hello from QML!");  
        }  
    }  
}  
// e.g. a JS file embedded in the QML project build can refer to an ext JS  
Qt.include("http://mydomain/import.js")
```

**JavaScript calls the exposed method**

```
window.qmlJS.qmlFunc();
```

Code: QML(Qt markup) + HTML/JavaScript

## QML JS SANDBOX

### Inside QML, imported/inline JavaScript is NOT sandboxed

```
import "http://localhost/mikko/qt/javascript/unsafe.js" as ExtScript
// Beware of evil content
function fakeFunc() {
    var xhr = new XMLHttpRequest;
    xhr.open("GET", "file:///c:/setup.log"); // Read files on the local disk
    xhr.onreadystatechange = function() {
        if (xhr.readyState == XMLHttpRequest.DONE) {
            var a = xhr.responseText;
            console.log(a); // Send someplace else
        }
    }
    xhr.send();
}
// Invoke
ExtScript.fakeFunc();
```

### WebView JavaScript is sandboxed

```
import QtWebKit 1.0
WebView {
    url: "https://www.owasp.org"
}
```

## QML XHR RESULT

### Local file was read via XHR

```
[InstallShield Silent]
Version=v7.00
File=Log File
[ResponseResult]
ResultCode=0
[Application]
Name=RICOH Media Driver ver.2.10.00.04
Version=2.10.00.04
Company=RICOH
Lang=0009
```

Need to be EXTRA careful with untrusted JavaScript/QML inside .qml files

---

# IDENTIFYING NATIVE METHODS IN JS

**JavaScript is looking for native QML methods**

```
for (var i in window) {
    document.write("Window property(" + i + "): " + window[i]);
}
```

**Where we see:**

```
Window property(qmlJS): QObject_QML_0 (name = "")
```

**And then iterating through window.qmlJS:**

```
Window property(qmlFunc()): undefined
Window property(qmlFunc2(QVariant)): undefined
Window property(qmlFunc3(QVariant, QVariant)): undefined
```

Code: QML/Qt + JavaScript

# A LITTLE REMINDER

## Excerpt from Qt documentation reg. QtWebKit Bridge

Think whether the exposed object enables the web environment access things that shouldn't be open, and whether the web content loaded by that web page comes from a trusted source. In general, when exposing native QObjects that give the web environment access to private information or to functionality that's potentially harmful to the client, such exposure should be balanced by limiting the web page's access to trusted URLs only with HTTPS, and by utilizing other measures as part of a security strategy.

# SECURITY FUNDAMENTALS


OWASP TOP TEN

YES, IT'S ALL VERY VALID

BOTH OF THEM

## UI CONTROLS

- A lot of the usual UI controls are missing
- E.g. Windows Phone will just fail self-signed or untrusted SSL cert (need to manually import)
- No SSL "lock" visible & no mixed mode (http + https content) in WP
- Warnings (WP gives SSL warning, but prevents from loading page), popups etc.



# DO NOT TRACK

## Windows Phone 8

- IE 10 "Do Not Track" setting does not apply in WP8 WebBrowser - NO user control over this

DEMO

# SAME ORIGIN POLICY

## Notes for Windows Phone 8

- Content loaded from isolated storage is not restricted by SOP (file:///)
- Content created via NavigateToString is not restricted by SOP

```
var html = "<html><script>...Something...</script></h  
tml>"  
  
webBrowser1.NavigateToString(html);
```

- JavaScript called via native InvokeScript can be loaded from any domain
- Some differences on desktop vs mobile Silverlight

# Qt/QML

- Qt WebView has SOP limits on file://

```
Origin: file://
```

- Qt WebView has normal SOP limits for JavaScript

```
<html> // This runs in the WebKit WebView
<script>xhr();</script>
</html> // Normal cross-origin (CORS) rules apply
```

- Qt QML inline JavaScript / XMLHttpRequest does not enforce the same origin policy

```
// Script source: http://some_site/some.js
// This is inside filename.qml and inline JavaScript
xhr.open("GET", "http://another_site/?&id=123456");
```

- Imported inline JS has 'full access'

```
import "http://untrusted.com/js/unsafe.js" as ExtScript
```

# EVAL IS STILL EVIL

## ARE YOU EVAL'ING SOME UNTRUSTED INPUT?

Or native:

```
// QML
WebviewID.evaluateJavaScript("something")

// Qt
QString js = input;
mainFrame()->evaluateJavaScript(something);
```

```
// C#
WP_browserInvokeScript("eval", "something");
```

# UTILIZING C/C++


## WINDOWS PHONE 8 - "GOING NATIVE"

- Most likely usages are: to redeploy existing code & squeeze out max performance
- I have deliberate use of non-secure versions of functions
- E.g. "strcpy" vs "strcpy\_s" (Microsoft)

```
// Call from managed C# code to C++ (file.cs)
OWASP_WP_RT_CPP.StringCharacterCounter sccMain = new OWASP_WP_RT_CPP.StringCharacterCounter();
answer.Text = sccMain.GetLength(answer_text.Text).ToString() + " characters were found!";

// Native C++ (file.cpp)
unsigned int StringCharacterCounter::GetLength(String^ strToParse)
{
    std::wstring stlString = strToParse->Data();
    return stlString.length();
}
```

# BUFFER OVERFLOWS



The above killed Nokia N9 (MeeGo) Twitter client (Qt C++)

we can't know how much space we need to allocate...  
...for this pathological string we are generating  
two glyphs for each character.

# Demo

# INJECTIONS

- SQL injection

```
QSqlQuery q("SELECT something FROM " + untrusted_data);
```

- XML Query / XPath injection

Dynamic queries with user-supplied input could leave you vulnerable in Qt  
Use parameter binding for XML & SQL


- XSS special cases (Qt rich text)

QLabel default setting is QLabel::AutoText ['MIME type sniffing']


```
QLabel::AutoText
```

Output can be manipulated via a limited set of supported HTML tags. Encode output, or use:

```
QLabel::PlainText
```



# QT XSS



## DENIAL OF SERVICE

- Isolated storage on Windows Phone has no size restrictions - single app may consume large amount of space
- Also, HTML5 AppCache can easily consume disk space by caching content locally

```
Content-type: text/cache-manifest
```


- XML query resource exhaustion attacks in Qt
- Qt 4.8.x also has various JS crash cases in very large arrays (Qt 5.0 & newer WebKit more robust)

# QML JavaScript


- QMLv1 has problems handling very large JavaScript arrays
- Crashes the app
- Unlikely to be seen in "normal" app use

```
function bigArray() {  
    var a = new Array(1000000000); // 1bn or something 'very big'  
}
```

Compare to e.g. Firefox, Chrome (no effect)



# Memory Leak in Nokia Suite (Qt)



# QML DoS Demo

# Capabilities

- Platform configurations are your 'enhanced capabilities'
- Your mileage will vary greatly
- Each framework has their own options and defaults

# SCRIPTING

```
/* Qt default: true */
QWebSettings::JavascriptEnabled

QWebSettings::JavascriptCanOpenWindows
QWebSettings::JavascriptCanAccessClipboard
```

```
<!-- Windows Phone 8 default: disabled -->
<Grid x:Name="LayoutRoot">
    <phone:WebBrowser Name="mybrowser"
        IsScriptEnabled="True"
        Source="index.html"
        ScriptNotify="pokeMyScript" />
</Grid>
```

# PLUGINS

Java, Flash and other plugins (NPAPI, Qt plugins)

```
/* Qt */
QWebSettings::JavaEnabled
QWebSettings::PluginsEnabled

/* No plugins in WP8 */
```

# WebKit XSS Auditor

If you have it, why not use it?

```
/* Control the Qt WebKit XSS auditor (not available in QML/Qt Quick 1) */
QWebSettings::XSSAuditingEnabled

QWebView view;
view.settings()->setAttribute(QWebSettings::XSSAuditingEnabled, false);
view.load(QUrl("http://yourdomain/xssauditor.php?xss=<script>alert(1)</script>"));
```

# HEADERS

Security header [overall HTML5] support finally becoming up-to-date

With WP8 + IE10 and Qt 5.0 + WebKit2

- Content Security Policy
- X-XSS-Protection
- Strict Transport Security for SSL
- X-Frame-Options to prevent framing

# AND SO ON

- File access

```
QWebSettings::LocalContentCanAccessRemoteUrls  
QWebSettings::LocalContentCanAccessFileUrls
```

```
Can file: access http:  
Can qrc: access file:
```

- Misc.

```
QWebSettings::PrivateBrowsingEnabled  
QWebSettings::DeveloperExtrasEnabled
```

With this setting, any site can access user's location

```
// Windows Phone  
IsGeolocationEnabled = "true"
```

DEMO


# Windows Phone 8 native methods

# <iframe> recap

- Unlike Windows Phone, Qt requires you to define to which frame native methods are published

```
// Only myFrame has access to the native object
QWebFrame *myFrame = myWebPage->mainFrame();
myFrame->addToJavaScriptWindowObject("myObject", theObject);
```

- As seen in the demo, any iframe in WP can access exposed native methods
- "Mind your security boundary"  
WP does not advertise available methods (it just takes a string)



# QML XHR

You know this

```
var xhr = new XMLHttpRequest();
...
xhr.open("GET", "http://target");
xhr.setRequestHeader("Whatever", "ValueHere");
xhr.send();
```

Tried this instead

```
xhr.setRequestHeader("Referer", "http://somedomain.com");
```

Obviously fails!

## Ok how about this?

```
xhr.setRequestHeader("Origin", "http://www.google.fi");
```

```
ORIGIN: http://www.google.fi
Connection: Keep-Alive
Accept-Encoding: gzip
Accept-Language: en-US, *
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0
```

# A Little Tweaking Later

```
xhr.setRequestHeader("anything", "buubaa\nReferer: http://www.google.fi/yourpath");
```

```
ANYTHING: buubaa
Referer: http://www.google.fi/yourpath
Connection: Keep-Alive
Accept-Encoding: gzip
Accept-Language: en-US, *
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0
```

Just needed a newline there ("\\n", "\\o12", "\\xo12")

To add "restricted" headers

# Call it the 'Power of C++'

The grey area between the mainstream browser and your own apps

# WebView uses WebKit - didn't have it

- Changing the Host header is not supported as Qt constructs only a single HTTP request
- This is not sandboxed code
- Currently classified as a **bug**  
(<https://bugreports.qt-project.org/browse/QTBUG-27570>)

## SUMMARY

Usual secure development practices apply (OWASP etc.)

Hybrid techs are catching up, security-wise

User has less or no control

This is not "a browser" - updates etc. are lagging

HTML5 & new platforms are bridging the air gap

Controls such as Same Origin Policy may function differently

Perform robust checks when exposing sensitive platform features (camera, location)

# QUESTIONS?

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