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		<updated>2026-05-25T07:31:07Z</updated>
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	<entry>
		<id>https://wiki.owasp.org/index.php?title=Credential_stuffing&amp;diff=189030</id>
		<title>Credential stuffing</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://wiki.owasp.org/index.php?title=Credential_stuffing&amp;diff=189030"/>
				<updated>2015-02-04T14:04:08Z</updated>
		
		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Neal Mueller: &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;{{Template:Attack}}&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Attack]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Description ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Credential stuffing is the automated injection of breached username/password pairs in order to fraudulently gain access to user accounts. This is a kind of brute force attack: large numbers of spilled credentials are automatically entered into websites until they are potentially matched to an existing account, which the attacker can then hijack for their own purposes. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Uniqueness ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Credential stuffing is a new form of attack to accomplish account takeover through automated web injection. Credential stuffing is related to the breaching of databases; both accomplish account takeover. Credential stuffing is an emerging threat. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Credential stuffing is dangerous to both consumers and enterprises because of the ripple effects of these breaches. For more information on this please reference the Examples section showing the connected chain of events from one breach to another through credential stuffing.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Severity ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Credential stuffing is one of the most common techniques used to take-over user accounts.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Anatomy of Attack ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
#The attacker acquires spilled usernames and passwords from a website breach or password dump site.&lt;br /&gt;
#The attacker uses an account checker to test the stolen credentials against many websites (for instance, social media sites or online marketplaces).&lt;br /&gt;
#Successful logins (usually 0.1-0.2% of the total login attempts) allow the attacker to take over the account matching the stolen credentials.&lt;br /&gt;
#The attacker drains stolen accounts of stored value, credit card numbers, and other personally identifiable information&lt;br /&gt;
#The attacker may also use account information going forward for other nefarious purposes (for example, to send spam or create further transactions)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Diagram ===&lt;br /&gt;
[[file:Credentialstuffing.png]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The above diagram was made by Michael Coates [https://www.owasp.org/index.php/User:MichaelCoates]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Risk Factors ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
TBD&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Examples ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Below are excerpts taken from publications analyzing large-scale breaches.  Evidence supports that these breaches were the result of credential stuffing.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
*Sony, 2011 breach: “I wish to highlight that two-thirds of users whose data were in both the Sony data set and the Gawker breach earlier this year used the same password for each system.” &lt;br /&gt;
**Source: Agile Bits [https://blog.agilebits.com/2011/06/07/two-thirds-of-web-users-re-use-the-same-passwords/] &lt;br /&gt;
**Source: Wired [http://www.wired.com/2011/10/93000-sony-accounts-breached/]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
*Yahoo, 2012 breach: “What do Sony and Yahoo! have in common? Passwords!”. &lt;br /&gt;
**Source: Troy Hunt. [http://www.troyhunt.com/2012/07/what-do-sony-and-yahoo-have-in-common.html] &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
*Dropbox, 2012 breach: “The usernames and passwords referenced in these articles were stolen from unrelated services, not Dropbox. Attackers then used these stolen credentials to try to log in to sites across the internet, including Dropbox”. &lt;br /&gt;
**Source: Dropbox. [https://blog.dropbox.com/2014/10/dropbox-wasnt-hacked/] &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
*JPMC, 2014 breach: “[The breached data] contained some of the combinations of passwords and email addresses used by race participants who had registered on the Corporate Challenge website, an online platform for a series of annual charitable races that JPMorgan sponsors in major cities and that is run by an outside vendor. The races are open to bank employees and employees of other corporations”. &lt;br /&gt;
**Source: NY Times. [http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/10/31/discovery-of-jpmorgan-cyberattack-aided-by-company-that-runs-race-website-for-bank/] &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This connected chain of events from Sony to Yahoo to Dropbox excludes JPMC. The JPMC breach came from a separate and unrelated source. We know that the JPMC breach was caused by attackers targeting an unrelated third-party athletic race/run site for credentials to use against JPMC. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Related Threat Agents ==&lt;br /&gt;
* [[:Category:Authentication]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Related Attacks ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Brute force attack]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Related Vulnerabilities ==&lt;br /&gt;
* [[API Abuse]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Related Controls ==&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Authentication]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== References ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
*Ramification of Credential Stuffing [https://prezi.com/kdilcmkhhrfl/ramification-of-credential-stuffing/]&lt;br /&gt;
*What Happens to Stolen Data After a Breach? [http://www.securityweek.com/what-happens-stolen-data-after-breach]&lt;br /&gt;
*How Third Party Password Breaches Put Your Website at Risk [http://michael-coates.blogspot.com/2013/11/how-third-party-password-breaches-put.html]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Neal Mueller</name></author>	</entry>

	<entry>
		<id>https://wiki.owasp.org/index.php?title=Credential_stuffing&amp;diff=188988</id>
		<title>Credential stuffing</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://wiki.owasp.org/index.php?title=Credential_stuffing&amp;diff=188988"/>
				<updated>2015-02-03T21:31:40Z</updated>
		
		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Neal Mueller: &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;{{Template:Attack}}&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Attack]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Description ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Credential stuffing is the automated injection of breached username/password pairs in order to fraudulently gain access to user accounts. This is a kind of brute force attack: large numbers of spilled credentials are automatically entered into websites until they are potentially matched to an existing account, which the attacker can then hijack for their own purposes. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Uniqueness ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Credential stuffing is a new form of attack to accomplish account takeover through automated web injection. Credential stuffing is related to the breaching of databases; both accomplish account takeover. Credential stuffing is an emerging threat. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Credential stuffing is dangerous to both consumers and enterprises because of the ripple effects of these breaches. For more information on this please reference the Examples section showing the connected chain of events from one breach to another through credential stuffing.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Severity ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Credential stuffing is one of the most common techniques used to take-over user accounts.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Anatomy of Attack ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
#The attacker acquires spilled usernames and passwords from a website breach or password dump site.&lt;br /&gt;
#The attacker uses an account checker to test the stolen credentials against many websites (for instance, social media sites or online marketplaces).&lt;br /&gt;
#Successful logins (usually 0.1-0.2% of the total login attempts) allow the attacker to take over the account matching the stolen credentials.&lt;br /&gt;
#The attacker drains stolen accounts of stored value, credit card numbers, and other personally identifiable information&lt;br /&gt;
#The attacker may also use account information going forward for other nefarious purposes (for example, to send spam or create further transactions)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Diagram ===&lt;br /&gt;
[[file:Credentialstuffing.png]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The above diagram was made by Michael Coates [https://www.owasp.org/index.php/User:MichaelCoates]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Risk Factors ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
TBD&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Examples ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Below are excerpts taken from publications analyzing large-scale breaches.  Evidence supports that these breaches were the result of credential stuffing.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
*Sony, 2012: “I wish to highlight that two-thirds of users whose data were in both the Sony data set and the Gawker breach earlier this year used the same password for each system.” &lt;br /&gt;
**Source: Agile Bits [https://blog.agilebits.com/2011/06/07/two-thirds-of-web-users-re-use-the-same-passwords/] &lt;br /&gt;
**Source: Wired [http://www.wired.com/2011/10/93000-sony-accounts-breached/]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
*Yahoo, 2013: “What do Sony and Yahoo! have in common? Passwords!”. &lt;br /&gt;
**Source: Troy Hunt. [http://www.troyhunt.com/2012/07/what-do-sony-and-yahoo-have-in-common.html] &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
*Dropbox, 2013: “The usernames and passwords referenced in these articles were stolen from unrelated services, not Dropbox. Attackers then used these stolen credentials to try to log in to sites across the internet, including Dropbox”. &lt;br /&gt;
**Source: Dropbox. [https://blog.dropbox.com/2014/10/dropbox-wasnt-hacked/] &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
*JPMC, 2014: “[The breached data] contained some of the combinations of passwords and email addresses used by race participants who had registered on the Corporate Challenge website, an online platform for a series of annual charitable races that JPMorgan sponsors in major cities and that is run by an outside vendor. The races are open to bank employees and employees of other corporations”. &lt;br /&gt;
**Source: NY Times. [http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/10/31/discovery-of-jpmorgan-cyberattack-aided-by-company-that-runs-race-website-for-bank/] &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This connected chain of events from Sony to Yahoo to Dropbox excludes JPMC. The JPMC breach came from a separate and unrelated source. We know that the JPMC breach was caused by attackers targeting an unrelated third-party athletic race/run site for credentials to use against JPMC. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Related Threat Agents ==&lt;br /&gt;
* [[:Category:Authentication]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Related Attacks ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Brute force attack]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Related Vulnerabilities ==&lt;br /&gt;
* [[API Abuse]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Related Controls ==&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Authentication]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== References ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
*Ramification of Credential Stuffing [https://prezi.com/kdilcmkhhrfl/ramification-of-credential-stuffing/]&lt;br /&gt;
*What Happens to Stolen Data After a Breach? [http://www.securityweek.com/what-happens-stolen-data-after-breach]&lt;br /&gt;
*How Third Party Password Breaches Put Your Website at Risk [http://michael-coates.blogspot.com/2013/11/how-third-party-password-breaches-put.html]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Neal Mueller</name></author>	</entry>

	<entry>
		<id>https://wiki.owasp.org/index.php?title=Credential_stuffing&amp;diff=188986</id>
		<title>Credential stuffing</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://wiki.owasp.org/index.php?title=Credential_stuffing&amp;diff=188986"/>
				<updated>2015-02-03T21:16:50Z</updated>
		
		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Neal Mueller: /* Anatomy of Attack */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;{{Template:Attack}}&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Attack]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Description ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Credential stuffing is the automated injection of breached username/password pairs in order to fraudulently gain access to user accounts. This is a kind of brute force attack: large numbers of spilled credentials are automatically entered into websites until they are potentially matched to an existing account, which the attacker can then hijack for their own purposes. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Severity ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Credential stuffing is one of the most common techniques used to take-over user accounts.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Anatomy of Attack ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
#The attacker acquires spilled usernames and passwords from a website breach or password dump site.&lt;br /&gt;
#The attacker uses an account checker to test the stolen credentials against many websites (for instance, social media sites or online marketplaces).&lt;br /&gt;
#Successful logins (usually 0.1-0.2% of the total login attempts) allow the attacker to take over the account matching the stolen credentials.&lt;br /&gt;
#The attacker drains stolen accounts of stored value, credit card numbers, and other personally identifiable information&lt;br /&gt;
#The attacker may also use account information going forward for other nefarious purposes (for example, to send spam or create further transactions)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Diagram ===&lt;br /&gt;
[[file:Credentialstuffing.png]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The above diagram was made by Michael Coates [https://www.owasp.org/index.php/User:MichaelCoates]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Risk Factors ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
TBD&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Examples ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Below are excerpts taken from publications analyzing large-scale breaches.  Evidence supports that these breaches were the result of credential stuffing.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
*Sony, 2012: “I wish to highlight that two-thirds of users whose data were in both the Sony data set and the Gawker breach earlier this year used the same password for each system.” &lt;br /&gt;
**Source: Agile Bits [https://blog.agilebits.com/2011/06/07/two-thirds-of-web-users-re-use-the-same-passwords/] &lt;br /&gt;
**Source: Wired [http://www.wired.com/2011/10/93000-sony-accounts-breached/]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
*Yahoo, 2013: “What do Sony and Yahoo! have in common? Passwords!”. &lt;br /&gt;
**Source: Troy Hunt. [http://www.troyhunt.com/2012/07/what-do-sony-and-yahoo-have-in-common.html] &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
*Dropbox, 2013: “The usernames and passwords referenced in these articles were stolen from unrelated services, not Dropbox. Attackers then used these stolen credentials to try to log in to sites across the internet, including Dropbox”. &lt;br /&gt;
**Source: Dropbox. [https://blog.dropbox.com/2014/10/dropbox-wasnt-hacked/] &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
*JPMC, 2014: “[The breached data] contained some of the combinations of passwords and email addresses used by race participants who had registered on the Corporate Challenge website, an online platform for a series of annual charitable races that JPMorgan sponsors in major cities and that is run by an outside vendor. The races are open to bank employees and employees of other corporations”. &lt;br /&gt;
**Source: NY Times. [http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/10/31/discovery-of-jpmorgan-cyberattack-aided-by-company-that-runs-race-website-for-bank/] &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This connected chain of events from Sony to Yahoo to Dropbox excludes JPMC. The JPMC breach came from a separate and unrelated source. We know that the JPMC breach was caused by attackers targeting an unrelated third-party athletic race/run site for credentials to use against JPMC. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Related Threat Agents ==&lt;br /&gt;
* [[:Category:Authentication]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Related Attacks ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Brute force attack]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Related Vulnerabilities ==&lt;br /&gt;
* [[API Abuse]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Related Controls ==&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Authentication]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== References ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
*Ramification of Credential Stuffing [https://prezi.com/kdilcmkhhrfl/ramification-of-credential-stuffing/]&lt;br /&gt;
*What Happens to Stolen Data After a Breach? [http://www.securityweek.com/what-happens-stolen-data-after-breach]&lt;br /&gt;
*How Third Party Password Breaches Put Your Website at Risk [http://michael-coates.blogspot.com/2013/11/how-third-party-password-breaches-put.html]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Neal Mueller</name></author>	</entry>

	<entry>
		<id>https://wiki.owasp.org/index.php?title=Credential_stuffing&amp;diff=188985</id>
		<title>Credential stuffing</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://wiki.owasp.org/index.php?title=Credential_stuffing&amp;diff=188985"/>
				<updated>2015-02-03T21:16:12Z</updated>
		
		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Neal Mueller: /* Related Vulnerabilities */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;{{Template:Attack}}&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Attack]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Description ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Credential stuffing is the automated injection of breached username/password pairs in order to fraudulently gain access to user accounts. This is a kind of brute force attack: large numbers of spilled credentials are automatically entered into websites until they are potentially matched to an existing account, which the attacker can then hijack for their own purposes. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Severity ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Credential stuffing is one of the most common techniques used to take-over user accounts.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Anatomy of Attack ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
#The attacker acquires spilled usernames and passwords from a website breach or password dump site.&lt;br /&gt;
#The attacker uses an account checker to test the stolen credentials against many websites (for instance, social media sites or online marketplaces).&lt;br /&gt;
#Successful logins (usually 0.1-0.2% of the total login attempts) allow the attacker to take over the account matching the stolen credentials.&lt;br /&gt;
#The attacker drains stolen accounts of stored value, credit card numbers, and other personally identifiable information&lt;br /&gt;
#The attacker may also use account information going forward for other nefarious purposes (for example, to send spam or create further transactions)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[file:Credentialstuffing.png]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The above diagram was made by Michael Coates [https://www.owasp.org/index.php/User:MichaelCoates]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Risk Factors ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
TBD&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Examples ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Below are excerpts taken from publications analyzing large-scale breaches.  Evidence supports that these breaches were the result of credential stuffing.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
*Sony, 2012: “I wish to highlight that two-thirds of users whose data were in both the Sony data set and the Gawker breach earlier this year used the same password for each system.” &lt;br /&gt;
**Source: Agile Bits [https://blog.agilebits.com/2011/06/07/two-thirds-of-web-users-re-use-the-same-passwords/] &lt;br /&gt;
**Source: Wired [http://www.wired.com/2011/10/93000-sony-accounts-breached/]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
*Yahoo, 2013: “What do Sony and Yahoo! have in common? Passwords!”. &lt;br /&gt;
**Source: Troy Hunt. [http://www.troyhunt.com/2012/07/what-do-sony-and-yahoo-have-in-common.html] &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
*Dropbox, 2013: “The usernames and passwords referenced in these articles were stolen from unrelated services, not Dropbox. Attackers then used these stolen credentials to try to log in to sites across the internet, including Dropbox”. &lt;br /&gt;
**Source: Dropbox. [https://blog.dropbox.com/2014/10/dropbox-wasnt-hacked/] &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
*JPMC, 2014: “[The breached data] contained some of the combinations of passwords and email addresses used by race participants who had registered on the Corporate Challenge website, an online platform for a series of annual charitable races that JPMorgan sponsors in major cities and that is run by an outside vendor. The races are open to bank employees and employees of other corporations”. &lt;br /&gt;
**Source: NY Times. [http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/10/31/discovery-of-jpmorgan-cyberattack-aided-by-company-that-runs-race-website-for-bank/] &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This connected chain of events from Sony to Yahoo to Dropbox excludes JPMC. The JPMC breach came from a separate and unrelated source. We know that the JPMC breach was caused by attackers targeting an unrelated third-party athletic race/run site for credentials to use against JPMC. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Related Threat Agents ==&lt;br /&gt;
* [[:Category:Authentication]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Related Attacks ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Brute force attack]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Related Vulnerabilities ==&lt;br /&gt;
* [[API Abuse]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Related Controls ==&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Authentication]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== References ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
*Ramification of Credential Stuffing [https://prezi.com/kdilcmkhhrfl/ramification-of-credential-stuffing/]&lt;br /&gt;
*What Happens to Stolen Data After a Breach? [http://www.securityweek.com/what-happens-stolen-data-after-breach]&lt;br /&gt;
*How Third Party Password Breaches Put Your Website at Risk [http://michael-coates.blogspot.com/2013/11/how-third-party-password-breaches-put.html]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Neal Mueller</name></author>	</entry>

	<entry>
		<id>https://wiki.owasp.org/index.php?title=Credential_stuffing&amp;diff=188984</id>
		<title>Credential stuffing</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://wiki.owasp.org/index.php?title=Credential_stuffing&amp;diff=188984"/>
				<updated>2015-02-03T21:15:35Z</updated>
		
		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Neal Mueller: /* Related Controls */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;{{Template:Attack}}&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Attack]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Description ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Credential stuffing is the automated injection of breached username/password pairs in order to fraudulently gain access to user accounts. This is a kind of brute force attack: large numbers of spilled credentials are automatically entered into websites until they are potentially matched to an existing account, which the attacker can then hijack for their own purposes. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Severity ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Credential stuffing is one of the most common techniques used to take-over user accounts.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Anatomy of Attack ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
#The attacker acquires spilled usernames and passwords from a website breach or password dump site.&lt;br /&gt;
#The attacker uses an account checker to test the stolen credentials against many websites (for instance, social media sites or online marketplaces).&lt;br /&gt;
#Successful logins (usually 0.1-0.2% of the total login attempts) allow the attacker to take over the account matching the stolen credentials.&lt;br /&gt;
#The attacker drains stolen accounts of stored value, credit card numbers, and other personally identifiable information&lt;br /&gt;
#The attacker may also use account information going forward for other nefarious purposes (for example, to send spam or create further transactions)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[file:Credentialstuffing.png]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The above diagram was made by Michael Coates [https://www.owasp.org/index.php/User:MichaelCoates]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Risk Factors ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
TBD&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Examples ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Below are excerpts taken from publications analyzing large-scale breaches.  Evidence supports that these breaches were the result of credential stuffing.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
*Sony, 2012: “I wish to highlight that two-thirds of users whose data were in both the Sony data set and the Gawker breach earlier this year used the same password for each system.” &lt;br /&gt;
**Source: Agile Bits [https://blog.agilebits.com/2011/06/07/two-thirds-of-web-users-re-use-the-same-passwords/] &lt;br /&gt;
**Source: Wired [http://www.wired.com/2011/10/93000-sony-accounts-breached/]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
*Yahoo, 2013: “What do Sony and Yahoo! have in common? Passwords!”. &lt;br /&gt;
**Source: Troy Hunt. [http://www.troyhunt.com/2012/07/what-do-sony-and-yahoo-have-in-common.html] &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
*Dropbox, 2013: “The usernames and passwords referenced in these articles were stolen from unrelated services, not Dropbox. Attackers then used these stolen credentials to try to log in to sites across the internet, including Dropbox”. &lt;br /&gt;
**Source: Dropbox. [https://blog.dropbox.com/2014/10/dropbox-wasnt-hacked/] &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
*JPMC, 2014: “[The breached data] contained some of the combinations of passwords and email addresses used by race participants who had registered on the Corporate Challenge website, an online platform for a series of annual charitable races that JPMorgan sponsors in major cities and that is run by an outside vendor. The races are open to bank employees and employees of other corporations”. &lt;br /&gt;
**Source: NY Times. [http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/10/31/discovery-of-jpmorgan-cyberattack-aided-by-company-that-runs-race-website-for-bank/] &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This connected chain of events from Sony to Yahoo to Dropbox excludes JPMC. The JPMC breach came from a separate and unrelated source. We know that the JPMC breach was caused by attackers targeting an unrelated third-party athletic race/run site for credentials to use against JPMC. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Related Threat Agents ==&lt;br /&gt;
* [[:Category:Authentication]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Related Attacks ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Brute force attack]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Related Vulnerabilities ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Related Controls ==&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Authentication]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== References ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
*Ramification of Credential Stuffing [https://prezi.com/kdilcmkhhrfl/ramification-of-credential-stuffing/]&lt;br /&gt;
*What Happens to Stolen Data After a Breach? [http://www.securityweek.com/what-happens-stolen-data-after-breach]&lt;br /&gt;
*How Third Party Password Breaches Put Your Website at Risk [http://michael-coates.blogspot.com/2013/11/how-third-party-password-breaches-put.html]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Neal Mueller</name></author>	</entry>

	<entry>
		<id>https://wiki.owasp.org/index.php?title=Credential_stuffing&amp;diff=188983</id>
		<title>Credential stuffing</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://wiki.owasp.org/index.php?title=Credential_stuffing&amp;diff=188983"/>
				<updated>2015-02-03T21:14:35Z</updated>
		
		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Neal Mueller: /* Related Threat Agents */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;{{Template:Attack}}&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Attack]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Description ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Credential stuffing is the automated injection of breached username/password pairs in order to fraudulently gain access to user accounts. This is a kind of brute force attack: large numbers of spilled credentials are automatically entered into websites until they are potentially matched to an existing account, which the attacker can then hijack for their own purposes. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Severity ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Credential stuffing is one of the most common techniques used to take-over user accounts.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Anatomy of Attack ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
#The attacker acquires spilled usernames and passwords from a website breach or password dump site.&lt;br /&gt;
#The attacker uses an account checker to test the stolen credentials against many websites (for instance, social media sites or online marketplaces).&lt;br /&gt;
#Successful logins (usually 0.1-0.2% of the total login attempts) allow the attacker to take over the account matching the stolen credentials.&lt;br /&gt;
#The attacker drains stolen accounts of stored value, credit card numbers, and other personally identifiable information&lt;br /&gt;
#The attacker may also use account information going forward for other nefarious purposes (for example, to send spam or create further transactions)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[file:Credentialstuffing.png]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The above diagram was made by Michael Coates [https://www.owasp.org/index.php/User:MichaelCoates]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Risk Factors ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
TBD&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Examples ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Below are excerpts taken from publications analyzing large-scale breaches.  Evidence supports that these breaches were the result of credential stuffing.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
*Sony, 2012: “I wish to highlight that two-thirds of users whose data were in both the Sony data set and the Gawker breach earlier this year used the same password for each system.” &lt;br /&gt;
**Source: Agile Bits [https://blog.agilebits.com/2011/06/07/two-thirds-of-web-users-re-use-the-same-passwords/] &lt;br /&gt;
**Source: Wired [http://www.wired.com/2011/10/93000-sony-accounts-breached/]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
*Yahoo, 2013: “What do Sony and Yahoo! have in common? Passwords!”. &lt;br /&gt;
**Source: Troy Hunt. [http://www.troyhunt.com/2012/07/what-do-sony-and-yahoo-have-in-common.html] &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
*Dropbox, 2013: “The usernames and passwords referenced in these articles were stolen from unrelated services, not Dropbox. Attackers then used these stolen credentials to try to log in to sites across the internet, including Dropbox”. &lt;br /&gt;
**Source: Dropbox. [https://blog.dropbox.com/2014/10/dropbox-wasnt-hacked/] &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
*JPMC, 2014: “[The breached data] contained some of the combinations of passwords and email addresses used by race participants who had registered on the Corporate Challenge website, an online platform for a series of annual charitable races that JPMorgan sponsors in major cities and that is run by an outside vendor. The races are open to bank employees and employees of other corporations”. &lt;br /&gt;
**Source: NY Times. [http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/10/31/discovery-of-jpmorgan-cyberattack-aided-by-company-that-runs-race-website-for-bank/] &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This connected chain of events from Sony to Yahoo to Dropbox excludes JPMC. The JPMC breach came from a separate and unrelated source. We know that the JPMC breach was caused by attackers targeting an unrelated third-party athletic race/run site for credentials to use against JPMC. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Related Threat Agents ==&lt;br /&gt;
* [[:Category:Authentication]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Related Attacks ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Brute force attack]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Related Vulnerabilities ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Related Controls ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== References ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
*Ramification of Credential Stuffing [https://prezi.com/kdilcmkhhrfl/ramification-of-credential-stuffing/]&lt;br /&gt;
*What Happens to Stolen Data After a Breach? [http://www.securityweek.com/what-happens-stolen-data-after-breach]&lt;br /&gt;
*How Third Party Password Breaches Put Your Website at Risk [http://michael-coates.blogspot.com/2013/11/how-third-party-password-breaches-put.html]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Neal Mueller</name></author>	</entry>

	<entry>
		<id>https://wiki.owasp.org/index.php?title=Credential_stuffing&amp;diff=188982</id>
		<title>Credential stuffing</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://wiki.owasp.org/index.php?title=Credential_stuffing&amp;diff=188982"/>
				<updated>2015-02-03T21:14:16Z</updated>
		
		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Neal Mueller: /* Related Attacks */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;{{Template:Attack}}&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Attack]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Description ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Credential stuffing is the automated injection of breached username/password pairs in order to fraudulently gain access to user accounts. This is a kind of brute force attack: large numbers of spilled credentials are automatically entered into websites until they are potentially matched to an existing account, which the attacker can then hijack for their own purposes. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Severity ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Credential stuffing is one of the most common techniques used to take-over user accounts.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Anatomy of Attack ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
#The attacker acquires spilled usernames and passwords from a website breach or password dump site.&lt;br /&gt;
#The attacker uses an account checker to test the stolen credentials against many websites (for instance, social media sites or online marketplaces).&lt;br /&gt;
#Successful logins (usually 0.1-0.2% of the total login attempts) allow the attacker to take over the account matching the stolen credentials.&lt;br /&gt;
#The attacker drains stolen accounts of stored value, credit card numbers, and other personally identifiable information&lt;br /&gt;
#The attacker may also use account information going forward for other nefarious purposes (for example, to send spam or create further transactions)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[file:Credentialstuffing.png]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The above diagram was made by Michael Coates [https://www.owasp.org/index.php/User:MichaelCoates]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Risk Factors ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
TBD&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Examples ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Below are excerpts taken from publications analyzing large-scale breaches.  Evidence supports that these breaches were the result of credential stuffing.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
*Sony, 2012: “I wish to highlight that two-thirds of users whose data were in both the Sony data set and the Gawker breach earlier this year used the same password for each system.” &lt;br /&gt;
**Source: Agile Bits [https://blog.agilebits.com/2011/06/07/two-thirds-of-web-users-re-use-the-same-passwords/] &lt;br /&gt;
**Source: Wired [http://www.wired.com/2011/10/93000-sony-accounts-breached/]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
*Yahoo, 2013: “What do Sony and Yahoo! have in common? Passwords!”. &lt;br /&gt;
**Source: Troy Hunt. [http://www.troyhunt.com/2012/07/what-do-sony-and-yahoo-have-in-common.html] &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
*Dropbox, 2013: “The usernames and passwords referenced in these articles were stolen from unrelated services, not Dropbox. Attackers then used these stolen credentials to try to log in to sites across the internet, including Dropbox”. &lt;br /&gt;
**Source: Dropbox. [https://blog.dropbox.com/2014/10/dropbox-wasnt-hacked/] &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
*JPMC, 2014: “[The breached data] contained some of the combinations of passwords and email addresses used by race participants who had registered on the Corporate Challenge website, an online platform for a series of annual charitable races that JPMorgan sponsors in major cities and that is run by an outside vendor. The races are open to bank employees and employees of other corporations”. &lt;br /&gt;
**Source: NY Times. [http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/10/31/discovery-of-jpmorgan-cyberattack-aided-by-company-that-runs-race-website-for-bank/] &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This connected chain of events from Sony to Yahoo to Dropbox excludes JPMC. The JPMC breach came from a separate and unrelated source. We know that the JPMC breach was caused by attackers targeting an unrelated third-party athletic race/run site for credentials to use against JPMC. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Related Threat Agents ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Related Attacks ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Brute force attack]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Related Vulnerabilities ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Related Controls ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== References ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
*Ramification of Credential Stuffing [https://prezi.com/kdilcmkhhrfl/ramification-of-credential-stuffing/]&lt;br /&gt;
*What Happens to Stolen Data After a Breach? [http://www.securityweek.com/what-happens-stolen-data-after-breach]&lt;br /&gt;
*How Third Party Password Breaches Put Your Website at Risk [http://michael-coates.blogspot.com/2013/11/how-third-party-password-breaches-put.html]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Neal Mueller</name></author>	</entry>

	<entry>
		<id>https://wiki.owasp.org/index.php?title=Credential_stuffing&amp;diff=188980</id>
		<title>Credential stuffing</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://wiki.owasp.org/index.php?title=Credential_stuffing&amp;diff=188980"/>
				<updated>2015-02-03T21:05:42Z</updated>
		
		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Neal Mueller: /* References */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;{{Template:Attack}}&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Attack]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Description ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Credential stuffing is the automated injection of breached username/password pairs in order to fraudulently gain access to user accounts. This is a kind of brute force attack: large numbers of spilled credentials are automatically entered into websites until they are potentially matched to an existing account, which the attacker can then hijack for their own purposes. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Severity ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Credential stuffing is one of the most common techniques used to take-over user accounts.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Anatomy of Attack ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
#The attacker acquires spilled usernames and passwords from a website breach or password dump site.&lt;br /&gt;
#The attacker uses an account checker to test the stolen credentials against many websites (for instance, social media sites or online marketplaces).&lt;br /&gt;
#Successful logins (usually 0.1-0.2% of the total login attempts) allow the attacker to take over the account matching the stolen credentials.&lt;br /&gt;
#The attacker drains stolen accounts of stored value, credit card numbers, and other personally identifiable information&lt;br /&gt;
#The attacker may also use account information going forward for other nefarious purposes (for example, to send spam or create further transactions)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[file:Credentialstuffing.png]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The above diagram was made by Michael Coates [https://www.owasp.org/index.php/User:MichaelCoates]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Risk Factors ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
TBD&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Examples ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Below are excerpts taken from publications analyzing large-scale breaches.  Evidence supports that these breaches were the result of credential stuffing.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
*Sony, 2012: “I wish to highlight that two-thirds of users whose data were in both the Sony data set and the Gawker breach earlier this year used the same password for each system.” &lt;br /&gt;
**Source: Agile Bits [https://blog.agilebits.com/2011/06/07/two-thirds-of-web-users-re-use-the-same-passwords/] &lt;br /&gt;
**Source: Wired [http://www.wired.com/2011/10/93000-sony-accounts-breached/]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
*Yahoo, 2013: “What do Sony and Yahoo! have in common? Passwords!”. &lt;br /&gt;
**Source: Troy Hunt. [http://www.troyhunt.com/2012/07/what-do-sony-and-yahoo-have-in-common.html] &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
*Dropbox, 2013: “The usernames and passwords referenced in these articles were stolen from unrelated services, not Dropbox. Attackers then used these stolen credentials to try to log in to sites across the internet, including Dropbox”. &lt;br /&gt;
**Source: Dropbox. [https://blog.dropbox.com/2014/10/dropbox-wasnt-hacked/] &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
*JPMC, 2014: “[The breached data] contained some of the combinations of passwords and email addresses used by race participants who had registered on the Corporate Challenge website, an online platform for a series of annual charitable races that JPMorgan sponsors in major cities and that is run by an outside vendor. The races are open to bank employees and employees of other corporations”. &lt;br /&gt;
**Source: NY Times. [http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/10/31/discovery-of-jpmorgan-cyberattack-aided-by-company-that-runs-race-website-for-bank/] &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This connected chain of events from Sony to Yahoo to Dropbox excludes JPMC. The JPMC breach came from a separate and unrelated source. We know that the JPMC breach was caused by attackers targeting an unrelated third-party athletic race/run site for credentials to use against JPMC. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Related Threat Agents ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Related Attacks ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Related Vulnerabilities ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Related Controls ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== References ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
*Ramification of Credential Stuffing [https://prezi.com/kdilcmkhhrfl/ramification-of-credential-stuffing/]&lt;br /&gt;
*What Happens to Stolen Data After a Breach? [http://www.securityweek.com/what-happens-stolen-data-after-breach]&lt;br /&gt;
*How Third Party Password Breaches Put Your Website at Risk [http://michael-coates.blogspot.com/2013/11/how-third-party-password-breaches-put.html]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Neal Mueller</name></author>	</entry>

	<entry>
		<id>https://wiki.owasp.org/index.php?title=Credential_stuffing&amp;diff=188979</id>
		<title>Credential stuffing</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://wiki.owasp.org/index.php?title=Credential_stuffing&amp;diff=188979"/>
				<updated>2015-02-03T21:04:02Z</updated>
		
		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Neal Mueller: &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;{{Template:Attack}}&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Attack]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Description ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Credential stuffing is the automated injection of breached username/password pairs in order to fraudulently gain access to user accounts. This is a kind of brute force attack: large numbers of spilled credentials are automatically entered into websites until they are potentially matched to an existing account, which the attacker can then hijack for their own purposes. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Severity ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Credential stuffing is one of the most common techniques used to take-over user accounts.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Anatomy of Attack ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
#The attacker acquires spilled usernames and passwords from a website breach or password dump site.&lt;br /&gt;
#The attacker uses an account checker to test the stolen credentials against many websites (for instance, social media sites or online marketplaces).&lt;br /&gt;
#Successful logins (usually 0.1-0.2% of the total login attempts) allow the attacker to take over the account matching the stolen credentials.&lt;br /&gt;
#The attacker drains stolen accounts of stored value, credit card numbers, and other personally identifiable information&lt;br /&gt;
#The attacker may also use account information going forward for other nefarious purposes (for example, to send spam or create further transactions)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[file:Credentialstuffing.png]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The above diagram was made by Michael Coates [https://www.owasp.org/index.php/User:MichaelCoates]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Risk Factors ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
TBD&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Examples ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Below are excerpts taken from publications analyzing large-scale breaches.  Evidence supports that these breaches were the result of credential stuffing.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
*Sony, 2012: “I wish to highlight that two-thirds of users whose data were in both the Sony data set and the Gawker breach earlier this year used the same password for each system.” &lt;br /&gt;
**Source: Agile Bits [https://blog.agilebits.com/2011/06/07/two-thirds-of-web-users-re-use-the-same-passwords/] &lt;br /&gt;
**Source: Wired [http://www.wired.com/2011/10/93000-sony-accounts-breached/]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
*Yahoo, 2013: “What do Sony and Yahoo! have in common? Passwords!”. &lt;br /&gt;
**Source: Troy Hunt. [http://www.troyhunt.com/2012/07/what-do-sony-and-yahoo-have-in-common.html] &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
*Dropbox, 2013: “The usernames and passwords referenced in these articles were stolen from unrelated services, not Dropbox. Attackers then used these stolen credentials to try to log in to sites across the internet, including Dropbox”. &lt;br /&gt;
**Source: Dropbox. [https://blog.dropbox.com/2014/10/dropbox-wasnt-hacked/] &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
*JPMC, 2014: “[The breached data] contained some of the combinations of passwords and email addresses used by race participants who had registered on the Corporate Challenge website, an online platform for a series of annual charitable races that JPMorgan sponsors in major cities and that is run by an outside vendor. The races are open to bank employees and employees of other corporations”. &lt;br /&gt;
**Source: NY Times. [http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/10/31/discovery-of-jpmorgan-cyberattack-aided-by-company-that-runs-race-website-for-bank/] &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This connected chain of events from Sony to Yahoo to Dropbox excludes JPMC. The JPMC breach came from a separate and unrelated source. We know that the JPMC breach was caused by attackers targeting an unrelated third-party athletic race/run site for credentials to use against JPMC. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Related Threat Agents ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Related Attacks ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Related Vulnerabilities ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Related Controls ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== References ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
*Ramification of Credential Stuffing [https://prezi.com/kdilcmkhhrfl/ramification-of-credential-stuffing/&lt;br /&gt;
*What Happens to Stolen Data After a Breach? [http://www.securityweek.com/what-happens-stolen-data-after-breach]&lt;br /&gt;
*How Third Party Password Breaches Put Your Website at Risk [http://michael-coates.blogspot.com/2013/11/how-third-party-password-breaches-put.html]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Neal Mueller</name></author>	</entry>

	<entry>
		<id>https://wiki.owasp.org/index.php?title=Credential_stuffing&amp;diff=188978</id>
		<title>Credential stuffing</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://wiki.owasp.org/index.php?title=Credential_stuffing&amp;diff=188978"/>
				<updated>2015-02-03T21:02:28Z</updated>
		
		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Neal Mueller: &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;{{Template:Attack}}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Description ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Credential stuffing is the automated injection of breached username/password pairs in order to fraudulently gain access to user accounts. This is a kind of brute force attack: large numbers of spilled credentials are automatically entered into websites until they are potentially matched to an existing account, which the attacker can then hijack for their own purposes. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Severity ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Credential stuffing is one of the most common techniques used to take-over user accounts.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Anatomy of Attack ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
#The attacker acquires spilled usernames and passwords from a website breach or password dump site.&lt;br /&gt;
#The attacker uses an account checker to test the stolen credentials against many websites (for instance, social media sites or online marketplaces).&lt;br /&gt;
#Successful logins (usually 0.1-0.2% of the total login attempts) allow the attacker to take over the account matching the stolen credentials.&lt;br /&gt;
#The attacker drains stolen accounts of stored value, credit card numbers, and other personally identifiable information&lt;br /&gt;
#The attacker may also use account information going forward for other nefarious purposes (for example, to send spam or create further transactions)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[file:Credentialstuffing.png]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The above diagram was made by Michael Coates [https://www.owasp.org/index.php/User:MichaelCoates]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Risk Factors ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
TBD&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Examples ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Below are excerpts taken from publications analyzing large-scale breaches.  Evidence supports that these breaches were the result of credential stuffing.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
*Sony, 2012: “I wish to highlight that two-thirds of users whose data were in both the Sony data set and the Gawker breach earlier this year used the same password for each system.” &lt;br /&gt;
**Source: Agile Bits [https://blog.agilebits.com/2011/06/07/two-thirds-of-web-users-re-use-the-same-passwords/] &lt;br /&gt;
**Source: Wired [http://www.wired.com/2011/10/93000-sony-accounts-breached/]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
*Yahoo, 2013: “What do Sony and Yahoo! have in common? Passwords!”. &lt;br /&gt;
**Source: Troy Hunt. [http://www.troyhunt.com/2012/07/what-do-sony-and-yahoo-have-in-common.html] &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
*Dropbox, 2013: “The usernames and passwords referenced in these articles were stolen from unrelated services, not Dropbox. Attackers then used these stolen credentials to try to log in to sites across the internet, including Dropbox”. &lt;br /&gt;
**Source: Dropbox. [https://blog.dropbox.com/2014/10/dropbox-wasnt-hacked/] &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
*JPMC, 2014: “[The breached data] contained some of the combinations of passwords and email addresses used by race participants who had registered on the Corporate Challenge website, an online platform for a series of annual charitable races that JPMorgan sponsors in major cities and that is run by an outside vendor. The races are open to bank employees and employees of other corporations”. &lt;br /&gt;
**Source: NY Times. [http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/10/31/discovery-of-jpmorgan-cyberattack-aided-by-company-that-runs-race-website-for-bank/] &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This connected chain of events from Sony to Yahoo to Dropbox excludes JPMC. The JPMC breach came from a separate and unrelated source. We know that the JPMC breach was caused by attackers targeting an unrelated third-party athletic race/run site for credentials to use against JPMC. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Related Threat Agents ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Related Attacks ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Related Vulnerabilities ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Related Controls ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== References ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
*Ramification of Credential Stuffing [https://prezi.com/kdilcmkhhrfl/ramification-of-credential-stuffing/&lt;br /&gt;
*What Happens to Stolen Data After a Breach? [http://www.securityweek.com/what-happens-stolen-data-after-breach]&lt;br /&gt;
*How Third Party Password Breaches Put Your Website at Risk [http://michael-coates.blogspot.com/2013/11/how-third-party-password-breaches-put.html]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Neal Mueller</name></author>	</entry>

	<entry>
		<id>https://wiki.owasp.org/index.php?title=Credential_stuffing&amp;diff=188977</id>
		<title>Credential stuffing</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://wiki.owasp.org/index.php?title=Credential_stuffing&amp;diff=188977"/>
				<updated>2015-02-03T21:00:46Z</updated>
		
		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Neal Mueller: &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;&lt;br /&gt;
== Description ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Credential stuffing is the automated injection of breached username/password pairs in order to fraudulently gain access to user accounts. This is a kind of brute force attack: large numbers of spilled credentials are automatically entered into websites until they are potentially matched to an existing account, which the attacker can then hijack for their own purposes. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Severity == &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Credential stuffing is one of the most common techniques used to take-over user accounts.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Anatomy of Attack ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
#The attacker acquires spilled usernames and passwords from a website breach or password dump site.&lt;br /&gt;
#The attacker uses an account checker to test the stolen credentials against many websites (for instance, social media sites or online marketplaces).&lt;br /&gt;
#Successful logins (usually 0.1-0.2% of the total login attempts) allow the attacker to take over the account matching the stolen credentials.&lt;br /&gt;
#The attacker drains stolen accounts of stored value, credit card numbers, and other personally identifiable information&lt;br /&gt;
#The attacker may also use account information going forward for other nefarious purposes (for example, to send spam or create further transactions)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[file:Credentialstuffing.png]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The above diagram was made by Michael Coates [https://www.owasp.org/index.php/User:MichaelCoates]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Risk Factors ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
TBD&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Examples ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Below are excerpts taken from publications analyzing large-scale breaches.  Evidence supports that these breaches were the result of credential stuffing.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
*Sony, 2012: “I wish to highlight that two-thirds of users whose data were in both the Sony data set and the Gawker breach earlier this year used the same password for each system.” &lt;br /&gt;
**Source: Agile Bits [https://blog.agilebits.com/2011/06/07/two-thirds-of-web-users-re-use-the-same-passwords/] &lt;br /&gt;
**Source: Wired [http://www.wired.com/2011/10/93000-sony-accounts-breached/]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
*Yahoo, 2013: “What do Sony and Yahoo! have in common? Passwords!”. &lt;br /&gt;
**Source: Troy Hunt. [http://www.troyhunt.com/2012/07/what-do-sony-and-yahoo-have-in-common.html] &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
*Dropbox, 2013: “The usernames and passwords referenced in these articles were stolen from unrelated services, not Dropbox. Attackers then used these stolen credentials to try to log in to sites across the internet, including Dropbox”. &lt;br /&gt;
**Source: Dropbox. [https://blog.dropbox.com/2014/10/dropbox-wasnt-hacked/] &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
*JPMC, 2014: “[The breached data] contained some of the combinations of passwords and email addresses used by race participants who had registered on the Corporate Challenge website, an online platform for a series of annual charitable races that JPMorgan sponsors in major cities and that is run by an outside vendor. The races are open to bank employees and employees of other corporations”. &lt;br /&gt;
**Source: NY Times. [http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/10/31/discovery-of-jpmorgan-cyberattack-aided-by-company-that-runs-race-website-for-bank/] &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This connected chain of events from Sony to Yahoo to Dropbox excludes JPMC. The JPMC breach came from a separate and unrelated source. We know that the JPMC breach was caused by attackers targeting an unrelated third-party athletic race/run site for credentials to use against JPMC. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Related Threat Agents ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Related Attacks ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Related Vulnerabilities ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Related Controls ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== References ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
*Ramification of Credential Stuffing [https://prezi.com/kdilcmkhhrfl/ramification-of-credential-stuffing/&lt;br /&gt;
*What Happens to Stolen Data After a Breach? [http://www.securityweek.com/what-happens-stolen-data-after-breach]&lt;br /&gt;
*How Third Party Password Breaches Put Your Website at Risk [http://michael-coates.blogspot.com/2013/11/how-third-party-password-breaches-put.html]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Neal Mueller</name></author>	</entry>

	<entry>
		<id>https://wiki.owasp.org/index.php?title=Credential_stuffing&amp;diff=188976</id>
		<title>Credential stuffing</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://wiki.owasp.org/index.php?title=Credential_stuffing&amp;diff=188976"/>
				<updated>2015-02-03T20:57:17Z</updated>
		
		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Neal Mueller: &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;&lt;br /&gt;
== Description ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Credential stuffing is the automated injection of breached username/password pairs in order to fraudulently gain access to user accounts. This is a kind of brute force attack: large numbers of spilled credentials are automatically entered into websites until they are potentially matched to an existing account, which the attacker can then hijack for their own purposes. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Severity == &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Credential stuffing is one of the most common techniques used to take-over user accounts.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Anatomy of Attack ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
#The attacker acquires spilled usernames and passwords from a website breach or password dump site.&lt;br /&gt;
#The attacker uses an account checker to test the stolen credentials against many websites (for instance, social media sites or online marketplaces).&lt;br /&gt;
#Successful logins (usually 0.1-0.2% of the total login attempts) allow the attacker to take over the account matching the stolen credentials.&lt;br /&gt;
#The attacker drains stolen accounts of stored value, credit card numbers, and other personally identifiable information&lt;br /&gt;
#The attacker may also use account information going forward for other nefarious purposes (for example, to send spam or create further transactions)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[file:Credentialstuffing.png]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Risk Factors ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
TBD&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Examples ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Below are excerpts taken from publications analyzing large-scale breaches.  Evidence supports that these breaches were the result of credential stuffing.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
*Sony, 2012: “I wish to highlight that two-thirds of users whose data were in both the Sony data set and the Gawker breach earlier this year used the same password for each system.” &lt;br /&gt;
**Source: Agile Bits [https://blog.agilebits.com/2011/06/07/two-thirds-of-web-users-re-use-the-same-passwords/] &lt;br /&gt;
**Source: Wired [http://www.wired.com/2011/10/93000-sony-accounts-breached/]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
*Yahoo, 2013: “What do Sony and Yahoo! have in common? Passwords!”. &lt;br /&gt;
**Source: Troy Hunt. [http://www.troyhunt.com/2012/07/what-do-sony-and-yahoo-have-in-common.html] &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
*Dropbox, 2013: “The usernames and passwords referenced in these articles were stolen from unrelated services, not Dropbox. Attackers then used these stolen credentials to try to log in to sites across the internet, including Dropbox”. &lt;br /&gt;
**Source: Dropbox. [https://blog.dropbox.com/2014/10/dropbox-wasnt-hacked/] &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
*JPMC, 2014: “[The breached data] contained some of the combinations of passwords and email addresses used by race participants who had registered on the Corporate Challenge website, an online platform for a series of annual charitable races that JPMorgan sponsors in major cities and that is run by an outside vendor. The races are open to bank employees and employees of other corporations”. &lt;br /&gt;
**Source: NY Times. [http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/10/31/discovery-of-jpmorgan-cyberattack-aided-by-company-that-runs-race-website-for-bank/] &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This connected chain of events from Sony to Yahoo to Dropbox excludes JPMC. The JPMC breach came from a separate and unrelated source. We know that the JPMC breach was caused by attackers targeting an unrelated third-party athletic race/run site for credentials to use against JPMC. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Related Threat Agents ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Related Attacks ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Related Vulnerabilities ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Related Controls ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== References ==&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Neal Mueller</name></author>	</entry>

	<entry>
		<id>https://wiki.owasp.org/index.php?title=File:Credentialstuffing.png&amp;diff=188975</id>
		<title>File:Credentialstuffing.png</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://wiki.owasp.org/index.php?title=File:Credentialstuffing.png&amp;diff=188975"/>
				<updated>2015-02-03T20:55:30Z</updated>
		
		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Neal Mueller: &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Neal Mueller</name></author>	</entry>

	<entry>
		<id>https://wiki.owasp.org/index.php?title=Credential_stuffing&amp;diff=188974</id>
		<title>Credential stuffing</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://wiki.owasp.org/index.php?title=Credential_stuffing&amp;diff=188974"/>
				<updated>2015-02-03T20:35:30Z</updated>
		
		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Neal Mueller: &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;&lt;br /&gt;
== Description ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Credential stuffing is the automated injection of breached username/password pairs in order to fraudulently gain access to user accounts. This is a kind of brute force attack: large numbers of spilled credentials are automatically entered into websites until they are potentially matched to an existing account, which the attacker can then hijack for their own purposes. Credential stuffing is one of the most common techniques used to take-over user accounts.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Anatomy of Attack ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
#The attacker acquires spilled usernames and passwords from a website breach or password dump site.&lt;br /&gt;
#The attacker uses an account checker to test the stolen credentials against many websites (for instance, social media sites or online marketplaces).&lt;br /&gt;
#Successful logins (usually 0.1-0.2% of the total login attempts) allow the attacker to take over the account matching the stolen credentials.&lt;br /&gt;
#The attacker drains stolen accounts of stored value, credit card numbers, and other personally identifiable information&lt;br /&gt;
#The attacker may also use account information going forward for other nefarious purposes (for example, to send spam or create further transactions)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Risk Factors ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
TBD&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Examples ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Below are excerpts taken from publications analyzing these large-scale breaches.  There is evidence to support that these breaches were connected by credential stuffing.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
*Sony, 2012: “I wish to highlight that two-thirds of users whose data were in both the Sony data set and the Gawker breach earlier this year used the same password for each system.” &lt;br /&gt;
**Source: Agile Bits [https://blog.agilebits.com/2011/06/07/two-thirds-of-web-users-re-use-the-same-passwords/] &lt;br /&gt;
**Source: Wired [http://www.wired.com/2011/10/93000-sony-accounts-breached/]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
*Yahoo, 2013: “What do Sony and Yahoo! have in common? Passwords!”. &lt;br /&gt;
**Source: Troy Hunt. [http://www.troyhunt.com/2012/07/what-do-sony-and-yahoo-have-in-common.html] &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
*Dropbox, 2013: “The usernames and passwords referenced in these articles were stolen from unrelated services, not Dropbox. Attackers then used these stolen credentials to try to log in to sites across the internet, including Dropbox”. &lt;br /&gt;
**Source: Dropbox. [https://blog.dropbox.com/2014/10/dropbox-wasnt-hacked/] &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
*JPMC, 2014: “[The breached data] contained some of the combinations of passwords and email addresses used by race participants who had registered on the Corporate Challenge website, an online platform for a series of annual charitable races that JPMorgan sponsors in major cities and that is run by an outside vendor. The races are open to bank employees and employees of other corporations”. &lt;br /&gt;
**Source: NY Times. [http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/10/31/discovery-of-jpmorgan-cyberattack-aided-by-company-that-runs-race-website-for-bank/] &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This connected chain of events from Sony to Yahoo to Dropbox excludes JPMC. The JPMC breach came from a separate and unrelated source. We know that the JPMC breach was caused by attackers targeting an unrelated third-party athletic race/run site for credentials to use against JPMC. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Related Threat Agents ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Related Attacks ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Related Vulnerabilities ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Related Controls ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== References ==&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Neal Mueller</name></author>	</entry>

	<entry>
		<id>https://wiki.owasp.org/index.php?title=Credential_stuffing&amp;diff=188973</id>
		<title>Credential stuffing</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://wiki.owasp.org/index.php?title=Credential_stuffing&amp;diff=188973"/>
				<updated>2015-02-03T20:34:26Z</updated>
		
		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Neal Mueller: Credential stuffing is the automated injection of breached username/password pairs in order to fraudulently gain access to user accounts.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;&lt;br /&gt;
== Description ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Credential stuffing is the automated injection of breached username/password pairs in order to fraudulently gain access to user accounts. This is a kind of brute force attack: large numbers of spilled credentials are automatically entered into websites until they are potentially matched to an existing account, which the attacker can then hijack for their own purposes. Credential stuffing is one of the most common techniques used to take-over user accounts.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Anatomy of Attack ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The attacker acquires spilled usernames and passwords from a website breach or password dump site.&lt;br /&gt;
The attacker uses an account checker to test the stolen credentials against many websites (for instance, social media sites or online marketplaces).&lt;br /&gt;
Successful logins (usually 0.1-0.2% of the total login attempts) allow the attacker to take over the account matching the stolen credentials.&lt;br /&gt;
The attacker drains stolen accounts of stored value, credit card numbers, and other personally identifiable information&lt;br /&gt;
The attacker may also use account information going forward for other nefarious purposes (for example, to send spam or create further transactions)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Risk Factors ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
TBD&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Examples ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Below are excerpts taken from publications analyzing these large-scale breaches.  There is evidence to support that these breaches were connected by credential stuffing.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Sony, 2012: “I wish to highlight that two-thirds of users whose data were in both the Sony data set and the Gawker breach earlier this year used the same password for each system.” &lt;br /&gt;
Source: Agile Bits [https://blog.agilebits.com/2011/06/07/two-thirds-of-web-users-re-use-the-same-passwords/] &lt;br /&gt;
Source: Wired [http://www.wired.com/2011/10/93000-sony-accounts-breached/]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Yahoo, 2013: “What do Sony and Yahoo! have in common? Passwords!”. &lt;br /&gt;
Source: Troy Hunt. [http://www.troyhunt.com/2012/07/what-do-sony-and-yahoo-have-in-common.html] &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Dropbox, 2013: “The usernames and passwords referenced in these articles were stolen from unrelated services, not Dropbox. Attackers then used these stolen credentials to try to log in to sites across the internet, including Dropbox”. &lt;br /&gt;
Source: Dropbox. [https://blog.dropbox.com/2014/10/dropbox-wasnt-hacked/] &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
JPMC, 2014: “[The breached data] contained some of the combinations of passwords and email addresses used by race participants who had registered on the Corporate Challenge website, an online platform for a series of annual charitable races that JPMorgan sponsors in major cities and that is run by an outside vendor. The races are open to bank employees and employees of other corporations”. &lt;br /&gt;
Source: NY Times. [http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/10/31/discovery-of-jpmorgan-cyberattack-aided-by-company-that-runs-race-website-for-bank/] &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This connected chain of events from Sony to Yahoo to Dropbox excludes JPMC. The JPMC breach came from a separate and unrelated source. We know that the JPMC breach was caused by attackers targeting an unrelated third-party athletic race/run site for credentials to use against JPMC. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Related Threat Agents ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Related Attacks ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Related Vulnerabilities ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Related Controls ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== References ==&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Neal Mueller</name></author>	</entry>

	<entry>
		<id>https://wiki.owasp.org/index.php?title=User:Neal_Mueller&amp;diff=188972</id>
		<title>User:Neal Mueller</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://wiki.owasp.org/index.php?title=User:Neal_Mueller&amp;diff=188972"/>
				<updated>2015-02-03T20:33:19Z</updated>
		
		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Neal Mueller: &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;[http://www.linkedin.com/in/nealmueller http://www.nealmueller.com/wp-content/uploads/bio-small.jpg]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Linkedin Profile: [http://www.linkedin.com/in/nealmueller]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Personal website: [http://www.nealmueller.com]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Twitter: [http://www.twitter.com/nealmueller]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== OWASP Contributions ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== OWASP Wiki Submissions ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Heartbleed [https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Heartbleed_Bug]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Credential Stuffing [https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Credential_stuffing]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== OWASP Event Planning Committee ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
AppSecCali 2015 Santa Monica&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
AppSecUSA 2015 San Francisco&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Neal Mueller</name></author>	</entry>

	<entry>
		<id>https://wiki.owasp.org/index.php?title=User:Neal_Mueller&amp;diff=188971</id>
		<title>User:Neal Mueller</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://wiki.owasp.org/index.php?title=User:Neal_Mueller&amp;diff=188971"/>
				<updated>2015-02-03T20:32:18Z</updated>
		
		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Neal Mueller: /* = Event Planning Committee */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;[http://www.linkedin.com/in/nealmueller http://www.nealmueller.com/wp-content/uploads/bio-small.jpg]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
professional: [http://www.linkedin.com/in/nealmueller]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
personal website: [http://www.nealmueller.com]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
twitter: [http://www.twitter.com/nealmueller]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== OWASP Contributions ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== OWASP Submissions ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Heartbleed [https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Heartbleed_Bug]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Credential Stuffing [https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Credential_stuffing]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Event Planning Committee ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
AppSecCali 2015 Santa Monica&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
AppSecUSA 2015 San Francisco&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Neal Mueller</name></author>	</entry>

	<entry>
		<id>https://wiki.owasp.org/index.php?title=User:Neal_Mueller&amp;diff=188970</id>
		<title>User:Neal Mueller</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://wiki.owasp.org/index.php?title=User:Neal_Mueller&amp;diff=188970"/>
				<updated>2015-02-03T20:32:07Z</updated>
		
		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Neal Mueller: &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;[http://www.linkedin.com/in/nealmueller http://www.nealmueller.com/wp-content/uploads/bio-small.jpg]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
professional: [http://www.linkedin.com/in/nealmueller]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
personal website: [http://www.nealmueller.com]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
twitter: [http://www.twitter.com/nealmueller]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== OWASP Contributions ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== OWASP Submissions ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Heartbleed [https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Heartbleed_Bug]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Credential Stuffing [https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Credential_stuffing]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Event Planning Committee ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
AppSecCali 2015 Santa Monica&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
AppSecUSA 2015 San Francisco&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Neal Mueller</name></author>	</entry>

	<entry>
		<id>https://wiki.owasp.org/index.php?title=User:Neal_Mueller&amp;diff=188969</id>
		<title>User:Neal Mueller</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://wiki.owasp.org/index.php?title=User:Neal_Mueller&amp;diff=188969"/>
				<updated>2015-02-03T20:28:41Z</updated>
		
		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Neal Mueller: &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;[http://www.nealmueller.com/wp-content/uploads/bio-small.jpg]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
personal website: [http://www.nealmueller.com]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
twitter: [http://www.twitter.com/nealmueller]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
professional: [http://www.linkedin.com/in/nealmueller]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Neal Mueller</name></author>	</entry>

	<entry>
		<id>https://wiki.owasp.org/index.php?title=User:Neal_Mueller&amp;diff=188968</id>
		<title>User:Neal Mueller</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://wiki.owasp.org/index.php?title=User:Neal_Mueller&amp;diff=188968"/>
				<updated>2015-02-03T20:26:46Z</updated>
		
		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Neal Mueller: &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
personal website: [http://www.nealmueller.com]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
twitter: [http://www.twitter.com/nealmueller]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
professional: [http://www.linkedin.com/in/nealmueller]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Neal Mueller</name></author>	</entry>

	<entry>
		<id>https://wiki.owasp.org/index.php?title=User:Neal_Mueller&amp;diff=188967</id>
		<title>User:Neal Mueller</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://wiki.owasp.org/index.php?title=User:Neal_Mueller&amp;diff=188967"/>
				<updated>2015-02-03T20:26:28Z</updated>
		
		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Neal Mueller: &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;personal website: [http://www.nealmueller.com]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
twitter: [http://www.twitter.com/nealmueller]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
professional: [http://www.linkedin.com/in/nealmueller]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Neal Mueller</name></author>	</entry>

	<entry>
		<id>https://wiki.owasp.org/index.php?title=User:Neal_Mueller&amp;diff=188966</id>
		<title>User:Neal Mueller</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://wiki.owasp.org/index.php?title=User:Neal_Mueller&amp;diff=188966"/>
				<updated>2015-02-03T20:26:15Z</updated>
		
		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Neal Mueller: &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;personal website: [http://www.nealmueller.com]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
twitter: [www.twitter.com/nealmueller]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
professional: [www.linkedin.com/in/nealmueller]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Neal Mueller</name></author>	</entry>

	<entry>
		<id>https://wiki.owasp.org/index.php?title=User:Neal_Mueller&amp;diff=188965</id>
		<title>User:Neal Mueller</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://wiki.owasp.org/index.php?title=User:Neal_Mueller&amp;diff=188965"/>
				<updated>2015-02-03T20:25:52Z</updated>
		
		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Neal Mueller: &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;personal website: [http://www.nealmueller.com]&lt;br /&gt;
twitter: twitter.com/nealmueller&lt;br /&gt;
professional: [linkedin.com/in/nealmueller]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Neal Mueller</name></author>	</entry>

	<entry>
		<id>https://wiki.owasp.org/index.php?title=User:Neal_Mueller&amp;diff=188964</id>
		<title>User:Neal Mueller</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://wiki.owasp.org/index.php?title=User:Neal_Mueller&amp;diff=188964"/>
				<updated>2015-02-03T20:25:39Z</updated>
		
		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Neal Mueller: &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;personal website: [nealmueller.com]&lt;br /&gt;
twitter: twitter.com/nealmueller&lt;br /&gt;
professional: [linkedin.com/in/nealmueller]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Neal Mueller</name></author>	</entry>

	<entry>
		<id>https://wiki.owasp.org/index.php?title=Conferences/AppSecUSA/2015&amp;diff=183467</id>
		<title>Conferences/AppSecUSA/2015</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://wiki.owasp.org/index.php?title=Conferences/AppSecUSA/2015&amp;diff=183467"/>
				<updated>2014-10-08T21:16:04Z</updated>
		
		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Neal Mueller: &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;__NOTOC__&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=ABOUT=&lt;br /&gt;
San Francisco, California&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
SF Hyatt Hotel&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Sept. 22 - Sept. 25, 2015&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
More Details Coming Soon&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
http://2015.appsecusa.org/home.html&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
=TEAM=&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
AppSec USA would not be possible without the  hard work of the following volunteers and staff:&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
'''General Conference Chair''':&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Wiki: &amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Email:&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
'''Speaker and Trainer Selection Chair''':&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Wiki: &amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Email: &amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
'''Conference Volunteers:'''&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
'''OWASP Staff'''&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Kate Hartmann @kate_hartmann&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
LinkedIn: http://www.linkedin.com/pub/kate-hartmann/8/968/786/&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Kelly Santalucia @KellySantalucia&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
LinkedIn: www.linkedin.com/pub/kelly-santalucia/30/59b/2b3/&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Laura Grau&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
LinkedIn: http://www.linkedin.com/pub/laura-grau/27/639/461&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Alison Shrader&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
LinkedIn: http://www.linkedin.com/pub/alison-shrader/5/328/91b&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Matt Tesauro @matt_tesauro&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
LinkedIn: http://www.linkedin.com/in/matttesauro&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=CALL FOR PRESENTATIONS=&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
The call for presentations (CFP) is not yet open. &amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
'''Dates and deadlines'''&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
'''Topics of interest'''&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
'''Submission Format'''&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
'''Judging Criteria'''&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
'''Terms'''&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
All speakers must provide written agreement to the OWASP Speaker Agreement after notification of acceptance.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=CALL FOR TRAININGS=&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
The call for training (CFT) is not yet open. &amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
'''Dates and deadlines'''&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
'''Topics of interest'''&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
'''Submission Format'''&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
'''Terms'''&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=KEYNOTE SPEAKERS=&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=VENUE &amp;amp; TRAVEL=&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
San Francisco, California &lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
'''Travel &amp;amp; Transportation'''&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
'''Hotel direction:''' &lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
'''Alternate transportation:'''&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
'''City Attractions and Activities'''&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=REGISTRATION=&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
= SPONSORS =&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;headertabs/&amp;gt;&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Neal Mueller</name></author>	</entry>

	<entry>
		<id>https://wiki.owasp.org/index.php?title=Conferences/AppSecUSA/2015&amp;diff=183466</id>
		<title>Conferences/AppSecUSA/2015</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://wiki.owasp.org/index.php?title=Conferences/AppSecUSA/2015&amp;diff=183466"/>
				<updated>2014-10-08T21:15:53Z</updated>
		
		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Neal Mueller: &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;__NOTOC__&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=ABOUT=&lt;br /&gt;
San Francisco, California&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
SF Hyatt Hotel&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Sept. 22 - Sept. 25, 2015&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
More Details Coming Soon&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
http://2015.appsecusa.org/home.html&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
=TEAM=&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
AppSec USA would not be possible without the  hard work of the following volunteers and staff:&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
'''General Conference Chair''':&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Wiki: &amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Email:&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
'''Speaker and Trainer Selection Chair''':&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Wiki: &amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Email: &amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
'''Conference Volunteers:'''&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
'''OWASP Staff'''&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Kate Hartmann @kate_hartmann&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
LinkedIn: http://www.linkedin.com/pub/kate-hartmann/8/968/786/&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Kelly Santalucia @KellySantalucia&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
LinkedIn: www.linkedin.com/pub/kelly-santalucia/30/59b/2b3/&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Laura Grau&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
LinkedIn: http://www.linkedin.com/pub/laura-grau/27/639/461&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Alison Shrader&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
LinkedIn: http://www.linkedin.com/pub/alison-shrader/5/328/91b&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Matt Tesauro @matt_tesauro&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
LinkedIn: http://www.linkedin.com/in/matttesauro&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=CALL FOR PRESENTATIONS=&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
The call for presentations (CFP) is not yet open. &amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
'''Dates and deadlines'''&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
'''Topics of interest'''&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
'''Submission Format'''&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
'''Judging Criteria'''&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
'''Terms'''&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
All speakers must provide written agreement to the OWASP Speaker Agreement after notification of acceptance.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=CALL FOR TRAININGS=&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
The call for training (CFT) is not yet open. &amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
'''Dates and deadlines'''&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
'''Topics of interest'''&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
'''Submission Format'''&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
'''Terms'''&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=KEYNOTE SPEAKERS=&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=VENUE &amp;amp; TRAVEL=&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
San Francisco, California &lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
'''Travel &amp;amp; Transportation'''&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
'''Hotel direction:''' &lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
'''Alternate transportation:'''&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
'''City Attractions and Activities'''&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=REGISTRATION=&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
= SPONSORS =&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;headertabs/&amp;gt;&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Neal Mueller</name></author>	</entry>

	<entry>
		<id>https://wiki.owasp.org/index.php?title=Conferences/AppSecUSA/2015&amp;diff=183465</id>
		<title>Conferences/AppSecUSA/2015</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://wiki.owasp.org/index.php?title=Conferences/AppSecUSA/2015&amp;diff=183465"/>
				<updated>2014-10-08T21:15:41Z</updated>
		
		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Neal Mueller: &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;__NOTOC__&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=ABOUT=&lt;br /&gt;
San Francisco, California&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
SF Hyatt Hotel&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Sept. 22 - Sept. 25, 2015&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
More Details Coming Soon &lt;br /&gt;
http://2015.appsecusa.org/home.html&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
=TEAM=&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
AppSec USA would not be possible without the  hard work of the following volunteers and staff:&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
'''General Conference Chair''':&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Wiki: &amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Email:&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
'''Speaker and Trainer Selection Chair''':&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Wiki: &amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Email: &amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
'''Conference Volunteers:'''&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
'''OWASP Staff'''&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Kate Hartmann @kate_hartmann&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
LinkedIn: http://www.linkedin.com/pub/kate-hartmann/8/968/786/&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Kelly Santalucia @KellySantalucia&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
LinkedIn: www.linkedin.com/pub/kelly-santalucia/30/59b/2b3/&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Laura Grau&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
LinkedIn: http://www.linkedin.com/pub/laura-grau/27/639/461&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Alison Shrader&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
LinkedIn: http://www.linkedin.com/pub/alison-shrader/5/328/91b&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Matt Tesauro @matt_tesauro&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
LinkedIn: http://www.linkedin.com/in/matttesauro&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=CALL FOR PRESENTATIONS=&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
The call for presentations (CFP) is not yet open. &amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
'''Dates and deadlines'''&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
'''Topics of interest'''&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
'''Submission Format'''&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
'''Judging Criteria'''&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
'''Terms'''&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
All speakers must provide written agreement to the OWASP Speaker Agreement after notification of acceptance.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=CALL FOR TRAININGS=&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
The call for training (CFT) is not yet open. &amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
'''Dates and deadlines'''&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
'''Topics of interest'''&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
'''Submission Format'''&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
'''Terms'''&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=KEYNOTE SPEAKERS=&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=VENUE &amp;amp; TRAVEL=&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
San Francisco, California &lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
'''Travel &amp;amp; Transportation'''&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
'''Hotel direction:''' &lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
'''Alternate transportation:'''&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
'''City Attractions and Activities'''&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=REGISTRATION=&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
= SPONSORS =&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;headertabs/&amp;gt;&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Neal Mueller</name></author>	</entry>

	<entry>
		<id>https://wiki.owasp.org/index.php?title=Conferences/AppSecUSA/2015&amp;diff=183464</id>
		<title>Conferences/AppSecUSA/2015</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://wiki.owasp.org/index.php?title=Conferences/AppSecUSA/2015&amp;diff=183464"/>
				<updated>2014-10-08T21:15:27Z</updated>
		
		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Neal Mueller: &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;__NOTOC__&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=ABOUT=&lt;br /&gt;
San Francisco, California&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
SF Hyatt Hotel&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Sept. 22 - Sept. 25, 2015&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
http://2015.appsecusa.org/home.html&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
More Details Coming Soon &lt;br /&gt;
=TEAM=&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
AppSec USA would not be possible without the  hard work of the following volunteers and staff:&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
'''General Conference Chair''':&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Wiki: &amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Email:&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
'''Speaker and Trainer Selection Chair''':&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Wiki: &amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Email: &amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
'''Conference Volunteers:'''&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
'''OWASP Staff'''&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Kate Hartmann @kate_hartmann&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
LinkedIn: http://www.linkedin.com/pub/kate-hartmann/8/968/786/&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Kelly Santalucia @KellySantalucia&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
LinkedIn: www.linkedin.com/pub/kelly-santalucia/30/59b/2b3/&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Laura Grau&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
LinkedIn: http://www.linkedin.com/pub/laura-grau/27/639/461&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Alison Shrader&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
LinkedIn: http://www.linkedin.com/pub/alison-shrader/5/328/91b&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Matt Tesauro @matt_tesauro&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
LinkedIn: http://www.linkedin.com/in/matttesauro&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=CALL FOR PRESENTATIONS=&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
The call for presentations (CFP) is not yet open. &amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
'''Dates and deadlines'''&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
'''Topics of interest'''&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
'''Submission Format'''&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
'''Judging Criteria'''&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
'''Terms'''&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
All speakers must provide written agreement to the OWASP Speaker Agreement after notification of acceptance.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=CALL FOR TRAININGS=&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
The call for training (CFT) is not yet open. &amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
'''Dates and deadlines'''&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
'''Topics of interest'''&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
'''Submission Format'''&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
'''Terms'''&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=KEYNOTE SPEAKERS=&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=VENUE &amp;amp; TRAVEL=&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
San Francisco, California &lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
'''Travel &amp;amp; Transportation'''&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
'''Hotel direction:''' &lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
'''Alternate transportation:'''&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
'''City Attractions and Activities'''&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=REGISTRATION=&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
= SPONSORS =&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;headertabs/&amp;gt;&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Neal Mueller</name></author>	</entry>

	<entry>
		<id>https://wiki.owasp.org/index.php?title=Heartbleed_Bug&amp;diff=172341</id>
		<title>Heartbleed Bug</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://wiki.owasp.org/index.php?title=Heartbleed_Bug&amp;diff=172341"/>
				<updated>2014-04-10T23:45:45Z</updated>
		
		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Neal Mueller: &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;= Introduction =&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Heartbleed is a catastrophic bug in OpenSSL, announced in April 2014.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[File:Heartbleed.png]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
= About the Name =&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Like most major vulnerabilities, this major vulnerability is well branded. It gets it's name from the heart beat function between client and server. According to Dan Kaminsky [https://itunes.apple.com/us/podcast/apm-marketplace-tech-report/id73330855], &amp;quot;When you are communicating with another computer, sometimes you have a pulse message that says 'yes I'm still here'. This is a heart beat. In this particular case there is the possibility to leak information from the heartbeat, so you don't just know that someone is on the other side, you know something about them. In this case, you know too much. There's a bleeding of information from the heartbeat.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
= Timing = &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''What's known:'''&lt;br /&gt;
The vulnerability became public on April 7, 2014 after being independently discovered by Google Security and Codenomicon. &lt;br /&gt;
The vulnerability was widely reported on April 9, 2014.&lt;br /&gt;
The vulnerable versions have been widely used for two years.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Has this been abused in the wild? '''&lt;br /&gt;
We don't know. Security community should deploy TLS/DTLS honeypots that entrap attackers and to alert about exploitation attempts. According to Bruce Schneier, [https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2014/04/heartbleed.html] &amp;quot;The real question is whether or not someone deliberately inserted this bug into OpenSSL, and has had two years of unfettered access to everything. My guess is accident, but I have no proof.&amp;quot; According to EFF, intelligence agencies may have been using heartbleed in November 2013. Source: [https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/04/wild-heart-were-intelligence-agencies-using-heartbleed-november-2013]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
= Severity =&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
According to Bruce Schneier [https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2014/04/heartbleed.html], &amp;quot;Catastrophic is the right word. On the scale of 1 to 10, this is an 11.&amp;quot; Counterpoint also from Bruce Schneier, &amp;quot;If nothing really bad happens -- if this turns out to be something like the Y2K bug -- then we are going to face criticisms of crying wolf.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
According to Codenomicon [http://heartbleed.com/], &amp;quot;There is no total of 64 kilobytes limitation to the attack, that limit applies only to a single heartbeat. Attacker can either keep reconnecting or during an active TLS connection keep requesting arbitrary number of 64 kilobyte chunks of memory content until enough secrets are revealed.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Session Hijacking with Heartbleed ==&lt;br /&gt;
Matt Sullivan published [https://www.mattslifebytes.com/?p=533 an interesting article] about leveraging Heartbleed for [[Session_hijacking_attack|session hijacking attacks]], including a walkthrough on JIRA [https://www.mattslifebytes.com/?p=533 here].&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
= Explanation of the Bug = &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This serious flaw (CVE-2014-0160) is a missing bounds check before a memcpy() call that uses non-sanitized user input as the length parameter. An attacker can trick OpenSSL into allocating a 64KB buffer, copy more bytes than is necessary into the buffer, send that buffer back, and thus leak the contents of the victim's memory, 64KB at a time. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
TheRegister's explanation [http://www.theregister.co.uk/2014/04/09/heartbleed_explained/]&lt;br /&gt;
OpenSSL Github Fix [http://git.openssl.org/gitweb/?p=openssl.git;a=commitdiff;h=96db902]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
= The Fix = &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The patch in OpenSSL 1.0.1g is essentially a bounds check, using the correct record length in the SSL3 structure (s3-&amp;gt;rrec) that described the incoming HeartbeatMessage.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Below is the revised code from Github.[http://git.openssl.org/gitweb/?p=openssl.git;a=commitdiff;h=731f431497f463f3a2a97236fe0187b11c44aead]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
    hbtype = *p++;&lt;br /&gt;
    n2s(p, payload);&lt;br /&gt;
    if (1 + 2 + payload + 16 &amp;gt; s-&amp;gt;s3-&amp;gt;rrec.length)&lt;br /&gt;
    return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */&lt;br /&gt;
    pl = p;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
= Impact of the Vulnerability =&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This vulnerability allows an attacker to extract memory contents from the webserver through the vulnerability in the heartbeat. As a result an attacker may be able to access sensitive information such as the private keys used for SSL/TLS.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Active Attack''' - Equipped with the private key, an attacker can silently monitor and decrypt communications between the user and the web server. As a result, an attacker could view private data such as passwords, credit card data, medical records and any other sensitive data the user exchanges with the website. In addition, the attacker could impersonate the target website to deliver fake, inaccurate or malicious data to the user.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Offline Attack''' - Some well funded attackers gather large amounts of encrypted data and store this data in the event they can later decrypt the information. Using the Heartbleed vulnerability the attackers could decrypt this information if it was obtained when passed between a user and a vulnerable website. This means that sensitive data exchanged up to two years ago could also now be at risk for exposure to attackers. Note: sites implementing Perfect Forward Secrecy are protected against this particular attack.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Scope''' - 1.0.1 and 1.0.2-beta releases of OpenSSL are affected including 1.0.1f and 1.0.2-beta1. Apache, which uses OpenSSL for HTTPS, is used by 66% of all websites according to netcraft.com.  A study of the TLS heartbeat extension by Netcraft also identified that 17.5% of SSL sites may be vulnerable to the Heartbleed bug.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
= Defending against Vulnerability =&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''What should website owners do?'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Verify if you are using a vulnerable version of OpenSSL.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Upgrade OpenSSL as soon as possible. OpenSSL 1.0.1g was released on April 7, 2014 (https://www.openssl.org/source/).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Reissue your security certificates for SSL/TLS. The vulnerability has been present for two years and there is no way to verify if your private key has been compromised as a result of this vulnerability. In addition, a compromised key would be used to silently monitor communications from your users and the attack would be undetectable. It is prudent to assume a breach and proactively reissue security certificates.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Implement Perfect Forward Secrecy. This additional layer of security protects encrypted data from several potential attacks by using a per session random keys. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''What should users do?'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Unfortunately there’s not much a user can do. If you have an account at one of the many large websites that may have been affected, you can proactively change your password just to be safe. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
According to Errata Security [http://blog.erratasec.com/2014/04/yes-you-might-have-to-change-your.html#.U0blvq1dWv0], &amp;quot;The only passwords you need to change would be ones that you entered in the last couple of days. Personally, I haven't entered any passwords over the last couple days, so I don't need to change any passwords.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
= Exploit POCs =&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A list of Heartbeat exploit POCs is provided here.[https://blog.bugcrowd.com/heartbleed-exploit-yet/]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
= Links for More Information =&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Heartbleed page from Codenomicon [http://heartbleed.com/]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Test a website's vulnerability here [http://filippo.io/Heartbleed/]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Blog post from Michael Coates [[http://blog.shapesecurity.com/heartbleed-bug-places-encrypted-user-data-and-webservers-at-risk]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
XKCD cartoon [https://xkcd.com/1353]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Vulnerability]]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Neal Mueller</name></author>	</entry>

	<entry>
		<id>https://wiki.owasp.org/index.php?title=Heartbleed_Bug&amp;diff=172316</id>
		<title>Heartbleed Bug</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://wiki.owasp.org/index.php?title=Heartbleed_Bug&amp;diff=172316"/>
				<updated>2014-04-10T20:37:20Z</updated>
		
		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Neal Mueller: &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;= Introduction =&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Heartbleed is a catastrophic bug in OpenSSL, announced in April 2014.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[File:Heartbleed.png]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
= About the Name =&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Like most major vulnerabilities, this major vulnerability is well branded. It gets it's name from the heart beat function between client and server. According to Dan Kaminsky [https://itunes.apple.com/us/podcast/apm-marketplace-tech-report/id73330855], &amp;quot;When you are communicating with another computer, sometimes you have a pulse message that says 'yes I'm still here'. This is a heart beat. In this particular case there is the possibility to leak information from the heartbeat, so you don't just know that someone is on the other side, you know something about them. In this case, you know too much. There's a bleeding of information from the heartbeat.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
= Timing = &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''What's known:'''&lt;br /&gt;
The vulnerability became public on April 7, 2014 after being independently discovered by Google Security and Codenomicon. &lt;br /&gt;
The vulnerability was widely reported on April 9, 2014.&lt;br /&gt;
The vulnerable versions have been widely used for two years.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Has this been abused in the wild? '''&lt;br /&gt;
We don't know. Security community should deploy TLS/DTLS honeypots that entrap attackers and to alert about exploitation attempts. According to Bruce Schneier, [https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2014/04/heartbleed.html] &amp;quot;The real question is whether or not someone deliberately inserted this bug into OpenSSL, and has had two years of unfettered access to everything. My guess is accident, but I have no proof.&amp;quot; According to EFF, intelligence agencies may have been using heartbleed in November 2013. Source: [https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/04/wild-heart-were-intelligence-agencies-using-heartbleed-november-2013]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
= Severity =&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
According to Bruce Schneier [https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2014/04/heartbleed.html], &amp;quot;Catastrophic is the right word. On the scale of 1 to 10, this is an 11.&amp;quot; Counterpoint also from Bruce Schneier, &amp;quot;If nothing really bad happens -- if this turns out to be something like the Y2K bug -- then we are going to face criticisms of crying wolf.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
According to Codenomicon [http://heartbleed.com/], &amp;quot;There is no total of 64 kilobytes limitation to the attack, that limit applies only to a single heartbeat. Attacker can either keep reconnecting or during an active TLS connection keep requesting arbitrary number of 64 kilobyte chunks of memory content until enough secrets are revealed.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
= Explanation of the Bug = &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This serious flaw (CVE-2014-0160) is a missing bounds check before a memcpy() call that uses non-sanitized user input as the length parameter. An attacker can trick OpenSSL into allocating a 64KB buffer, copy more bytes than is necessary into the buffer, send that buffer back, and thus leak the contents of the victim's memory, 64KB at a time. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
TheRegister's explanation [http://www.theregister.co.uk/2014/04/09/heartbleed_explained/]&lt;br /&gt;
OpenSSL Github Fix [http://git.openssl.org/gitweb/?p=openssl.git;a=commitdiff;h=96db902]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
= The Fix = &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The patch in OpenSSL 1.0.1g is essentially a bounds check, using the correct record length in the SSL3 structure (s3-&amp;gt;rrec) that described the incoming HeartbeatMessage.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Below is the revised code from Github.[http://git.openssl.org/gitweb/?p=openssl.git;a=commitdiff;h=731f431497f463f3a2a97236fe0187b11c44aead]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
    hbtype = *p++;&lt;br /&gt;
    n2s(p, payload);&lt;br /&gt;
    if (1 + 2 + payload + 16 &amp;gt; s-&amp;gt;s3-&amp;gt;rrec.length)&lt;br /&gt;
    return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */&lt;br /&gt;
    pl = p;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
= Impact of the Vulnerability =&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This vulnerability allows an attacker to extract memory contents from the webserver through the vulnerability in the heartbeat. As a result an attacker may be able to access sensitive information such as the private keys used for SSL/TLS.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Active Attack''' - Equipped with the private key, an attacker can silently monitor and decrypt communications between the user and the web server. As a result, an attacker could view private data such as passwords, credit card data, medical records and any other sensitive data the user exchanges with the website. In addition, the attacker could impersonate the target website to deliver fake, inaccurate or malicious data to the user.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Offline Attack''' - Some well funded attackers gather large amounts of encrypted data and store this data in the event they can later decrypt the information. Using the Heartbleed vulnerability the attackers could decrypt this information if it was obtained when passed between a user and a vulnerable website. This means that sensitive data exchanged up to two years ago could also now be at risk for exposure to attackers. Note: sites implementing Perfect Forward Secrecy are protected against this particular attack.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Scope''' - 1.0.1 and 1.0.2-beta releases of OpenSSL are affected including 1.0.1f and 1.0.2-beta1. Apache, which uses OpenSSL for HTTPS, is used by 66% of all websites according to netcraft.com.  A study of the TLS heartbeat extension by Netcraft also identified that 17.5% of SSL sites may be vulnerable to the Heartbleed bug.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
= Defending against Vulnerability =&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''What should website owners do?'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Verify if you are using a vulnerable version of OpenSSL.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Upgrade OpenSSL as soon as possible. OpenSSL 1.0.1g was released on April 7, 2014 (https://www.openssl.org/source/).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Reissue your security certificates for SSL/TLS. The vulnerability has been present for two years and there is no way to verify if your private key has been compromised as a result of this vulnerability. In addition, a compromised key would be used to silently monitor communications from your users and the attack would be undetectable. It is prudent to assume a breach and proactively reissue security certificates.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Implement Perfect Forward Secrecy. This additional layer of security protects encrypted data from several potential attacks by using a per session random keys. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''What should users do?'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Unfortunately there’s not much a user can do. If you have an account at one of the many large websites that may have been affected, you can proactively change your password just to be safe. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
According to Errata Security [http://blog.erratasec.com/2014/04/yes-you-might-have-to-change-your.html#.U0blvq1dWv0], &amp;quot;The only passwords you need to change would be ones that you entered in the last couple of days. Personally, I haven't entered any passwords over the last couple days, so I don't need to change any passwords.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
= Links for More Information =&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Heartbleed page from Codenomicon [http://heartbleed.com/]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Test a website's vulnerability here [http://filippo.io/Heartbleed/]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Blog post from Michael Coates [[http://blog.shapesecurity.com/heartbleed-bug-places-encrypted-user-data-and-webservers-at-risk]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
XKCD cartoon [https://xkcd.com/1353]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Vulnerability]]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Neal Mueller</name></author>	</entry>

	<entry>
		<id>https://wiki.owasp.org/index.php?title=Heartbleed_Bug&amp;diff=172315</id>
		<title>Heartbleed Bug</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://wiki.owasp.org/index.php?title=Heartbleed_Bug&amp;diff=172315"/>
				<updated>2014-04-10T20:36:27Z</updated>
		
		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Neal Mueller: &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;= Introduction =&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Heartbleed is a catastrophic bug in OpenSSL, announced in April 2014.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[File:Heartbleed.png]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
= About the Name =&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Like most major vulnerabilities, this major vulnerability is well branded. It gets it's name from the heart beat function between client and server. According to Dan Kaminsky [https://itunes.apple.com/us/podcast/apm-marketplace-tech-report/id73330855], &amp;quot;When you are communicating with another computer, sometimes you have a pulse message that says 'yes I'm still here'. This is a heart beat. In this particular case there is the possibility to leak information from the heartbeat, so you don't just know that someone is on the other side, you know something about them. In this case, you know too much. There's a bleeding of information from the heartbeat.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
= Timing = &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''What's known:'''&lt;br /&gt;
The vulnerability became public on April 7, 2014 after being independently discovered by Google Security and Codenomicon. &lt;br /&gt;
The vulnerability was widely reported on April 9, 2014.&lt;br /&gt;
The vulnerable versions have been widely used for two years.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Has this been abused in the wild? '''&lt;br /&gt;
We don't know. Security community should deploy TLS/DTLS honeypots that entrap attackers and to alert about exploitation attempts. According to Bruce Schneier, [https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2014/04/heartbleed.html] &amp;quot;The real question is whether or not someone deliberately inserted this bug into OpenSSL, and has had two years of unfettered access to everything. My guess is accident, but I have no proof.&amp;quot; According to EFF, intelligence agencies may have been using heartbleed in November 2013. Source: [https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/04/wild-heart-were-intelligence-agencies-using-heartbleed-november-2013]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
= Severity =&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
According to Bruce Schneier [https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2014/04/heartbleed.html], &amp;quot;Catastrophic is the right word. On the scale of 1 to 10, this is an 11.&amp;quot; Counterpoint also from Bruce Schneier, &amp;quot;If nothing really bad happens -- if this turns out to be something like the Y2K bug -- then we are going to face criticisms of crying wolf.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
According to Codenomicon [http://heartbleed.com/], &amp;quot;There is no total of 64 kilobytes limitation to the attack, that limit applies only to a single heartbeat. Attacker can either keep reconnecting or during an active TLS connection keep requesting arbitrary number of 64 kilobyte chunks of memory content until enough secrets are revealed.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
= Explanation of the Bug = &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This serious flaw (CVE-2014-0160) is a missing bounds check before a memcpy() call that uses non-sanitized user input as the length parameter. An attacker can trick OpenSSL into allocating a 64KB buffer, copy more bytes than is necessary into the buffer, send that buffer back, and thus leak the contents of the victim's memory, 64KB at a time. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
TheRegister's explanation [http://www.theregister.co.uk/2014/04/09/heartbleed_explained/]&lt;br /&gt;
OpenSSL Github Fix [http://git.openssl.org/gitweb/?p=openssl.git;a=commitdiff;h=96db902]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
= The Fix = &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The patch in OpenSSL 1.0.1g is essentially a bounds check, using the correct record length in the SSL3 structure (s3-&amp;gt;rrec) that described the incoming HeartbeatMessage.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Below is the revised code from Github.[http://git.openssl.org/gitweb/?p=openssl.git;a=commitdiff;h=731f431497f463f3a2a97236fe0187b11c44aead]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
hbtype = *p++;&lt;br /&gt;
n2s(p, payload);&lt;br /&gt;
if (1 + 2 + payload + 16 &amp;gt; s-&amp;gt;s3-&amp;gt;rrec.length)&lt;br /&gt;
    return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */&lt;br /&gt;
pl = p;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
= Impact of the Vulnerability =&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This vulnerability allows an attacker to extract memory contents from the webserver through the vulnerability in the heartbeat. As a result an attacker may be able to access sensitive information such as the private keys used for SSL/TLS.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Active Attack''' - Equipped with the private key, an attacker can silently monitor and decrypt communications between the user and the web server. As a result, an attacker could view private data such as passwords, credit card data, medical records and any other sensitive data the user exchanges with the website. In addition, the attacker could impersonate the target website to deliver fake, inaccurate or malicious data to the user.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Offline Attack''' - Some well funded attackers gather large amounts of encrypted data and store this data in the event they can later decrypt the information. Using the Heartbleed vulnerability the attackers could decrypt this information if it was obtained when passed between a user and a vulnerable website. This means that sensitive data exchanged up to two years ago could also now be at risk for exposure to attackers. Note: sites implementing Perfect Forward Secrecy are protected against this particular attack.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Scope''' - 1.0.1 and 1.0.2-beta releases of OpenSSL are affected including 1.0.1f and 1.0.2-beta1. Apache, which uses OpenSSL for HTTPS, is used by 66% of all websites according to netcraft.com.  A study of the TLS heartbeat extension by Netcraft also identified that 17.5% of SSL sites may be vulnerable to the Heartbleed bug.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
= Defending against Vulnerability =&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''What should website owners do?'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Verify if you are using a vulnerable version of OpenSSL.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Upgrade OpenSSL as soon as possible. OpenSSL 1.0.1g was released on April 7, 2014 (https://www.openssl.org/source/).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Reissue your security certificates for SSL/TLS. The vulnerability has been present for two years and there is no way to verify if your private key has been compromised as a result of this vulnerability. In addition, a compromised key would be used to silently monitor communications from your users and the attack would be undetectable. It is prudent to assume a breach and proactively reissue security certificates.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Implement Perfect Forward Secrecy. This additional layer of security protects encrypted data from several potential attacks by using a per session random keys. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''What should users do?'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Unfortunately there’s not much a user can do. If you have an account at one of the many large websites that may have been affected, you can proactively change your password just to be safe. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
According to Errata Security [http://blog.erratasec.com/2014/04/yes-you-might-have-to-change-your.html#.U0blvq1dWv0], &amp;quot;The only passwords you need to change would be ones that you entered in the last couple of days. Personally, I haven't entered any passwords over the last couple days, so I don't need to change any passwords.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
= Links for More Information =&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Heartbleed page from Codenomicon [http://heartbleed.com/]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Test a website's vulnerability here [http://filippo.io/Heartbleed/]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Blog post from Michael Coates [[http://blog.shapesecurity.com/heartbleed-bug-places-encrypted-user-data-and-webservers-at-risk]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
XKCD cartoon [https://xkcd.com/1353]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Vulnerability]]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Neal Mueller</name></author>	</entry>

	<entry>
		<id>https://wiki.owasp.org/index.php?title=Heartbleed_Bug&amp;diff=172306</id>
		<title>Heartbleed Bug</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://wiki.owasp.org/index.php?title=Heartbleed_Bug&amp;diff=172306"/>
				<updated>2014-04-10T19:03:29Z</updated>
		
		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Neal Mueller: &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;= Introduction =&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Heartbleed is a catastrophic bug in OpenSSL, announced in April 2014.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[File:Heartbleed.png]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
= About the Name =&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Like most major vulnerabilities, this major vulnerability is well branded. It gets it's name from the heart beat function between client and server. According to Dan Kaminsky [https://itunes.apple.com/us/podcast/apm-marketplace-tech-report/id73330855], &amp;quot;When you are communicating with another computer, sometimes you have a pulse message that says 'yes I'm still here'. This is a heart beat. In this particular case there is the possibility to leak information from the heartbeat, so you don't just know that someone is on the other side, you know something about them. In this case, you know too much. There's a bleeding of information from the heartbeat.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
= Timing = &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''What's known:'''&lt;br /&gt;
The vulnerability became public on April 7, 2014 after being independently discovered by Google Security and Codenomicon. &lt;br /&gt;
The vulnerability was widely reported on April 9, 2014.&lt;br /&gt;
The vulnerable versions have been widely used for two years.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Has this been abused in the wild? '''&lt;br /&gt;
We don't know. Security community should deploy TLS/DTLS honeypots that entrap attackers and to alert about exploitation attempts. According to Bruce Schneier, [https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2014/04/heartbleed.html] &amp;quot;The real question is whether or not someone deliberately inserted this bug into OpenSSL, and has had two years of unfettered access to everything. My guess is accident, but I have no proof.&amp;quot; According to EFF, intelligence agencies may have been using heartbleed in November 2013. Source: [https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/04/wild-heart-were-intelligence-agencies-using-heartbleed-november-2013]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
= Severity =&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
According to Bruce Schneier [https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2014/04/heartbleed.html], &amp;quot;Catastrophic is the right word. On the scale of 1 to 10, this is an 11.&amp;quot; Counterpoint also from Bruce Schneier, &amp;quot;If nothing really bad happens -- if this turns out to be something like the Y2K bug -- then we are going to face criticisms of crying wolf.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
According to Codenomicon [http://heartbleed.com/], &amp;quot;There is no total of 64 kilobytes limitation to the attack, that limit applies only to a single heartbeat. Attacker can either keep reconnecting or during an active TLS connection keep requesting arbitrary number of 64 kilobyte chunks of memory content until enough secrets are revealed.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
= Impact of the Vulnerability =&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This vulnerability allows an attacker to extract memory contents from the webserver through the vulnerability in the heartbeat. As a result an attacker may be able to access sensitive information such as the private keys used for SSL/TLS.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Active Attack''' - Equipped with the private key, an attacker can silently monitor and decrypt communications between the user and the web server. As a result, an attacker could view private data such as passwords, credit card data, medical records and any other sensitive data the user exchanges with the website. In addition, the attacker could impersonate the target website to deliver fake, inaccurate or malicious data to the user.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Offline Attack''' - Some well funded attackers gather large amounts of encrypted data and store this data in the event they can later decrypt the information. Using the Heartbleed vulnerability the attackers could decrypt this information if it was obtained when passed between a user and a vulnerable website. This means that sensitive data exchanged up to two years ago could also now be at risk for exposure to attackers. Note: sites implementing Perfect Forward Secrecy are protected against this particular attack.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Scope''' - 1.0.1 and 1.0.2-beta releases of OpenSSL are affected including 1.0.1f and 1.0.2-beta1. Apache, which uses OpenSSL for HTTPS, is used by 66% of all websites according to netcraft.com.  A study of the TLS heartbeat extension by Netcraft also identified that 17.5% of SSL sites may be vulnerable to the Heartbleed bug.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
= Defending against Vulnerability =&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''What should website owners do?'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Verify if you are using a vulnerable version of OpenSSL.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Upgrade OpenSSL as soon as possible. OpenSSL 1.0.1g was released on April 7, 2014 (https://www.openssl.org/source/).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Reissue your security certificates for SSL/TLS. The vulnerability has been present for two years and there is no way to verify if your private key has been compromised as a result of this vulnerability. In addition, a compromised key would be used to silently monitor communications from your users and the attack would be undetectable. It is prudent to assume a breach and proactively reissue security certificates.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Implement Perfect Forward Secrecy. This additional layer of security protects encrypted data from several potential attacks by using a per session random keys. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''What should users do?'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Unfortunately there’s not much a user can do. If you have an account at one of the many large websites that may have been affected, you can proactively change your password just to be safe. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
According to Errata Security [http://blog.erratasec.com/2014/04/yes-you-might-have-to-change-your.html#.U0blvq1dWv0], &amp;quot;The only passwords you need to change would be ones that you entered in the last couple of days. Personally, I haven't entered any passwords over the last couple days, so I don't need to change any passwords.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
= Links for More Information =&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Heartbleed page from Codenomicon [http://heartbleed.com/]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Test a website's vulnerability here [http://filippo.io/Heartbleed/]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Blog post from Michael Coates [[http://blog.shapesecurity.com/heartbleed-bug-places-encrypted-user-data-and-webservers-at-risk]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
XKCD cartoon [https://xkcd.com/1353]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Vulnerability]]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Neal Mueller</name></author>	</entry>

	<entry>
		<id>https://wiki.owasp.org/index.php?title=Heartbleed_Bug&amp;diff=172305</id>
		<title>Heartbleed Bug</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://wiki.owasp.org/index.php?title=Heartbleed_Bug&amp;diff=172305"/>
				<updated>2014-04-10T19:03:21Z</updated>
		
		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Neal Mueller: &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;= Introduction =&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Heartbleed is a catastrophic bug in OpenSSL, announced in April 2014.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[File:Heartbleed.png]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
= About the Name =&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Like most major vulnerabilities, this major vulnerability is well branded. It gets it's name from the heart beat function between client and server. According to Dan Kaminsky [https://itunes.apple.com/us/podcast/apm-marketplace-tech-report/id73330855], &amp;quot;When you are communicating with another computer, sometimes you have a pulse message that says 'yes I'm still here'. This is a heart beat. In this particular case there is the possibility to leak information from the heartbeat, so you don't just know that someone is on the other side, you know something about them. In this case, you know too much. There's a bleeding of information from the heartbeat.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
= Timing = &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''What's known:'''&lt;br /&gt;
The vulnerability became public on April 7, 2014 after being independently discovered by Google Security and Codenomicon. &lt;br /&gt;
The vulnerability was widely reported on April 9, 2014.&lt;br /&gt;
The vulnerable versions have been widely used for two years.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Has this been abused in the wild? '''&lt;br /&gt;
We don't know. Security community should deploy TLS/DTLS honeypots that entrap attackers and to alert about exploitation attempts. According to Bruce Schneier, [https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2014/04/heartbleed.html] &amp;quot;The real question is whether or not someone deliberately inserted this bug into OpenSSL, and has had two years of unfettered access to everything. My guess is accident, but I have no proof.&amp;quot; According to EFF, intelligence agencies may have been using heartbleed in November 2013. Source: [https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/04/wild-heart-were-intelligence-agencies-using-heartbleed-november-2013]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
= Severity =&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
According to Bruce Schneier [https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2014/04/heartbleed.html], &amp;quot;Catastrophic is the right word. On the scale of 1 to 10, this is an 11.&amp;quot; Counterpoint also from Bruce Schneier, &amp;quot;If nothing really bad happens -- if this turns out to be something like the Y2K bug -- then we are going to face criticisms of crying wolf.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
According to Codenomicon [http://heartbleed.com/], &amp;quot;There is no total of 64 kilobytes limitation to the attack, that limit applies only to a single heartbeat. Attacker can either keep reconnecting or during an active TLS connection keep requesting arbitrary number of 64 kilobyte chunks of memory content until enough secrets are revealed.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
= Impact of the Vulnerability =&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This vulnerability allows an attacker to extract memory contents from the webserver through the vulnerability in the heartbeat. As a result an attacker may be able to access sensitive information such as the private keys used for SSL/TLS.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Active Attack''' - Equipped with the private key, an attacker can silently monitor and decrypt communications between the user and the web server. As a result, an attacker could view private data such as passwords, credit card data, medical records and any other sensitive data the user exchanges with the website. In addition, the attacker could impersonate the target website to deliver fake, inaccurate or malicious data to the user.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Offline Attack''' - Some well funded attackers gather large amounts of encrypted data and store this data in the event they can later decrypt the information. Using the Heartbleed vulnerability the attackers could decrypt this information if it was obtained when passed between a user and a vulnerable website. This means that sensitive data exchanged up to two years ago could also now be at risk for exposure to attackers. Note: sites implementing Perfect Forward Secrecy are protected against this particular attack.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Scope''' - 1.0.1 and 1.0.2-beta releases of OpenSSL are affected including 1.0.1f and 1.0.2-beta1. Apache, which uses OpenSSL for HTTPS, is used by 66% of all websites according to netcraft.com.  A study of the TLS heartbeat extension by Netcraft also identified that 17.5% of SSL sites may be vulnerable to the Heartbleed bug.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
= Defending against Vulnerability =&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''What should website owners do?'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Verify if you are using a vulnerable version of OpenSSL.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Upgrade OpenSSL as soon as possible. OpenSSL 1.0.1g was released on April 7, 2014 (https://www.openssl.org/source/).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Reissue your security certificates for SSL/TLS. The vulnerability has been present for two years and there is no way to verify if your private key has been compromised as a result of this vulnerability. In addition, a compromised key would be used to silently monitor communications from your users and the attack would be undetectable. It is prudent to assume a breach and proactively reissue security certificates.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Implement Perfect Forward Secrecy. This additional layer of security protects encrypted data from several potential attacks by using a per session random keys. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''What should users do?'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Unfortunately there’s not much a user can do. If you have an account at one of the many large websites that may have been affected, you can proactively change your password just to be safe. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
According to Errata Security [http://blog.erratasec.com/2014/04/yes-you-might-have-to-change-your.html#.U0blvq1dWv0], &amp;quot;The only passwords you need to change would be ones that you entered in the last couple of days. Personally, I haven't entered any passwords over the last couple days, so I don't need to change any passwords.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
= Links for More Information =&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Heartbleed page from Codenomicon [http://heartbleed.com/]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Test a website's vulnerability here [http://filippo.io/Heartbleed/]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Blog post from Michael Coates [[http://blog.shapesecurity.com/heartbleed-bug-places-encrypted-user-data-and-webservers-at-risk]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
XKCD cartoon [https://xkcd.com/1353]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Vulnerability]]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Neal Mueller</name></author>	</entry>

	<entry>
		<id>https://wiki.owasp.org/index.php?title=Heartbleed_Bug&amp;diff=172304</id>
		<title>Heartbleed Bug</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://wiki.owasp.org/index.php?title=Heartbleed_Bug&amp;diff=172304"/>
				<updated>2014-04-10T19:02:51Z</updated>
		
		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Neal Mueller: &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;[[File:Heartbleed.png]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
= Introduction =&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Heartbleed is a catastrophic bug in OpenSSL, announced in April 2014.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
= About the Name =&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Like most major vulnerabilities, this major vulnerability is well branded. It gets it's name from the heart beat function between client and server. According to Dan Kaminsky [https://itunes.apple.com/us/podcast/apm-marketplace-tech-report/id73330855], &amp;quot;When you are communicating with another computer, sometimes you have a pulse message that says 'yes I'm still here'. This is a heart beat. In this particular case there is the possibility to leak information from the heartbeat, so you don't just know that someone is on the other side, you know something about them. In this case, you know too much. There's a bleeding of information from the heartbeat.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
= Timing = &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''What's known:'''&lt;br /&gt;
The vulnerability became public on April 7, 2014 after being independently discovered by Google Security and Codenomicon. &lt;br /&gt;
The vulnerability was widely reported on April 9, 2014.&lt;br /&gt;
The vulnerable versions have been widely used for two years.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Has this been abused in the wild? '''&lt;br /&gt;
We don't know. Security community should deploy TLS/DTLS honeypots that entrap attackers and to alert about exploitation attempts. According to Bruce Schneier, [https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2014/04/heartbleed.html] &amp;quot;The real question is whether or not someone deliberately inserted this bug into OpenSSL, and has had two years of unfettered access to everything. My guess is accident, but I have no proof.&amp;quot; According to EFF, intelligence agencies may have been using heartbleed in November 2013. Source: [https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/04/wild-heart-were-intelligence-agencies-using-heartbleed-november-2013]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
= Severity =&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
According to Bruce Schneier [https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2014/04/heartbleed.html], &amp;quot;Catastrophic is the right word. On the scale of 1 to 10, this is an 11.&amp;quot; Counterpoint also from Bruce Schneier, &amp;quot;If nothing really bad happens -- if this turns out to be something like the Y2K bug -- then we are going to face criticisms of crying wolf.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
According to Codenomicon [http://heartbleed.com/], &amp;quot;There is no total of 64 kilobytes limitation to the attack, that limit applies only to a single heartbeat. Attacker can either keep reconnecting or during an active TLS connection keep requesting arbitrary number of 64 kilobyte chunks of memory content until enough secrets are revealed.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
= Impact of the Vulnerability =&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This vulnerability allows an attacker to extract memory contents from the webserver through the vulnerability in the heartbeat. As a result an attacker may be able to access sensitive information such as the private keys used for SSL/TLS.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Active Attack''' - Equipped with the private key, an attacker can silently monitor and decrypt communications between the user and the web server. As a result, an attacker could view private data such as passwords, credit card data, medical records and any other sensitive data the user exchanges with the website. In addition, the attacker could impersonate the target website to deliver fake, inaccurate or malicious data to the user.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Offline Attack''' - Some well funded attackers gather large amounts of encrypted data and store this data in the event they can later decrypt the information. Using the Heartbleed vulnerability the attackers could decrypt this information if it was obtained when passed between a user and a vulnerable website. This means that sensitive data exchanged up to two years ago could also now be at risk for exposure to attackers. Note: sites implementing Perfect Forward Secrecy are protected against this particular attack.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Scope''' - 1.0.1 and 1.0.2-beta releases of OpenSSL are affected including 1.0.1f and 1.0.2-beta1. Apache, which uses OpenSSL for HTTPS, is used by 66% of all websites according to netcraft.com.  A study of the TLS heartbeat extension by Netcraft also identified that 17.5% of SSL sites may be vulnerable to the Heartbleed bug.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
= Defending against Vulnerability =&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''What should website owners do?'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Verify if you are using a vulnerable version of OpenSSL.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Upgrade OpenSSL as soon as possible. OpenSSL 1.0.1g was released on April 7, 2014 (https://www.openssl.org/source/).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Reissue your security certificates for SSL/TLS. The vulnerability has been present for two years and there is no way to verify if your private key has been compromised as a result of this vulnerability. In addition, a compromised key would be used to silently monitor communications from your users and the attack would be undetectable. It is prudent to assume a breach and proactively reissue security certificates.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Implement Perfect Forward Secrecy. This additional layer of security protects encrypted data from several potential attacks by using a per session random keys. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''What should users do?'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Unfortunately there’s not much a user can do. If you have an account at one of the many large websites that may have been affected, you can proactively change your password just to be safe. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
According to Errata Security [http://blog.erratasec.com/2014/04/yes-you-might-have-to-change-your.html#.U0blvq1dWv0], &amp;quot;The only passwords you need to change would be ones that you entered in the last couple of days. Personally, I haven't entered any passwords over the last couple days, so I don't need to change any passwords.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
= Links for More Information =&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Heartbleed page from Codenomicon [http://heartbleed.com/]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Test a website's vulnerability here [http://filippo.io/Heartbleed/]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Blog post from Michael Coates [[http://blog.shapesecurity.com/heartbleed-bug-places-encrypted-user-data-and-webservers-at-risk]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
XKCD cartoon [https://xkcd.com/1353]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Vulnerability]]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Neal Mueller</name></author>	</entry>

	<entry>
		<id>https://wiki.owasp.org/index.php?title=File:Heartbleed.png&amp;diff=172303</id>
		<title>File:Heartbleed.png</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://wiki.owasp.org/index.php?title=File:Heartbleed.png&amp;diff=172303"/>
				<updated>2014-04-10T19:02:41Z</updated>
		
		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Neal Mueller: &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Neal Mueller</name></author>	</entry>

	<entry>
		<id>https://wiki.owasp.org/index.php?title=Heartbleed_Bug&amp;diff=172302</id>
		<title>Heartbleed Bug</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://wiki.owasp.org/index.php?title=Heartbleed_Bug&amp;diff=172302"/>
				<updated>2014-04-10T18:58:48Z</updated>
		
		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Neal Mueller: &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;[[File:http://www.clickondetroit.com/image/view/-/25397200/medRes/1/-/maxh/360/maxw/640/-/14inmduz/-/Heartbleed-security-flaw-jpg.jpg]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
= Introduction =&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Heartbleed is a catastrophic bug in OpenSSL, announced in April 2014.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
= About the Name =&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Like most major vulnerabilities, this major vulnerability is well branded. It gets it's name from the heart beat function between client and server. According to Dan Kaminsky [https://itunes.apple.com/us/podcast/apm-marketplace-tech-report/id73330855], &amp;quot;When you are communicating with another computer, sometimes you have a pulse message that says 'yes I'm still here'. This is a heart beat. In this particular case there is the possibility to leak information from the heartbeat, so you don't just know that someone is on the other side, you know something about them. In this case, you know too much. There's a bleeding of information from the heartbeat.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
= Timing = &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''What's known:'''&lt;br /&gt;
The vulnerability became public on April 7, 2014 after being independently discovered by Google Security and Codenomicon. &lt;br /&gt;
The vulnerability was widely reported on April 9, 2014.&lt;br /&gt;
The vulnerable versions have been widely used for two years.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Has this been abused in the wild? '''&lt;br /&gt;
We don't know. Security community should deploy TLS/DTLS honeypots that entrap attackers and to alert about exploitation attempts. According to Bruce Schneier, [https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2014/04/heartbleed.html] &amp;quot;The real question is whether or not someone deliberately inserted this bug into OpenSSL, and has had two years of unfettered access to everything. My guess is accident, but I have no proof.&amp;quot; According to EFF, intelligence agencies may have been using heartbleed in November 2013. Source: [https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/04/wild-heart-were-intelligence-agencies-using-heartbleed-november-2013]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
= Severity =&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
According to Bruce Schneier [https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2014/04/heartbleed.html], &amp;quot;Catastrophic is the right word. On the scale of 1 to 10, this is an 11.&amp;quot; Counterpoint also from Bruce Schneier, &amp;quot;If nothing really bad happens -- if this turns out to be something like the Y2K bug -- then we are going to face criticisms of crying wolf.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
According to Codenomicon [http://heartbleed.com/], &amp;quot;There is no total of 64 kilobytes limitation to the attack, that limit applies only to a single heartbeat. Attacker can either keep reconnecting or during an active TLS connection keep requesting arbitrary number of 64 kilobyte chunks of memory content until enough secrets are revealed.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
= Impact of the Vulnerability =&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This vulnerability allows an attacker to extract memory contents from the webserver through the vulnerability in the heartbeat. As a result an attacker may be able to access sensitive information such as the private keys used for SSL/TLS.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Active Attack''' - Equipped with the private key, an attacker can silently monitor and decrypt communications between the user and the web server. As a result, an attacker could view private data such as passwords, credit card data, medical records and any other sensitive data the user exchanges with the website. In addition, the attacker could impersonate the target website to deliver fake, inaccurate or malicious data to the user.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Offline Attack''' - Some well funded attackers gather large amounts of encrypted data and store this data in the event they can later decrypt the information. Using the Heartbleed vulnerability the attackers could decrypt this information if it was obtained when passed between a user and a vulnerable website. This means that sensitive data exchanged up to two years ago could also now be at risk for exposure to attackers. Note: sites implementing Perfect Forward Secrecy are protected against this particular attack.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Scope''' - 1.0.1 and 1.0.2-beta releases of OpenSSL are affected including 1.0.1f and 1.0.2-beta1. Apache, which uses OpenSSL for HTTPS, is used by 66% of all websites according to netcraft.com.  A study of the TLS heartbeat extension by Netcraft also identified that 17.5% of SSL sites may be vulnerable to the Heartbleed bug.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
= Defending against Vulnerability =&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''What should website owners do?'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Verify if you are using a vulnerable version of OpenSSL.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Upgrade OpenSSL as soon as possible. OpenSSL 1.0.1g was released on April 7, 2014 (https://www.openssl.org/source/).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Reissue your security certificates for SSL/TLS. The vulnerability has been present for two years and there is no way to verify if your private key has been compromised as a result of this vulnerability. In addition, a compromised key would be used to silently monitor communications from your users and the attack would be undetectable. It is prudent to assume a breach and proactively reissue security certificates.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Implement Perfect Forward Secrecy. This additional layer of security protects encrypted data from several potential attacks by using a per session random keys. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''What should users do?'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Unfortunately there’s not much a user can do. If you have an account at one of the many large websites that may have been affected, you can proactively change your password just to be safe. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
According to Errata Security [http://blog.erratasec.com/2014/04/yes-you-might-have-to-change-your.html#.U0blvq1dWv0], &amp;quot;The only passwords you need to change would be ones that you entered in the last couple of days. Personally, I haven't entered any passwords over the last couple days, so I don't need to change any passwords.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
= Links for More Information =&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Heartbleed page from Codenomicon [http://heartbleed.com/]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Test a website's vulnerability here [http://filippo.io/Heartbleed/]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Blog post from Michael Coates [[http://blog.shapesecurity.com/heartbleed-bug-places-encrypted-user-data-and-webservers-at-risk]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
XKCD cartoon [https://xkcd.com/1353]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Vulnerability]]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Neal Mueller</name></author>	</entry>

	<entry>
		<id>https://wiki.owasp.org/index.php?title=Heartbleed_Bug&amp;diff=172293</id>
		<title>Heartbleed Bug</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://wiki.owasp.org/index.php?title=Heartbleed_Bug&amp;diff=172293"/>
				<updated>2014-04-10T18:43:18Z</updated>
		
		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Neal Mueller: &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;= Introduction =&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Heartbleed is a catastrophic bug in OpenSSL, announced in April 2014.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
= About the Name =&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Like most major vulnerabilities, this major vulnerability is well branded. It gets it's name from the heart beat function between client and server. According to Dan Kaminsky [https://itunes.apple.com/us/podcast/apm-marketplace-tech-report/id73330855], &amp;quot;When you are communicating with another computer, sometimes you have a pulse message that says 'yes I'm still here'. This is a heart beat. In this particular case there is the possibility to leak information from the heartbeat, so you don't just know that someone is on the other side, you know something about them. In this case, you know too much. There's a bleeding of information from the heartbeat.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
= Timing = &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''What's known:'''&lt;br /&gt;
The vulnerability became public on April 7, 2014 after being independently discovered by Google Security and Codenomicon. &lt;br /&gt;
The vulnerability was widely reported on April 9, 2014.&lt;br /&gt;
The vulnerable versions have been widely used for two years.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Has this been abused in the wild? '''&lt;br /&gt;
We don't know. Security community should deploy TLS/DTLS honeypots that entrap attackers and to alert about exploitation attempts. According to Bruce Schneier, [https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2014/04/heartbleed.html] &amp;quot;The real question is whether or not someone deliberately inserted this bug into OpenSSL, and has had two years of unfettered access to everything. My guess is accident, but I have no proof.&amp;quot; According to EFF, intelligence agencies may have been using heartbleed in November 2013. Source: [https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/04/wild-heart-were-intelligence-agencies-using-heartbleed-november-2013]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
= Severity =&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
According to Bruce Schneier [https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2014/04/heartbleed.html], &amp;quot;Catastrophic is the right word. On the scale of 1 to 10, this is an 11.&amp;quot; Counterpoint also from Bruce Schneier, &amp;quot;If nothing really bad happens -- if this turns out to be something like the Y2K bug -- then we are going to face criticisms of crying wolf.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
According to Codenomicon [http://heartbleed.com/], &amp;quot;There is no total of 64 kilobytes limitation to the attack, that limit applies only to a single heartbeat. Attacker can either keep reconnecting or during an active TLS connection keep requesting arbitrary number of 64 kilobyte chunks of memory content until enough secrets are revealed.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
= Impact of the Vulnerability =&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This vulnerability allows an attacker to extract memory contents from the webserver through the vulnerability in the heartbeat. As a result an attacker may be able to access sensitive information such as the private keys used for SSL/TLS.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Active Attack''' - Equipped with the private key, an attacker can silently monitor and decrypt communications between the user and the web server. As a result, an attacker could view private data such as passwords, credit card data, medical records and any other sensitive data the user exchanges with the website. In addition, the attacker could impersonate the target website to deliver fake, inaccurate or malicious data to the user.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Offline Attack''' - Some well funded attackers gather large amounts of encrypted data and store this data in the event they can later decrypt the information. Using the Heartbleed vulnerability the attackers could decrypt this information if it was obtained when passed between a user and a vulnerable website. This means that sensitive data exchanged up to two years ago could also now be at risk for exposure to attackers. Note: sites implementing Perfect Forward Secrecy are protected against this particular attack.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Scope''' - 1.0.1 and 1.0.2-beta releases of OpenSSL are affected including 1.0.1f and 1.0.2-beta1. Apache, which uses OpenSSL for HTTPS, is used by 66% of all websites according to netcraft.com.  A study of the TLS heartbeat extension by Netcraft also identified that 17.5% of SSL sites may be vulnerable to the Heartbleed bug.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
= Defending against Vulnerability =&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''What should website owners do?'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Verify if you are using a vulnerable version of OpenSSL.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Upgrade OpenSSL as soon as possible. OpenSSL 1.0.1g was released on April 7, 2014 (https://www.openssl.org/source/).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Reissue your security certificates for SSL/TLS. The vulnerability has been present for two years and there is no way to verify if your private key has been compromised as a result of this vulnerability. In addition, a compromised key would be used to silently monitor communications from your users and the attack would be undetectable. It is prudent to assume a breach and proactively reissue security certificates.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Implement Perfect Forward Secrecy. This additional layer of security protects encrypted data from several potential attacks by using a per session random keys. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''What should users do?'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Unfortunately there’s not much a user can do. If you have an account at one of the many large websites that may have been affected, you can proactively change your password just to be safe. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
According to Errata Security [http://blog.erratasec.com/2014/04/yes-you-might-have-to-change-your.html#.U0blvq1dWv0], &amp;quot;The only passwords you need to change would be ones that you entered in the last couple of days. Personally, I haven't entered any passwords over the last couple days, so I don't need to change any passwords.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
= Links for More Information =&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Heartbleed page from Codenomicon [http://heartbleed.com/]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Test a website's vulnerability here [http://filippo.io/Heartbleed/]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Blog post from Michael Coates [[http://blog.shapesecurity.com/heartbleed-bug-places-encrypted-user-data-and-webservers-at-risk]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
XKCD cartoon [https://xkcd.com/1353]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Vulnerability]]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Neal Mueller</name></author>	</entry>

	<entry>
		<id>https://wiki.owasp.org/index.php?title=Heartbleed_Bug&amp;diff=172292</id>
		<title>Heartbleed Bug</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://wiki.owasp.org/index.php?title=Heartbleed_Bug&amp;diff=172292"/>
				<updated>2014-04-10T18:41:13Z</updated>
		
		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Neal Mueller: &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;= Introduction =&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Heartbleed is a catastrophic bug in OpenSSL, announced in April 2014.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
= About the Name =&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Like most major vulnerabilities, this major vulnerability is well branded. It gets it's name from the heart beat function between client and server. According to Dan Kaminsky [https://itunes.apple.com/us/podcast/apm-marketplace-tech-report/id73330855], &amp;quot;When you are communicating with another computer, sometimes you have a pulse message that says 'yes I'm still here'. This is a heart beat. In this particular case there is the possibility to leak information from the heartbeat, so you don't just know that someone is on the other side, you know something about them. In this case, you know too much. There's a bleeding of information from the heartbeat.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
= Timing = &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''What's known:'''&lt;br /&gt;
The vulnerability became public on April 7, 2014 after being independently discovered by Google Security and Codenomicon. &lt;br /&gt;
The vulnerability was widely reported on April 9, 2014.&lt;br /&gt;
The vulnerable versions have been widely used for two years.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Has this been abused in the wild? '''&lt;br /&gt;
We don't know. Security community should deploy TLS/DTLS honeypots that entrap attackers and to alert about exploitation attempts. According to Bruce Schneier, [https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2014/04/heartbleed.html] &amp;quot;The real question is whether or not someone deliberately inserted this bug into OpenSSL, and has had two years of unfettered access to everything. My guess is accident, but I have no proof.&amp;quot; According to EFF, intelligence agencies may have been using heartbleed in November 2013. Source: [https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/04/wild-heart-were-intelligence-agencies-using-heartbleed-november-2013]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
= Severity =&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
According to Bruce Schneier [https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2014/04/heartbleed.html], &amp;quot;Catastrophic is the right word. On the scale of 1 to 10, this is an 11.&amp;quot; Counterpoint also from Bruce Schneier, &amp;quot;If nothing really bad happens -- if this turns out to be something like the Y2K bug -- then we are going to face criticisms of crying wolf.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
According to Codenomicon [http://heartbleed.com/], &amp;quot;There is no total of 64 kilobytes limitation to the attack, that limit applies only to a single heartbeat. Attacker can either keep reconnecting or during an active TLS connection keep requesting arbitrary number of 64 kilobyte chunks of memory content until enough secrets are revealed.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
= Impact of the Vulnerability =&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This vulnerability allows an attacker to extract memory contents from the webserver through the vulnerability in the heartbeat. As a result an attacker may be able to access sensitive information such as the private keys used for SSL/TLS.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Active Attack''' - Equipped with the private key, an attacker can silently monitor and decrypt communications between the user and the web server. As a result, an attacker could view private data such as passwords, credit card data, medical records and any other sensitive data the user exchanges with the website. In addition, the attacker could impersonate the target website to deliver fake, inaccurate or malicious data to the user.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Offline Attack''' - Some well funded attackers gather large amounts of encrypted data and store this data in the event they can later decrypt the information. Using the Heartbleed vulnerability the attackers could decrypt this information if it was obtained when passed between a user and a vulnerable website. This means that sensitive data exchanged up to two years ago could also now be at risk for exposure to attackers. Note: sites implementing Perfect Forward Secrecy are protected against this particular attack.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Scope''' - 1.0.1 and 1.0.2-beta releases of OpenSSL are affected including 1.0.1f and 1.0.2-beta1. Apache, which uses OpenSSL for HTTPS, is used by 66% of all websites according to netcraft.com.  A study of the TLS heartbeat extension by Netcraft also identified that 17.5% of SSL sites may be vulnerable to the Heartbleed bug.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
= Defending against Vulnerability =&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''What should website owners do?'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Verify if you are using a vulnerable version of OpenSSL.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Upgrade OpenSSL as soon as possible. OpenSSL 1.0.1g was released on April 7, 2014 (https://www.openssl.org/source/).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Reissue your security certificates for SSL/TLS. The vulnerability has been present for two years and there is no way to verify if your private key has been compromised as a result of this vulnerability. In addition, a compromised key would be used to silently monitor communications from your users and the attack would be undetectable. It is prudent to assume a breach and proactively reissue security certificates.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Implement Perfect Forward Secrecy. This additional layer of security protects encrypted data from several potential attacks by using a per session random keys. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''What should users do?'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Unfortunately there’s not much a user can do. If you have an account at one of the many large websites that may have been affected, you can proactively change your password just to be safe. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
According to Errata Security [http://blog.erratasec.com/2014/04/yes-you-might-have-to-change-your.html#.U0blvq1dWv0], &amp;quot;The only passwords you need to change would be ones that you entered in the last couple of days. Personally, I haven't entered any passwords over the last couple days, so I don't need to change any passwords.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
= Links for More Information =&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Heartbleed page from Codenomicon [http://heartbleed.com/]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Test a website's vulnerability here [http://filippo.io/Heartbleed/]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Blog post from Michael Coates [[http://blog.shapesecurity.com/heartbleed-bug-places-encrypted-user-data-and-webservers-at-risk]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
XKCD cartoon [https://xkcd.com/1353]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Neal Mueller</name></author>	</entry>

	<entry>
		<id>https://wiki.owasp.org/index.php?title=Heartbleed_Bug&amp;diff=172291</id>
		<title>Heartbleed Bug</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://wiki.owasp.org/index.php?title=Heartbleed_Bug&amp;diff=172291"/>
				<updated>2014-04-10T18:29:38Z</updated>
		
		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Neal Mueller: &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;= Introduction =&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Heartbleed is a catastrophic bug in OpenSSL, announced in April 2014.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
= About the Name =&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Like most major vulnerabilities, this major vulnerability is well branded. It gets it's name from the heart beat function between client and server. According to Dan Kaminsky, &amp;quot;When you are communicating with another computer, sometimes you have a pulse message that says 'yes I'm still here'. This is a heart beat. In this particular case there is the possibility to leak information from the heartbeat, so you don't just know that someone is on the other side, you know something about them. In this case, you know too much. There's a bleeding of information from the heartbeat.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
= Timing = &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''What's known:'''&lt;br /&gt;
The vulnerability became public on April 7, 2014 after being independently discovered by Google Security and Codenomicon. &lt;br /&gt;
The vulnerability was widely reported on April 9, 2014.&lt;br /&gt;
The vulnerable versions have been widely used for two years.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Has this been abused in the wild? '''&lt;br /&gt;
We don't know. Security community should deploy TLS/DTLS honeypots that entrap attackers and to alert about exploitation attempts. According to Bruce Schneier, &amp;quot;The real question is whether or not someone deliberately inserted this bug into OpenSSL, and has had two years of unfettered access to everything. My guess is accident, but I have no proof.&amp;quot; According to EFF, intelligence agencies may have been using heartbleed in November 2013. Source: [https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/04/wild-heart-were-intelligence-agencies-using-heartbleed-november-2013]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
= Severity =&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
According to Bruce Schneier, &amp;quot;Catastrophic is the right word. On the scale of 1 to 10, this is an 11.&amp;quot; Counterpoint also from Bruce Schneier, &amp;quot;If nothing really bad happens -- if this turns out to be something like the Y2K bug -- then we are going to face criticisms of crying wolf.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
According to Codenomicon, &amp;quot;There is no total of 64 kilobytes limitation to the attack, that limit applies only to a single heartbeat. Attacker can either keep reconnecting or during an active TLS connection keep requesting arbitrary number of 64 kilobyte chunks of memory content until enough secrets are revealed.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
= Impact of the Vulnerability =&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This vulnerability allows an attacker to extract memory contents from the webserver through the vulnerability in the heartbeat. As a result an attacker may be able to access sensitive information such as the private keys used for SSL/TLS.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Active Attack''' - Equipped with the private key, an attacker can silently monitor and decrypt communications between the user and the web server. As a result, an attacker could view private data such as passwords, credit card data, medical records and any other sensitive data the user exchanges with the website. In addition, the attacker could impersonate the target website to deliver fake, inaccurate or malicious data to the user.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Offline Attack''' - Some well funded attackers gather large amounts of encrypted data and store this data in the event they can later decrypt the information. Using the Heartbleed vulnerability the attackers could decrypt this information if it was obtained when passed between a user and a vulnerable website. This means that sensitive data exchanged up to two years ago could also now be at risk for exposure to attackers. Note: sites implementing Perfect Forward Secrecy are protected against this particular attack.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Scope''' - 1.0.1 and 1.0.2-beta releases of OpenSSL are affected including 1.0.1f and 1.0.2-beta1. Apache, which uses OpenSSL for HTTPS, is used by 66% of all websites according to netcraft.com.  A study of the TLS heartbeat extension by Netcraft also identified that 17.5% of SSL sites may be vulnerable to the Heartbleed bug.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
= Defending against Vulnerability =&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''What should website owners do?'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Verify if you are using a vulnerable version of OpenSSL.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Upgrade OpenSSL as soon as possible. OpenSSL 1.0.1g was released on April 7, 2014 (https://www.openssl.org/source/).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Reissue your security certificates for SSL/TLS. The vulnerability has been present for two years and there is no way to verify if your private key has been compromised as a result of this vulnerability. In addition, a compromised key would be used to silently monitor communications from your users and the attack would be undetectable. It is prudent to assume a breach and proactively reissue security certificates.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Implement Perfect Forward Secrecy. This additional layer of security protects encrypted data from several potential attacks by using a per session random keys. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''What should users do?'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Unfortunately there’s not much a user can do. If you have an account at one of the many large websites that may have been affected, you can proactively change your password just to be safe. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
According to Errata Security, &amp;quot;The only passwords you need to change would be ones that you entered in the last couple of days. Personally, I haven't entered any passwords over the last couple days, so I don't need to change any passwords.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
= Links for More Information =&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Heartbleed page from Codenomicon [http://heartbleed.com/]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Test a website's vulnerability here [http://filippo.io/Heartbleed/]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Blog post from Michael Coates [[http://blog.shapesecurity.com/heartbleed-bug-places-encrypted-user-data-and-webservers-at-risk]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
XKCD cartoon [https://xkcd.com/1353]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Neal Mueller</name></author>	</entry>

	<entry>
		<id>https://wiki.owasp.org/index.php?title=Heartbleed_Bug&amp;diff=172290</id>
		<title>Heartbleed Bug</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://wiki.owasp.org/index.php?title=Heartbleed_Bug&amp;diff=172290"/>
				<updated>2014-04-10T18:29:07Z</updated>
		
		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Neal Mueller: &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;= Introduction =&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Heartbleed is a catastrophic bug in OpenSSL, announced in April 2014.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
= About the Name =&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Like most major vulnerabilities, this major vulnerability is well branded. It gets it's name from the heart beat function between client and server. According to Dan Kaminsky, &amp;quot;When you are communicating with another computer, sometimes you have a pulse message that says 'yes I'm still here'. This is a heart beat. In this particular case there is the possibility to leak information from the heartbeat, so you don't just know that someone is on the other side, you know something about them. In this case, you know too much. There's a bleeding of information from the heartbeat.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
= Timing = &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''What's known:'''&lt;br /&gt;
The vulnerability became public on April 7, 2014 after being independently discovered by Google Security and Codenomicon. &lt;br /&gt;
The vulnerability was widely reported on April 9, 2014.&lt;br /&gt;
The vulnerable versions have been widely used for two years.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Has this been abused in the wild? '''&lt;br /&gt;
We don't know. Security community should deploy TLS/DTLS honeypots that entrap attackers and to alert about exploitation attempts. According to Bruce Schneier, &amp;quot;The real question is whether or not someone deliberately inserted this bug into OpenSSL, and has had two years of unfettered access to everything. My guess is accident, but I have no proof.&amp;quot; According to EFF, intelligence agencies may have been using heartbleed in November 2013. Source: [https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/04/wild-heart-were-intelligence-agencies-using-heartbleed-november-2013]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
= Severity =&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
According to Bruce Schneier, &amp;quot;Catastrophic is the right word. On the scale of 1 to 10, this is an 11.&amp;quot; Counterpoint also from Bruce Schneier, &amp;quot;If nothing really bad happens -- if this turns out to be something like the Y2K bug -- then we are going to face criticisms of crying wolf.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
According to Codenomicon, &amp;quot;There is no total of 64 kilobytes limitation to the attack, that limit applies only to a single heartbeat. Attacker can either keep reconnecting or during an active TLS connection keep requesting arbitrary number of 64 kilobyte chunks of memory content until enough secrets are revealed.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
= Impact of the Vulnerability =&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This vulnerability allows an attacker to extract memory contents from the webserver through the vulnerability in the heartbeat. As a result an attacker may be able to access sensitive information such as the private keys used for SSL/TLS.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Active Attack''' - Equipped with the private key, an attacker can silently monitor and decrypt communications between the user and the web server. As a result, an attacker could view private data such as passwords, credit card data, medical records and any other sensitive data the user exchanges with the website. In addition, the attacker could impersonate the target website to deliver fake, inaccurate or malicious data to the user.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Offline Attack''' - Some well funded attackers gather large amounts of encrypted data and store this data in the event they can later decrypt the information. Using the Heartbleed vulnerability the attackers could decrypt this information if it was obtained when passed between a user and a vulnerable website. This means that sensitive data exchanged up to two years ago could also now be at risk for exposure to attackers. Note: sites implementing Perfect Forward Secrecy are protected against this particular attack.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Scope'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
1.0.1 and 1.0.2-beta releases of OpenSSL are affected including 1.0.1f and 1.0.2-beta1.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Apache, which uses OpenSSL for HTTPS, is used by 66% of all websites according to netcraft.com.  A study of the TLS heartbeat extension by Netcraft also identified that 17.5% of SSL sites may be vulnerable to the Heartbleed bug.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
= Defending against Vulnerability =&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''What should website owners do?'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Verify if you are using a vulnerable version of OpenSSL.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Upgrade OpenSSL as soon as possible. OpenSSL 1.0.1g was released on April 7, 2014 (https://www.openssl.org/source/).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Reissue your security certificates for SSL/TLS. The vulnerability has been present for two years and there is no way to verify if your private key has been compromised as a result of this vulnerability. In addition, a compromised key would be used to silently monitor communications from your users and the attack would be undetectable. It is prudent to assume a breach and proactively reissue security certificates.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Implement Perfect Forward Secrecy. This additional layer of security protects encrypted data from several potential attacks by using a per session random keys. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''What should users do?'''&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Unfortunately there’s not much a user can do. If you have an account at one of the many large websites that may have been affected, you can proactively change your password just to be safe. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
According to Errata Security, &amp;quot;The only passwords you need to change would be ones that you entered in the last couple of days. Personally, I haven't entered any passwords over the last couple days, so I don't need to change any passwords.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
= Links for More Information =&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Heartbleed page from Codenomicon [http://heartbleed.com/]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Test a website's vulnerability here [http://filippo.io/Heartbleed/]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Blog post from Michael Coates [[http://blog.shapesecurity.com/heartbleed-bug-places-encrypted-user-data-and-webservers-at-risk]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
XKCD cartoon [https://xkcd.com/1353]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Neal Mueller</name></author>	</entry>

	<entry>
		<id>https://wiki.owasp.org/index.php?title=Heartbleed_Bug&amp;diff=172289</id>
		<title>Heartbleed Bug</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://wiki.owasp.org/index.php?title=Heartbleed_Bug&amp;diff=172289"/>
				<updated>2014-04-10T18:28:19Z</updated>
		
		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Neal Mueller: Heartbleed is a catastrophic bug in OpenSSL&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;[[File:http://heartbleed.com/heartbleed.png]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
= Introduction =&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Heartbleed is a catastrophic bug in OpenSSL, announced in April 2014.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
= About the Name =&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Like most major vulnerabilities, this major vulnerability is well branded. It gets it's name from the heart beat function between client and server. According to Dan Kaminsky, &amp;quot;When you are communicating with another computer, sometimes you have a pulse message that says 'yes I'm still here'. This is a heart beat. In this particular case there is the possibility to leak information from the heartbeat, so you don't just know that someone is on the other side, you know something about them. In this case, you know too much. There's a bleeding of information from the heartbeat.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
= Timing = &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''What's known:'''&lt;br /&gt;
The vulnerability became public on April 7, 2014 after being independently discovered by Google Security and Codenomicon. &lt;br /&gt;
The vulnerability was widely reported on April 9, 2014.&lt;br /&gt;
The vulnerable versions have been widely used for two years.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Has this been abused in the wild? '''&lt;br /&gt;
We don't know. Security community should deploy TLS/DTLS honeypots that entrap attackers and to alert about exploitation attempts. According to Bruce Schneier, &amp;quot;The real question is whether or not someone deliberately inserted this bug into OpenSSL, and has had two years of unfettered access to everything. My guess is accident, but I have no proof.&amp;quot; According to EFF, intelligence agencies may have been using heartbleed in November 2013. Source: [https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/04/wild-heart-were-intelligence-agencies-using-heartbleed-november-2013]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
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= Severity =&lt;br /&gt;
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According to Bruce Schneier, &amp;quot;Catastrophic is the right word. On the scale of 1 to 10, this is an 11.&amp;quot; Counterpoint also from Bruce Schneier, &amp;quot;If nothing really bad happens -- if this turns out to be something like the Y2K bug -- then we are going to face criticisms of crying wolf.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
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According to Codenomicon, &amp;quot;There is no total of 64 kilobytes limitation to the attack, that limit applies only to a single heartbeat. Attacker can either keep reconnecting or during an active TLS connection keep requesting arbitrary number of 64 kilobyte chunks of memory content until enough secrets are revealed.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
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= Impact of the Vulnerability =&lt;br /&gt;
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This vulnerability allows an attacker to extract memory contents from the webserver through the vulnerability in the heartbeat. As a result an attacker may be able to access sensitive information such as the private keys used for SSL/TLS.&lt;br /&gt;
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'''Active Attack''' - Equipped with the private key, an attacker can silently monitor and decrypt communications between the user and the web server. As a result, an attacker could view private data such as passwords, credit card data, medical records and any other sensitive data the user exchanges with the website. In addition, the attacker could impersonate the target website to deliver fake, inaccurate or malicious data to the user.&lt;br /&gt;
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'''Offline Attack''' - Some well funded attackers gather large amounts of encrypted data and store this data in the event they can later decrypt the information. Using the Heartbleed vulnerability the attackers could decrypt this information if it was obtained when passed between a user and a vulnerable website. This means that sensitive data exchanged up to two years ago could also now be at risk for exposure to attackers. Note: sites implementing Perfect Forward Secrecy are protected against this particular attack.&lt;br /&gt;
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'''Scope'''&lt;br /&gt;
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1.0.1 and 1.0.2-beta releases of OpenSSL are affected including 1.0.1f and 1.0.2-beta1.&lt;br /&gt;
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Apache, which uses OpenSSL for HTTPS, is used by 66% of all websites according to netcraft.com.  A study of the TLS heartbeat extension by Netcraft also identified that 17.5% of SSL sites may be vulnerable to the Heartbleed bug.&lt;br /&gt;
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= Defending against Vulnerability =&lt;br /&gt;
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'''What should website owners do?'''&lt;br /&gt;
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Verify if you are using a vulnerable version of OpenSSL.&lt;br /&gt;
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Upgrade OpenSSL as soon as possible. OpenSSL 1.0.1g was released on April 7, 2014 (https://www.openssl.org/source/).&lt;br /&gt;
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Reissue your security certificates for SSL/TLS. The vulnerability has been present for two years and there is no way to verify if your private key has been compromised as a result of this vulnerability. In addition, a compromised key would be used to silently monitor communications from your users and the attack would be undetectable. It is prudent to assume a breach and proactively reissue security certificates.&lt;br /&gt;
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Implement Perfect Forward Secrecy. This additional layer of security protects encrypted data from several potential attacks by using a per session random keys. &lt;br /&gt;
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'''What should users do?'''&lt;br /&gt;
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Unfortunately there’s not much a user can do. If you have an account at one of the many large websites that may have been affected, you can proactively change your password just to be safe. &lt;br /&gt;
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According to Errata Security, &amp;quot;The only passwords you need to change would be ones that you entered in the last couple of days. Personally, I haven't entered any passwords over the last couple days, so I don't need to change any passwords.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
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= Links for More Information =&lt;br /&gt;
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Heartbleed page from Codenomicon [http://heartbleed.com/]&lt;br /&gt;
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Test a website's vulnerability here [http://filippo.io/Heartbleed/]&lt;br /&gt;
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Blog post from Michael Coates [[http://blog.shapesecurity.com/heartbleed-bug-places-encrypted-user-data-and-webservers-at-risk]]&lt;br /&gt;
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XKCD cartoon [https://xkcd.com/1353]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Neal Mueller</name></author>	</entry>

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