




BUT WAIT, THERE'S MORE!



### Threats

- External attacker impersonating user to access app
- External attacker modifying saved information
- External attacker intercepting traffic to modify information
- External attackers linking footage to real identity

### Threats

- External attacker launching DoS against cloud storage infrastructure
- External attacker launching DoS against cloud storage itself
- External attacker gained admin rights to code repository
- External attacker gaining admin rights to cloud storage


### Threats

- External attacker impersonating staff to access code repository
- External attacker impersonating staff to access cloud storage
- External attacker/malicious insider tampers with source code
- External attacker/malicious insider tampers with saved information
- Also consider compliance with legislation

# REMEMBER! BASIC THREAT MODELLING

- ▶ Hacked together from Microsoft's STRIDE threat modelling approach
- ▶ Three questions:
  - ▶ What are you building?
  - ▶ What can go wrong?
- ▶ **What are you going to do about it?**





### Threats

- External attacker impersonating user to access app
- External attacker modifying saved information
- External attacker intercepting traffic to modify information
- External attackers linking footage to real identity

### Threats

- External attacker launching DoS against cloud storage infrastructure
- External attacker launching DoS against cloud storage itself
- External attacker gained admin rights to code repository
- External attacker gaining admin rights to cloud storage


### Threats

- External attacker impersonating staff to access code repository
- External attacker impersonating staff to access cloud storage
- External attacker/malicious insider tampers with source code
- External attacker/malicious insider tampers with saved information
- Also consider compliance with legislation

# STRIDE – SPOOFING

- ▶ Someone impersonating a user to access data on phone, code repository, cloud storage
  - ▶ Credentials hashed with secure algorithm
  - ▶ Two factor authentication on code repository and cloud storage
  - ▶ IP whitelisting to access code repository and cloud storage if possible
  - ▶ Access Control Policy
    - ▶ Accounts are tied to identity
    - ▶ Permission only given if the user needs it
    - ▶ Accounts are revoked when user leaves
    - ▶ Accounts regularly audited
    - ▶ Someone is responsible for all this





### Threats


- External attacker impersonating user to access app
- External attacker modifying saved information
- External attacker intercepting traffic to modify information
- External attackers linking footage to real identity

### Threats

- External attacker launching DoS against cloud storage infrastructure
- External attacker launching DoS against cloud storage itself
- External attacker gained admin rights to code repository
- External attacker gaining admin rights to cloud storage

### Threats

- External attacker impersonating staff to access code repository
- External attacker impersonating staff to access cloud storage
- External attacker/malicious insider tampers with source code
- External attacker/malicious insider tampers with saved information
- Also consider compliance with legislation



### Threats

- External attacker impersonating user to access app
- External attacker modifying saved information
- External attacker intercepting traffic to modify information
- External attackers linking footage to real identity

### Threats


- External attacker launching DoS against cloud storage infrastructure
- External attacker launching DoS against cloud storage itself
- External attacker gained admin rights to code repository
- External attacker gaining admin rights to cloud storage


### Threats

- External attacker impersonating staff to access code repository
- External attacker impersonating staff to access cloud storage
- External attacker/malicious insider tampers with source code
- External attacker/malicious insider tampers with saved information
- Also consider compliance with legislation

# STRIDE – TAMPERING

- ▶ Data being modified on the phone, cloud storage, anywhere in between
  - ▶ File integrity by matching hashes of files at different stages
- ▶ Tampering with source code or logs
  - ▶ Log all actions of users
  - ▶ State in employee contracts what is unacceptable so they have no recourse
  - ▶ Forward logs to centralised, hardened log server with strong access control





### Threats

- External attacker impersonating user to access app
- External attacker modifying saved information
- External attacker intercepting traffic to modify information
- External attackers linking footage to real identity

### Threats

- External attacker launching DoS against cloud storage infrastructure
- External attacker launching DoS against cloud storage itself
- External attacker gained admin rights to code repository
- External attacker gaining admin rights to cloud storage

### Threats


- External attacker impersonating staff to access code repository
- External attacker impersonating staff to access cloud storage
- External attacker/malicious insider tampers with source code
- External attacker/malicious insider tampers with saved information
- Also consider compliance with legislation





- Access Control Policy
- Employee contracts
- 
- 




Trust boundary Lv. 1



- Hash creds
- 



Trust boundary Lv. 2



- Hash creds
- 2FA
- IP whitelisting
- File integrity check
- Log all actions
- Alert multiple people of suspicious behaviour

### Threats

- External attacker impersonating user to access app
- External attacker modifying saved information
- External attacker intercepting traffic to modify information
- External attackers linking footage to real identity

### Threats


- External attacker launching DoS against cloud storage infrastructure
- External attacker launching DoS against cloud storage itself
- External attacker gained admin rights to code repository
- External attacker gaining admin rights to cloud storage

### Threats

- External attacker impersonating staff to access code repository
- External attacker impersonating staff to access cloud storage
- External attacker/malicious insider tampers with source code
- External attacker/malicious insider tampers with saved information
- Also consider compliance with legislation

# STRIDE - REPUDIATION

- ▶ Someone claims the footage is false or of someone else
  - ▶ Other than a forensic chain of custody we can't do much about that
- ▶ For your app could someone perform an action and claim it wasn't them?



# STRIDE – INFORMATION DISCLOSURE

- ▶ Footage is tied to particular users
  - ▶ Policy to review footage with lawyers before being submitted as evidence
  - ▶ Remove metadata so footage can be posted online anonymously
  - ▶ Need further controls once done a deep dive






- Access Control Policy
- Employee contracts
- 
- 



### Threats

- External attacker impersonating user to access app
- External attacker modifying saved information
- External attacker intercepting traffic to modify information
- External attackers linking footage to real identity




Trust boundary Lv. 1





- Hash creds
- 

### Threats

- External attacker launching DoS against cloud storage infrastructure
- External attacker launching DoS against cloud storage itself
- External attacker gained admin rights to code repository
- External attacker gaining admin rights to cloud storage



Trust boundary Lv. 2




- Hash creds
- 2FA
- IP whitelisting
- File integrity check
- Log all actions
- Alert multiple people of suspicious behaviour






### Threats

- External attacker impersonating staff to access code repository
- External attacker impersonating staff to access cloud storage
- External attacker/malicious insider tampers with source code
- External attacker/malicious insider tampers with saved information
- Also consider compliance with legislation

- Access Control Policy
- Employee contracts
- Review footage before release
- 



Trust boundary  
Lv. 1



- Hash creds
- Remove metadata

- Hash creds
- 2FA
- IP whitelisting
- File integrity check
- Log all actions
- Alert multiple people of suspicious behaviour

### Threats

- External attacker impersonating user to access app
- External attacker modifying saved information
- External attacker intercepting traffic to modify information
- External attackers linking footage to real identity

### Threats


- External attacker launching DoS against cloud storage infrastructure
- External attacker launching DoS against cloud storage itself
- External attacker gained admin rights to code repository
- External attacker gaining admin rights to cloud storage

### Threats


- External attacker impersonating staff to access code repository
- External attacker impersonating staff to access cloud storage
- External attacker/malicious insider tampers with source code
- External attacker/malicious insider tampers with saved information
- Also consider compliance with legislation

# STRIDE – DENIAL OF SERVICE


- ▶ DDoS attack against the cloud storage (however that may be)
  - ▶ Employ DDoS mitigation services like Cloudflare
  - ▶ Cap how much footage a user can upload





- Access Control Policy
- Employee contracts
- Review footage before release
- 





Trust boundary  
Lv. 1



- Hash creds
- Remove metadata



Trust boundary  
Lv. 2



- Hash creds
- 2FA
- IP whitelisting
- File integrity check
- Log all actions
- Alert multiple people of suspicious behaviour

### Threats

- External attacker impersonating user to access app
- External attacker modifying saved information
- External attacker intercepting traffic to modify information
- External attackers linking footage to real identity

### Threats


- External attacker launching DoS against cloud storage infrastructure
- External attacker launching DoS against cloud storage itself
- External attacker gained admin rights to code repository
- External attacker gaining admin rights to cloud storage

### Threats





- External attacker impersonating staff to access code repository
- External attacker impersonating staff to access cloud storage
- External attacker/malicious insider tampers with source code
- External attacker/malicious insider tampers with saved information
- Also consider compliance with legislation




- Access Control Policy
- Employee contracts
- Review footage before release
- 



Trust boundary  
Lv. 1



Trust boundary  
Lv. 2



- Hash creds
- Remove metadata

- Hash creds
- 2FA
- IP whitelisting
- File integrity check
- Log all actions
- Alert multiple people of suspicious behaviour

- Cloudflare
- Cap footage upload

### Threats

- External attacker impersonating user to access app
- External attacker modifying saved information
- External attacker intercepting traffic to modify information
- External attackers linking footage to real identity

### Threats

- External attacker launching DoS against cloud storage infrastructure
- External attacker launching DoS against cloud storage itself
- External attacker gained admin rights to code repository
- External attacker gaining admin rights to cloud storage

### Threats

- External attacker impersonating staff to access code repository
- External attacker impersonating staff to access cloud storage
- External attacker/malicious insider tampers with source code
- External attacker/malicious insider tampers with saved information
- Also consider compliance with legislation

# STRIDE – ELEVATION OF PRIVILEGES

- ▶ Someone gaining administrator rights to the code repository or cloud storage
  - ▶ Log all actions by users
  - ▶ Flag multiple people of new admins being created
  - ▶ Flag multiple people of admins performing anomalous behaviour like logging in outside of work hours.

