

Software Assurance Maturity Model (SAMM) 1.0

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
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The OWASP Foundation

Outline

- Terminology
- Structure
- Using SAMM
- Supporting materials
- Future developments
- Other models and standards

Generic Individual Practice Over Time



SAMM

- Software (Security) Assurance Maturity Model (S[S]AMM)
- Framework to formulate and implement a strategy for software security
- Tailored to an organisation's specific risks
- Vendor neutral
- Sequential, measurable goals
- Open and freely available
- OWASP project since January 2009



History/plan

- Author and project lead
 - Pravir Chandra, United States
- Comprehensive, Lightweight Application Security Process (CLASP)
 - Ongoing development
 - Current version 1.2, 2006
- Open SAMM 0.8 beta
 - August 2008
- Open SAMM 1.0
 - ▶ March 2009
- Open SAMM 2.0
 - ▶ ? 2011



Aims

- Evaluating an organization's existing software security practices
- Building a balanced software security assurance program in well-defined iterations
- Demonstrating concrete improvements to a security assurance program
- Defining and measuring security-related activities throughout an organization

Four Critical Business Functions

Governance



Software development management activities and organisation-wide business processes

Construction



Goal definition and software creation processes

Verification

Checking, evaluation and testing of software development artifacts

Deployment



Software release management and normal operational management




Structure

- Four business practices, each with:
 - Three security practices, each with:
 - One objective
 - Two activities
 - Assessment method
 - Expected results
- Software security is assessed against every security practice, giving each a maturity level (score) of between 0 and 3: 1, 0, 0+, 1, 2, 3, 0+ 2, 0+, 1, 1+, 0



SAMM and an SDLC






Each with Three Security Practices





Each Practice has 3 levels (objectives) 1/2



Each Practice has 3 levels (objectives) 2/2

Veri	fication						
		$ \longrightarrow$	DR1	DR2	(DR3	>
		Objectives	Support ad hoc reviews of software design	Offer assessment services to review software design		Require assessments and validate artifacts	
Desig	gn Review		to ensure baseline mitigations for	against comprehensive best practices for		to develop detailed understanding of	
Cod	e Review		known risks	security		protection mechanisms	
Secur	ity Testing	Activitves	Identify software attack surface	Inspect for complete provision of security mechanisms		Develop data-flow diagrams for sensitive resources	
			Analyze design against known security requirements	Deploy design review service for project teams		Establish release gates for design review	

OWASF

DR3 Detail 1/4

Design Review



Require assessments and validate artifacts to develop detailed understanding of protection mechanisms

ACTIVITIES

A. Develop data-flow diagrams for sensitive resources

Based on the business function of the software project, conduct analysis to identify details on system behavior around high-risk functionality. Typically, high-risk functionality will correlate to features implementing creation, access, update, and deletion of sensitive data. Beyond data, high-risk functionality also includes project-specific business logic that is critical in nature, either from a denial-of-service or compromise perspective.

For each identified data source or business function, select and use a standardized notation to capture relevant software modules, data sources, actors, and messages that flow amongst them. It is often helpful to start with a high-level design diagram and iteratively flesh out relevant detail while removing elements that do not correspond to the sensitive resource.

With data-flow diagrams created for a project, conduct analysis over them to determine internal choke-points in the design. Generally, these will be individual software modules that handle data with differing sensitivity levels or those that gate access to several business functions of various levels of business criticality.

B. Establish release gates for design review

Having established a consistent design review program, the next step of enforcement is to set a particular point in the software development life-cycle where a project cannot pass until an design review is conducted and findings are reviewed and accepted. In order to accomplish this, a baseline level of expectations should be set, e.g. no projects with any high-severity findings will be allowed to pass and all other findings must be accepted by the business owner.

Generally, design reviews should occur toward the end of the design phase to aide early detection of security issues, but it must occur before releases can be made from the project team.

For legacy systems or inactive projects, an exception process should be created to allow those projects to continue operations, but with an explicitly assigned timeframe for each to be reviewed to illuminate any hidden vulnerabilities in the existing systems. Exceptions for should be limited to no more than 20% of all projects.

RESULTS

- Granular view of weak points in a system design to encourage better compartmentalization
- Organization-level awareness of project standing against baseline security expectations for architecture
- Comparisons between projects for efficiency and progress toward mitigating known flaws

ADD'L SUCCESS METRICS

- >80% of projects with updated dataflow diagrams in past 6 months
- + >75% of projects passing design review audit in past 6 months

ADD'L COSTS

- Ongoing project overhead from maintenance of data-flow diagrams
- Organization overhead from project delays caused by failed design review audits

ADD'L PERSONNEL

- + Developers (2 days/yr)
- Architects (1 day/yr)
- + Managers (1-2 days/yr)
- Business Owners (1-2 days/yr)
- + Security Auditors (2-3 days/yr)

RELATED LEVELS

Secure Architecture - 3
 Code Review - 3



13

DR3 Detail 2/4

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DR3 Detail 4/4

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RELATED LEVELS

- Secure Architecture 3
- Code Review 3

SAMM procedure

Conduct an assessment

- ▶ Lightweight
- Detailed
- Create a score card
- Build an assurance programme
 - Metrics
 - ▶ Road map
- Implementation and re-assessment



Assessment

Verification

Assessment worksheet

Design Review	Yes/No
Do project teams document the attack perimeter of software designs?	
Do project teams check software designs against known security risks?	
Do most project teams specifically analyze design elements for security mechanisms?	
Are most project stakeholders aware of how to obtain a formal design review?	DR 2
Does the design review process incorporate detailed data-level analysis?	
Does routine project audit require a baseline for design review results?	



18


Scorecards

Strategy & Metrics		0
Policy & Compliance		0
Education & Guidance		0
Threat Assessment	r a	0
Security Requirements		0-
Secure Architecture		0

Design Analysis		0
Code Review	<i>n.</i>	0
Security Testing	r a	0+
Vulnerability Management		0
Environment Hardening		0
Operational Enablement		0

OWASP

Roadmaps



20

SAMM in Use

- OpenSAMM Shows a Way, Building Real Software Blog, Jim Bird, 17 April 2009
- Feedback from client engagements using SAMM by Eoin Keary, Rahim Jina and Aidan Lynch (Ernst & Young), 10 July 2009
- Applicability
 - business maturity
 - organisation scale



Supporting Resources

- Wiki, PDF download, eBook and Lulu book in monochrome and colour
- Pravir Chandra's presentation at AppSec EU09
- Zate Berg's presentation at OWASP Tampa
- Matt Bartoldus' presentation at OWASP London
- Templates for assessments and managing software security strategies
- Roadmap charts



Success Measures

- Improve software security
- Promoted beyond the security community
- Metrics to measure improvements actually achieved (real projects)
- Reduce complexity
- Implemented in a wide range of organisations
- Supporting materials, tools, templates, papers and integration with other business process models and standards



Future Path

- Refinement based on experience and feedback
- Interview template assertions
- Additional case studies
- Use SAMM to assess OWASP project(s)
- Mappings to other resources (CLASP, BSIMM, NIST SP800-53, CobiT) and OWASP projects
- Translations (Spanish, French, Chinese, ...)
- Success metrics as business results



Success Metrics as Business Results

- In SAMM 1.0, most metrics are activity based
 - % activity success metrics e.g. ">80% of staff briefed on assurance program roadmap in past 3 months" and ">50% of projects with updated change management procedures in past 6 months"
 - ½ business success metrics
 e.g. ">50% of all security incidents identified a priori by threat models in past 12 months" and perhaps
 75% of projects passing infrastructure audits in past 6 months"
- Greater emphasis on business success?



25

Further reading 1/2

- Software Assurance Maturity Model (SAMM) http://www.opensamm.org/
- OWASP SAMM Project http://www.owasp.org/index.php/Category:OWASP_Software_Assurance_Maturity_M odel Project
- OWASP CLASP Project http://www.owasp.org/index.php/Category:OWASP CLASP Project
- SAMM presentation at AppSec EU09 by Pravir Chandra http://www.owasp.org/images/4/49/AppSecEU09_OpenSAMM-1.0.ppt
- SAMM presentation at OWASP Tampa by Zate Berg http://lists.owasp.org/pipermail/samm/attachments/20090602/6d0d864c/attachment -0001.ppt
- SAMM presentation at OWASP London by Matt Bartoldus <u>http://www.owasp.org/images/d/df/OpenSAMM.pdf</u>
- Software Security Assurance, State-of-the-Art Report, 31 July 2007, Information Assurance Technology Analysis Center (IATAC) and Data and Analysis Center for Software (DACS) http://iac.dtic.mil/iatac/download/security.pdf



Further reading 2/2

- OpenSAMM Shows a Way, Jim Bird, 17 April 2009 <u>http://swreflections.blogspot.com/2009/04/opensamm-shows-way.html</u>
- Team Software Process (TSP) <u>http://www.sei.cmu.edu/tsp/</u>
- Common Criteria (CC) <u>http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/thecc.html</u>
- CESG <u>http://www.cesg.gov.uk</u>
- Build Security In (BSI) <u>https://buildsecurityin.us-cert.gov</u>
- Software Assurance Metrics And Tool Evaluation (SAMATE) <u>http://samate.nist.gov/</u>
- Software Assurance Forum for Excellence in Code (SAFECode) <u>http://www.safecode.org/</u>
- Trustworthy Computing Security Development Lifecycle, Microsoft <u>http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms995349.aspx</u>
- Correctness by Construction (CbyC) <u>https://buildsecurityin.us-cert.gov/daisy/bsi/articles/knowledge/sdlc/613-BSI.html</u>
- Building Security In Maturity Model, Cigital <u>http://www.bsi-mm.com/</u>



Additional SAMM resources

- OWASP SAMM Project Mailing List <u>https://lists.owasp.org/pipermail/samm/</u>
- Open SAMM Blog <u>http://www.opensamm.org/news/</u>
- Tools
- http://www.opensamm.org/download/
 - OpenSAMM-BSIMM Mapping OWASP Summit 2011
 - Assessment Interview Template Nick Coblentz
 - Roadmap Chart Template Colin Watson
 - Assessment Worksheet Christian Frichot
 - Project Plan Template Jim Weiler
 - Vulnerability Manager Denim Group



End

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