

OFFENSIVE DEFENCE  
OWASP day, Auckland

Consultant  
@ Aura Information Security  
[www.aurainfosec.com](http://www.aurainfosec.com)

WE NEED **MASS** AWARENESS OF  
THESE COMMON ISSUES

WE NEED **MASS** REMEDIATION  
OF THESE COMMON ISSUES


30 minutes of your mind



# Internal Pen Test Recap:

An internal penetration is conducted from the perspective of an **unauthenticated** internal attacker with physical access to the network, or an external attacker who has achieved a foothold on an internal system

Defenders



# TEAM BLUE VS TEAM RED

Attackers



# PLAN A: 2005/2006

- I. Grab a desk
2. Gather Interesting Information
  - User Enumeration, System Information
3. Become a low-level/local admin user
4. Escalate to domain admin

# PLAN A: 2017/2018

- I. Grab a desk
2. Gather Interesting Information
  - User Enumeration, System Information
3. Become a low-level/local admin user
4. Escalate to domain admin

90%

Owned


13

Years



#celebration

# ALL THESE NETWORKS



HAVE THE SAME  
PROBLEMS

THE RIDICULOUS

SIX



## #1 : NULL Sessions

An anonymous connection to a computer which can be used to gather information about the system.

- Disabled by default on newer versions of Windows.

## The Problem

- If allowed, Domain Controllers will return the complete list of domain users, groups, and group membership to aid an attacker

Group 'Domain Admins' (RID: 512) has member: ACME\research2  
Group 'Domain Admins' (RID: 512) has member: ACME\ADM-Charlie  
Group 'Domain Admins' (RID: 512) has member: ACME\MeganR  
Group 'Domain Admins' (RID: 512) has member: ACME\ADM-Keifer  
Group 'Domain Admins' (RID: 512) has member: ACME\A.jordaan  
Group 'Domain Admins' (RID: 512) has member: ACME\ADM-Hobson  
Group 'Domain Admins' (RID: 512) has member: ACME\BackupAkl  
Group 'Domain Admins' (RID: 512) has member: ACME\adm-luke  
Group 'Domain Admins' (RID: 512) has member: ACME\QTSupplier  
Group 'Domain Admins' (RID: 512) has member: ACME\stevej  
Group 'Domain Admins' (RID: 512) has member: ACME\backupexec  
Group 'Domain Admins' (RID: 512) has member: ACME\ADM-Neil  
Group 'Domain Admins' (RID: 512) has member: ACME\ADM-Tony  
Group 'Domain Admins' (RID: 512) has member: ACME\b.furn  
Group 'Domain Admins' (RID: 512) has member: ACME\c.philbert  
Group 'Domain Admins' (RID: 512) has member: ACME\domainscan  
Group 'Domain Admins' (RID: 512) has member: ACME\jkeagan  
Group 'Domain Admins' (RID: 512) has member: ACME\fortinet  
Group 'Domain Admins' (RID: 512) has member: ACME\mtest

## BlueTeam Guidance

### Enum4linux

A wrapper around the Samba tools  
- smbclient, rpcclient, net nmblookup

## #2 Server Message Block (SMB) Signing

SMB is a file protocol mostly used by windows systems primarily to provide shared access to files, printers, network locations etc.

- Signing is disabled by default on Windows systems (except Domain Controllers)

### The Problem

Attacker can perform **SMB Relay** attacks against systems with signing disabled, gaining a foothold.

```
Relaying credentials for these users: evidence hashes nbtsec
[ Administrator ]tem32>cd c:\localhost>/Desktop\wcc# nano admin.h
cd c:\Domain Admins\root@localhost>/Desktop\wcc# nano admin.h
Group\Domain Admins
Retrieving information for : 2...
SMB signing: False
Os version: 'indows 7 Enterprise 7601 Service Pack 1'
Hostname: ' '
Part of the      domain
[+] Setting up SMB relay with SMB challenge: 990509b1d6be058a
[+] Received NTLMv2 hash from: 10.          False
```

# BlueTeam Guidance

## Nmap

```
Nmap scan report for acme1.acme.com (172.16.10.23)
Host is up (0.00043s latency).

PORT      STATE SERVICE
445/tcp    open  microsoft-ds
```

Host script results:

```
|  smb-security-mode:
|    account_used: guest
|    authentication_level: user
|    challenge_response: supported
|_  message_signing: disabled (dangerous, but default)
```


## **# 3: Link-Local Multicast and NetBIOS Name Resolution**

Two components of Microsoft Windows, which helps machines on the same subnet to find each other when DNS fails.

### **The Problem**

Attacker can intercept and respond to these requests, to capture password hashes > crack weak passwords.

## LLMNR / NBT-NS Poisoning



&lt;div[](https://img.shields.io/badge/USERNAME-ACME-blue)

# BlueTeam Guidance

Responder

Metasploit

## # 4: Passwords Management

Weak and default passwords are frequently detected. Domain and local account password policies enforce the company password requirements. Password reuse.

### The Problem

- The industry requirements are difficult, so users construct passwords following predictable patterns. Captured hashes are more likely to be cracked.

## BlueTeam Guidance

### Hashcat


<https://hashcat.net/hashcat/>

## #5: Out of Date Software

Software Vendors release new versions to fix bugs. Eventually software becomes deprecated (EOL) and replaced completely.

### The Problem

Patches seem to take between 3 months and ‘infinity’ to be installed.






ARE WE PROTECTED  
FROM THIS NEW ATTACK ?

RISK AND COMPLIANCE

SYS ADMIN



I DON'T

KNOW...

## BlueTeam Guidance

Nmap (has scripts for several vulns)

OpenVAS (free)

- Community version of Nessus

Metasploit Framework

<https://www.openvas.org>

[+] 10.7.39.160:445 - Host does NOT appear vulnerable.  
[+] 10.7.39.161:445 - Host is likely VULNERABLE to MS17-010!  
[-] 10.7.39.162:445 - Host does NOT appear vulnerable.  
[-] 10.7.39.163:445 - Host does NOT appear vulnerable.  
[-] 10.7.39.170:445 - Host does NOT appear vulnerable.  
[+] 10.7.39.171:445 - Host is likely VULNERABLE to MS17-010!  
(Windows 7 Enterprise 7601 Service Pack 1)

## #6: Privileged Service Accounts

Service accounts are created by Admins to install, configure and operate software applications.  
e.g. backup software, anti virus.

### The Problem

- Service accounts are often excluded from security policies i.e MFA, password expiration
- Excessive privileges

```
<UNCSite Type="repository" Name="Christchurch Repository" Order="2"
Server="chrv01" Enabled="1"
Local="0"><ShareName>mcafeeEPO5.1$</ShareName><RelativePath></RelativePath
><UseLoggedonUserAccount>0</UseLoggedonUserAccount><DomainName>ACME</Domai
nName><UserName>McAfeeEpo_SVC</UserName><Password
Encrypted="1">[REDACTED]kDTiFXsR/abAFPM9B3Q==</Pa
ssword></UNCSite><UNCSite Type="repository" Name="Dunedin Repository"
Order="3" Server="dnsrv01" Enabled="1"
Local="0"><ShareName>McAfeeEPO5.1$</ShareName><RelativePath></RelativePath
><UseLoggedonUserAccount>0</UseLoggedonUserAccount><DomainName>ACME</Domai
n
```

# funoverip / mcafee-sitelist-pwd-decryption

Watch 11

Star 57

Fork 14

Code

Issues 0

Pull requests 0

Projects 0

Wiki

Insights

Password decryption tool for the McAfee SiteList.xml file

7 commits

1 branch

0 releases

2 contributors

Branch: master ▾

New pull request

Create new file

Upload files

Find file

Clone or download ▾

funoverip Cleaning up IV

Latest commit 3665de8 on 12 Feb 2016

README.md

Typo fix (French != English)

2 years ago

mcafee\_sitelist\_pwd\_decrypt.py

Cleaning up IV

2 years ago

## BlueTeam Guidance

Enum4linux, but simpler to just review AD

**There is no acceptable excuse to be at risk to**

**20 year old vulnerabilities....**

**Summation**

**Thank you for your time**

**No Wait There's More**

**(code for: “I went to fast and finished early”)**