

### Ralph Durkee Durkee Consulting, Inc. Rochester ISSA & OWASP Chapters rd@rd1.net

### Ralph Durkee

- **Founder of Durkee Consulting** since 1996
- **Founder of Rochester OWASP** since 2004
- **#** President of Rochester ISSA chapter
- **#** SANS Instructor and course developer
- **# SANS GIAC Certified** GSEC, GCIH, GCIA, GSNA, GPEN
- **#** CISSP Certified
- Application Security, development, auditing, PCI compliance, pen testing, Ethical Hacking , Auditing and consulting
- CIS (Center for Internet Security) developed benchmark security standards – Apache, Linux, BIND DNS, OpenLDAP, FreeRadius, Unix, FreeBSD

### Agenda

- **I** OWASP Updates
- **#** App Sec DC 2010
- **#** State of Web Application Security
- **#** Web Security Methods and Tools
- Open Discussion on the State and Future of Web Application Security
- **#** References and Resources

### **OWASP**

### **Open Web Application Security Project**

- A volunteer group, a not-for-profit charitable organization
- Produces free, professional-quality, open-source documentation, tools, and standards
- Dedicated to helping organizations understand and improve the security of their web application.
- Facilitates conferences, local chapters, articles, papers, and message forums

#### See www.OWASP.org/rochester for the Rochester Chapter

### **OWASP Brief History**

- 2004 Local Chapters Started, include the Rochester Chapter
- Nov 2008 First Summit in 2008 Portugal Major Changes
  - Many Working Sessions
  - Formed Global Committees
  - New Outreach program, Tools and Guidance
- Nov 2009 Smaller 1day Summit
- Feb 2011 Next Summit in Portugal

### **OWASP 2008 Summit**



Over 80 application security experts from over 20 countries joined forces to identify, coordinate, and prioritize our 2009 efforts to create a more secure Internet.



State of Web Application Security

### **OWASP 2011 Summit**



Lots of anticipated work sessions
Expected changes for OWASP
Talk of new OWASP 4.0!

# App Sec DC 2010

Major App Sec Conference
2 Training Days and 2 Plenary Days
4 Parallel Tracks each days
Plenty of great presentations
RSS get's a major mention in the keynote
Presentation slides available on-line

# App Sec DC 2010 & RSS

#### 🔁 OWASPDC2010-v1.pdf - Adobe Reader

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### 2010 Events Globally

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2010 Regional And Local Events	DATE	LOCATION	<b>OWASP Introduction</b>	
AppSec DC 2010	November 8th - November 11th	Washington, DC	U.S. Board Members	
Boston Application Security Conference 2010	November 20th	Cambridge, MA		
IBWAS	November 25th - November 26th	Portugal	Dinis Cruz	
BeNeLux OWASP Day 2010	December 1st - 2nd	Eindhoven, The Netherlands	Seba	

#### 2010 Conferences and events - Completed

2010 Regional And Local Events	DATE	LOCATION	OWASP Introduction
OWASP AppSec Research 2010	June 21st - June 24th	Stockholm, Sweden	Dave Wichers, Tom Brennan, Seba
Froc 2010	June 2nd	Denver, Colorodo, USA	Tom Brennan
OWASP Day Mexico (at Aguascalientes)	June 4th	Aguascalientes, Mexico	Tom Brennan
OWASP Day, Argentina 2010	June 30	Buenos Aries	
New Zealand Day	July 15th	Auckland, New Zealand	
AppSec US 2010, CA	September 7th - September 10th	Irvine, CA	Jeff Williams, Tom Brennan, Dave Wichers
AppSec Ireland 2010	September 17th	Dublin, Ireland	Eoin Keary
OWASP AppSec Germany 2010 Conference	October 20th	Nürnberg, Germany	Tom Brennan
Rochester Security Summit	October 20th -October 21st	Rocheter, NY, USA	TBD
OWASP China Summit 2010	October 20th -October 23rd	Beijing, China	Tom Brennan
LASCON	October 29th, 2010	Austin, TX, USA	Matt Tesauro

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App Sec DC 2010 – Highlights H....t...p.....p...o...s...t

H....t...p....p...o...s...t Presented by Onn Chee – OWASP Singapore Lead Tom Brennan – OWASP Foundation A new Layer 7 DoS attack

# App Sec DC 2010 – Highlights H...t..t..p....p...o...s...t

- H....t....p.....p....o...s...t Onn Chee & Tom Brennan
- New Denial Service Vulnerability
- Has some Similar to Slow Loris, but uses POST
- Very difficult to mitigate
- Affects All Web Applications that allow POST
- Vendors Its a protocol flaw no fix coming
- Followed by Workshop on slow HTTP Post DoS

# App Sec DC 2010 – Highlights H....t...p.....p....o...s...t

### How it Works

- HTTP Post send with all the HTTP Headers
- Sending headers bypasses the IIS Slowloris mitigation which times out on the headers.
- Content-Length indicates size of the body
- Content is sent very slow and in small pieces.
- For Example 1 bytes per 110 seconds.
- Large servers easily brought down with only 20k connections

### App Sec DC 2010 – Highlights Closing the Gap

**Closing the Gap: Analyzing the Limitations of Web Application Vulnerability Scanners** 

By

- David Shelly
- Randy Marchany
- Joseph Tront

Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State Univ.

### App Sec DC 2010 – Highlights Closing the Gap

**Closing the Gap: Analyzing the Limitations of Web Application Vulnerability Scanners** 

- Examined Current State for Web App Scanners for accurately detecting:
  - SQL Injection
  - Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)
  - Session Management Flaws
- 6 Web App Vulnerability Scanners examined:
- Results Anonymized not intended to compare products

### App Sec DC 2010 – Highlights Closing the Gap - Results Summary

Vulnerability Tested	Detected	Implemented	False Negatives
SQL-Inject Form	59.7%	12	40.3%
SQL-Inject Cookie	6.3%	8	93.7%
XSS Reflect	43.3%	10	56.7%
XSS Stored	11.1%	6	88.9%
XSS DOM-based	0%	1	100%
Session Predictable SID	20%	1	80%
Session Insecure Cookie	4.4%	9	95.6%

### App Sec DC 2010 – Highlights Closing the Gap – False Positives

Vulnerability Tested	Total Reported	Avg. Correct	False Positives
SQL-Inject False Positives	58	79.3%	20.7%
XSS – False Positives	36	86,1%	13.9%

App Sec DC 2010 – Highlights Power of Code Review

**Power of Code Review** 

By Dave Wichers – Aspect Security & OWASP Board

- Compared Manual Code Review vs. Manual Web App Pen Test
- Demonstrated that many flaws are easier to find and verify with Code Review rather than with penetration testing.

# App Sec DC 2010 – Highlights Power of Code Review - Summary

### **Summary**

### □ To find them?

- Result: Similar, but slight edge to code review.
  - <u>It's a MYTH that code review is way more expensive</u>. If you have people with the right skills, its actually faster AND more effective

### □ To find exactly where they are in the app?

- Result: Clear advantage to code review
- □ To verify we don't have them?
  - Result: Also clearly the advantage goes to code review

## App Sec DC 2010 – Highlights Read the Label

### Don't Judge a Website by its Icon – Read the Label!

- By Jeff William Aspect Security & OWASP Chair
- Reviewed Impact of Consumer Labels on the industry
- Proposed Security Labels for Applications
- Addresses Issue of how do we make Software Security Visible.

State of Security What is being Attacked?

Major shifts in targets for Attacks

- Web Applications
- Client Browsers
- Client E-mail
- Combinations of all of the above
- **Why the Change**?
  - Attackers go for the easy targets
  - Broadband clients are very useful too

### Web Application Vulnerabilities

#### Web Application Security is:

<b>Traditional Layers</b>	Traditional Security Controls			
Network Protocols	Firewalls, Routers, Operating System IP Stack Configuration and Filtering, VPNs, and Vulnerability Scanners			
Operating System	Operating System Patches and OS Configuration, Authentication, Authorization, Encryption, and Vulnerability Scanners			
Commercial and Open Source Applications	Minimize Services, Application Configuration, Patches, Application Level Authentication Authorization, and Vulnerability Scanners			
Custom Web Applications	Architecture, Design and Code Reviews, Application Scanners, Testing with Malicious Input			

State of Web Application Security

### How Bad Is It? – SANS - Top Cyber Security Risks

- Sept 2009 Report with data from TippingPoint IPS and vulnerability data by Qualys.
- **Web** Applications have largest # of Vulnerabilities.



### How Bad Is It? – More Reports

- Typically reports are 90-99% of Web Applications are Vulnerable
- Privacy Rights Clearing House reports 93% of all data breaches involve Applications or Databases.
- Gartner reports 75% of attacks today are at the Application Level
- # 90% of malware originates from legitimate websites that have been hacked [Sophos July 2008]

### How Bad Is It? - Verizon 2010 Data Breach Investigations Report

#### **Attack Pathways**

- After being edged out in 2008 as the most-used path of intrusion, web applications now reign supreme in both the number of breaches and the amount of data compromised through this vector.
- . . . 54% of breaches and 92% of records ...
- Web applications have the rather unfortunate calling to be publicfacing, dynamic, user-friendly, and secure all at the same time. Needless to say, it's a tough job.

http://www.verizonbusiness.com/resources/reports/rp\_2010-data-breachreport\_en\_xg.pdf

### How Bad Is It? – SANS @ RISK Vulnerability Reports

- Vulnerability Reports consistently report Web Applications with highest # of vulnerabilities.
- **#** Example SANS @RISK Oct 2010

SANS @RISK Oct 2010	10/7	10/15	10/21	10/28	Total
Microsoft	3	14	11	0	28
Мас	0	0	0	1	1
Linux	4	10	4	2	20
Solaris	0	0	0	0	0
Network Device	0	0	2	0 、	2
Web Applications	28	7	15	9	59

# Auditing Web Applications

#### **Security Trends**

- Vast Majority of Vulnerabilities are now found in the Web Applications
- The Criminals have shifted their focus to attacking Web Applications and Web clients

#### **Audit Trends?**

- Has Auditing adjusted to the changing threats?
- As Auditors are we focusing a majority of the effort where we find the greatest risks?
- Are check lists and automated scans effective for auditing custom in-house developed applications?

# Auditing Web Applications Methods

In addition to check-list and network scans:

- **#** Applications Vulnerability Scanners
- **#** Web App Penetration Testing
- **#** Security Code Reviews
- SDLC training and processes Integrate Security throughout the Software Development Life Cycle
- Threat Modeling
- See www.OWASP.org for free resources on each

# Web Application Code and Network Scanners

#### **#** Web Application Scanners

- Different from Vulnerability scanners
- Not as easy to use
- High level of False Positives and False Negatives

#### **Study by Stanford** [1]

Vulnerability detection rate averaged from 2% - 48% depending on vulnerability category

#### **Study by MITRE** [2]

 All tool vendors claims put together covered only 45% of over 600 CWE vulnerabilities studied.

# **OWASP ASVS** - Application Security Verification Standard

### Level 1 – Automated Verification

Level 1A – Dynamic Scan (Partial Automated Verification) Level 1B – Source Code Scan (Partial Automated Verification) Level 2 – Manual Verification Level 2A – Penetration Test (Partial Manual Verification) Level 2B – Code Review (Partial Manual Verification) Level 3 – Design Verification (Includes Threat Modeling) Level 4 – Internal Verification

# Testing Web Applications with a Proxy

#### **App. Tester or Attackers Computer**





All request and responses may be analyzed and modified using the proxy!

Web Application Security Trends © 2005-2010 Durkee Consulting, Inc.



# Secure SDLC Building Secure Web Applications

- Application vulnerabilities are NOT prevented by traditional security controls
- **Application Security starts with the Architecture and Design**
- Security can't be easily added on later without re-work
- **H** Educate developers and testers on Web App Security.
- Perform application architecture and code reviews with security trained professionals.
- Integrate security into software development life cycle.
- Don't invent your own security controls
- **H** Design, Design, Design, code, Test, Test, Test

### Threat Risk Modeling

Looks at detailed architecture and design along with threat vectors, and abuse cases to identify vulnerabilities and analyze the risk.

#### **Steps:**

- 1. Identify Security Objectives
- 2. Survey the Application
- 3. Decompose it
- 4. Identify Threats
- 5. Identify Vulnerabilities

### **Discussion and Questions**

### **Current State**

- Are we making progress? And are we getting ahead of or keeping up with the threats?
- How has the risks changed?
- In what areas are we as an application security industry doing better, and where is improvement needed?

### **Discussion and Questions**

### **Current State**

- Are we making progress? And are we getting ahead of or keeping up with the threats?
- **#** How has the risks changed?
- In what areas are we as an application security industry doing better, and where is improvement needed?
- Is the Application Software Industry a broken economy?

Discussion and Questions – Future State

### **Future State**

Where should we be headed?

■ Are there major changes needed or helpful to "fix" the application security profession?

# Resources – Rochester Non-Profit Groups

**OWASP Rochester Chapter Information** http://www.OWASP.org/rochester

Rochester Security Summit Oct 2011 http://RochesterSecurity.org

**Rochester ISSA Chapter** http://RochISSA.org

### **On-Line References**

- 1. State of The Art: Automated Black Box Web Application Vulnerability Testing - Stanford Computer Lab http://www.owasp.org/images/2/28/Black\_Box\_Sc anner\_Presentation.pdf and http://theory.stanford.edu/~jcm/papers/pci\_oa kland10.pdf
- 2. SAMATE and Evaluating Static Analysis Tools http://hissa.nist.gov/~black/Papers/staticAna lyExper%20Ada%20Geneva%20Jun%20007.pdf
- 3. Verizon 2010 Data Breach Investigations Report http://www.verizonbusiness.com/resources/repo rts/rp\_2010-data-breach-report\_en\_xg.pdf

### **On-Line Resources**

#### SANS The Top Cyber Security Risks Sept 2009

http://www.sans.org/top-cyber-security-risks/

#### Washington Post - European Cyber-Gangs Target Small U.S. Firms

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2009/08/24/AR2009082402272.html

#### Washington Post - PC Invader Costs Ky. County \$415,000

http://voices.washingtonpost.com/securityfix/2009/07/an\_odyssey\_of\_fraud\_part\_ii.html

#### IBM X-Force reports time from disclosure to exploit often less then 24 hours.

http://www.theregister.co.uk/2008/07/29/x\_force\_threat\_report/print.html

#### **Honetnet Project KYE: Fast-Flux Service Networks**

http://honeynet.org/node/132

#### **OWASP - Open Web Application Security Project**

http://www.owasp.org/



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